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A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk                                                                  Abstract 




Natural oil and gas has become one of mankind’s most fundamental resources. Hence, 
the performance of mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) under various conditions 
has received considerable attention. MODUs are designed, constructed, operated, and 
managed for harsh geographical environments, thus they are unavoidably exposed to a 
wide range of uncertain threats and hazards. Ensuring the operational safety of an 
MODU’s system is often a complex problem. The system faces hazards from many 
different sources which dynamically threaten its integrity and can cause catastrophic 
consequences at time of failure. The main purpose of this thesis is to propose a 
methodology to improve the current procedures used in the risk assessment of MODUs. 
The aim is to prevent a critical event from occurring during drilling rather than on 
measures that mitigate the consequences once the undesirable event has occurred. A 
conceptual framework has been developed in this thesis to identify a range of hazards 
associated with normal operational activities and rank them in order to reduce the risks 
of the MODU. The proposed methodology provides a rational and systematic approach 
to an MODU’s risk assessment; a comprehensive model is suggested to take into 
consideration different influences of each hazard group (HG) of an offshore system. The 
Fuzzy- analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is used to determine the weights of each HG. 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is used to identify basic causes and their logical relationships 
leading to the undesired events and to calculate the probability of occurrence of each 
undesirable event in an MODU system. The BBN technique is used to express the 
causal relationships between variables in order to predict and update the occurrence 
probability of each undesirable event when any new evidence becomes available. 
Finally, an integrated Fuzzy multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) model based on 
the Fuzzy-AHP and a Fuzzy techniques for order preference by similarity to an ideal 
solution (TOPSIS) is developed to offer decision support that can help the Decision 
maker to set priorities for controlling the risk and improving the MODU’s safety level. 
All the developed models have been tested and demonstrated with case studies. An 
MODU’s drilling failure due to its operational scenario has been investigated and focus 
has been on the mud circulation system including the blowout preventer (BOP).   
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1 CHAPTER 1: Introduction  
Chapter summary  
This chapter provides a summary of the main purpose of this research and presents the 
background and a brief justification of the need for a comprehensive and structured 
methodology for the risk assessment and analysis of the hazards associated with the 
offshore operation systems (e.g. Mobile offshore drilling units). The objectives and 
hypotheses of the research serve to set out a coherent structure for the research, which is 
aimed at addressing the inherent problems outlined to minimise the offshore operator’s 
risk. This chapter further presents the goals of the study described in this thesis and 
provides a general characterisation of the structure of the work. This is followed by a 
brief description of the research methodology and the scope of the study, and concludes 
with a summary of the thesis structure and its contents. 
1.1 Definitions  
In the course of constructing a quantitative risk assessment model for an offshore 
operation system, definitions of the following terms are useful: 
MODU: Mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) means a vessel capable of engaging in 
drilling operations for the exploration or the exploitation of resources beneath the 
seabed (e.g. liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons, sulphur or salt) (MODU Code, 2009)
1
. 
Mode of Operation of MODU: Mode of operation means the condition or manner in 
which an MODU may operate or function while on location or in transit. The modes of 
operation of an MODU include the following
2
: 
- Operating conditions: Conditions where an MODU is on location for the purpose of 
conducting operations, including drilling and production activities, and where 
combined environmental and operational loadings are within the appropriate design 
                                                 
1
-International Maritime Organization. 2009. MODU Code. London, United Kingdom. 
2
-Source: IMO Resolution A.1079 (28), Recommendations for the Training and Certification of Personnel 
on Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs). Adopted on 4 December 2013, International Maritime 
Organization, Regulatory Guidance. 
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limits established for such operations. The MODU may be either afloat (e.g. Semi-
Submersible) or supported on the seabed, as applicable (e.g. Jack-Up drilling unit). 
- Survival conditions: Conditions wherein an MODU may be subjected to 
environmental loadings in excess of those established by the MODU’s operating 
manual. It is assumed that routine operations will have been discontinued due to the 
severity of the environmental loading. 
- Transit conditions: Conditions wherein an MODU is moving from one geographical 
location to another. 
- Combined operations: Operations in association with, or in close proximity to, 
another mobile offshore MODU or offshore installation, where conditions on the 
other MODU or installation may have an immediate impact on the safety of the 
MODU; for example, an MODU attached to a fixed platform. 
Hazard: A physical situation with a potential for human injury, damage to property, 
damage to the environment or some combination of these is called a hazard (Kumamoto 
and Henley, 2000).  
Uncertainty: A situation in which a person does not have the proper quantitative and 
qualitative data to describe, prescribe or predict deterministically and numerically a 
system, its behaviour or other characteristics is called uncertainty (Zimmermann, 2000). 
Judgements: In the environment of risk assessment, judgements is not simply the final 
decision but is an integral part of the entire risk assessment process with the essential 
nature being the ability to make a critical assessment of evidence (Chicken and Posner, 
1998). 
1.2 Background 
The comprehensive offshore oil and gas exploration and production field is a diverse 
landscape of differing operating and business environments, national regulations and 
numerous authorities regulating offshore activities. The oil and gas industry plays one 
of the most important roles in the world. Oil and natural gas are brought to the surface 
from underground reservoirs through wells that have been drilled and completed to 
produce these fluids safely and economically. Energy exploration and production, 
particularly at the frontiers of experience in offshore operations, involve risks for which 
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neither industry nor government has been adequately prepared. In recent years, the 
drilling of oil and gas wells has presented the industry with many problems, especially 
in offshore operations. The importance of an offshore operation system has been 
acknowledged and accepted for a long time, and substantial improvements concerning 
both design and operating procedures have been made. The offshore industry continues 
to develop new well designs for challenging reservoir circumstances. For instance, the 
industry now emphasises finding and developing the smaller/marginal fields in the 
southern part of the Norwegian continental shelf. In the search for new large and 
profitable fields, the industry moves north and into deeper water. Because of high oil 
and gas prices, new technology for increased recovery, and government incentives, it is 
now possible and profitable to extend production beyond the initially assumed design 
life. However, life extension may results in more frequent critical failures involving 
leakages in to the environment. The outcome of such leaks can be catastrophic. These 
development outcomes in production occur in more environmentally sensitive areas and 
in operations under more hostile weather conditions, and a similar development is seen 
in the world where offshore fields are being planned. In spite of these developments, 
failures still occur and will most likely continue to occur in the future. An analysis of 
past accidents and events has been performed based on the database WOAD (World 
offshore accident dataset) of DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV). This is one of the most 
reliable and most complete databases of failures, incidents and accidents in the offshore 
oil and gas sector. WOAD currently contains 6101 records (i.e. incidents, accidents and 
near-misses). The report shows the geographical distribution of collected accidents: 
3505 in the North Sea, 1685 in the Gulf of Mexico, while only 45 in the Mediterranean 
and 866 in all other regions of the world (Africa, South America, and Australasia). 
Some of the landmark past accidents will now be briefly described. The need for 
continued focus on offshore operation system safety is represented by the gas blowout 
in 2005 on the Snorre tension leg platform (TLP) operating on the Norwegian 
continental shelf (Aven and Vinnem, 2007). The Montara Blowout accident in Timor 
sea Australia was the worst that has occurred in the offshore industrial sector and 
resulted in the third-worst sea pollution in Australian history(Li et al.,2010). On 21 
August 2009, during drilling operations at the Montara Wellhead Platform, an 
uncontrolled release of oil and gas occurred from the H1 well. All 69 personnel at the 
Wellhead Platform were safely evacuated (Li et al.,2010). 
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Subsequently, there was a disastrous accident on 20 April 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico, 
where an explosion on the drilling rig Deepwater Horizon, exploring oil and gas at the 
Macondo well about 60 km offshore from the US coast, caused the death of 11 workers, 
severe injuries to many others and massive sea pollution from the release of 5 million 
barrels of crude oil (Lavrova and Kostianoy, 2011). The fundamental cause of the 
accident was an improper safety culture of the operator (i.e. BP Operator) and its 
contractors (i.e. Transocean, Halliburton). The investigation reports reveal a series of 
organisational and safety management failures that led to the accident. Amongst them, 
the following can be stressed (Graham et al., 2011): 
- Non-existence of adequate hazard identification, in particular addressing risks 
increasing from the frontier conditions and from changes to well design and 
conditions. 
- Inadequate level of detail in procedures. 
- Lack of timely recognition of and reaction to early warning signals. 
- Lack of communication and lack of appropriate training of personnel, especially in 
reacting to emergency situations. 
- Lack of clear leadership, especially lack of a culture of leadership responsibility. 
- Lack of the ability to learn lessons from other accidents and recent near-misses. 
The investigation reports cover also recommendations for regulatory reform, since the 
Minerals Management Service (MMS) regulatory structure put in place in April 2010 
was found to be completely inadequate to address the risks of deepwater drilling 
projects like Macondo. In Norway, the NORSOK D-010 standard describes offshore 
well integrity requirements, where well integrity is “the application of technical, 
operational, and organizational solutions to reduce risk of uncontrolled release of 
formation fluids throughout the life cycle of the well” (NORSOK, 2004). Well integrity 
has always been focused on the design of new wells, but well integrity in the operational 
phase is now of increasing concern. The increased emphasis on well integrity in the 
operational phase is reflected in recent regulations and standards. In Norway, for 
example, NORSOK D-010 describes the requirements for Well Integrity in drilling and 
well operations, while the American petroleum institute (API) has recently developed a 
recommended practice for handling of annular casing pressure in the United States Gulf 
of Mexico (US GoM). Well integrity is also a major concern in the US GoM. A study 
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carried out on behalf of the MMS concluded that more than 8,000 wells in the US GoM 
Outer Continental Shelf experienced well completion leaks (Bourgoyne et al., 2003). 
Ten percent of the offshore wells in the United Kingdom continental shelf (UKCS) were 
shut-in due to well integrity problems over a five-year period (Corneliussen et al., 
2007). The article refers to a study based on interviews with 17 UKCS operators; 
approximately 83% of these operators experienced well integrity problems. This issue is 
therefore particularly important for the study of offshore drilling operation and drilling 
units (i.e. MODUs). Fundamental technology of drilling and production of oil and gas is 
common to onshore and offshore areas, but environmental conditions of the offshore 
field affect facilities and engineering works in the field. These aspects mean that 
processes for life management established for on-shore structures and equipment may 
not be applicable to the offshore operation system, where a different treatment might be 
more appropriate. 
In consideration of the magnitude of the offshore safety problems, it is clear that safety 
studies require continuous efforts aimed at eliminating or reducing hazards (Lois et al., 
2004). The task of safety analysis in this context will mainly concentrate on the 
prevention and/or mitigation or control of risks through the entire life of the project. 
This clearly resides within the concept of safety management. However, it is pertinent 
to note that risk management is not about complete removal of risks but to encourage an 
explicit decision-making process, which will be used to mitigate the potential effects of 
certain risks and facilitate approval for the project. The consensus of opinion among the 
experts on risk is unanimous in accepting the inadequacy of software-only solutions to 
the risk management problem (Raftery, 1993). The trends mentioned above indicate that 
new technology applied in more challenging fields will require continued focus on risk 
assessment and management in the future. In general, the tendency of offshore risk 
assessment is that it is not only used for verification purposes in the design and 
operational processes of marine and offshore systems, but also for making decisions 
from the early stages (Wang, 2002). Risk-based approaches are gaining currency as the 
offshore industry looks for rational, efficient and flexible approaches to managing their 
offshore installations. When applied to MODUs as industrial assets, risk-based 
approaches differ from other approaches mainly in their assessment of failure in its 
wider context and consequences. These advanced techniques provide more insight into 
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the causes and avoidance of system failure and competing risks, as well as the resources 
needed to manage them. Measuring risk is a challenge that is being met with state-of-
the-art technology, skills, knowledge and experience. In the light of the above 
development risk, analysis techniques are increasingly being deployed to assess risk and 
minimise losses in several industries such as railways, nuclear, chemical processing, oil 
& gas, etc. The tremendous benefits brought about by risk management efforts can be 
summarised as follows: 
- Provided better opportunities for collation of reliable data for further research and 
improvement in the area of analysis of risks.  
- Established the basis for making explicit decisions. 
- Discovered the full potential of risk personnel based on skills and experience. 
- Provided clearer opportunity for identification of atypical risks.  
1.3 Aims and objectives of the research  
The main objective of this thesis is to develop a novel quantitative risk assessment 
(QRA) methodology for an effective risk assessment and management of offshore 
operation systems; the kinds of offshore operation systems being considered include 
MODUs such as: Semi-Submersible, Jack-Up, Drill ship, etc. More precisely the aims 
of this research can be listed as follows:  
- To review previous studies undertaken on the MODUs. 
- To develop a novel QRA methodology for an effective risk assessment and 
management of MODUs.  
- To examine the MODU availability and associated risks  
In order to achieve such an aim, a clear understanding of the offshore operation and the 
system boundaries is an essential aspect in any analysis, including risk assessment. 
Offshore operation systems are often complex and operate in a hostile environment. 
They may be more vulnerable to failure and their failure may have different 
consequences in relation to those of their on-shore matching parts. The efficient 
management of these systems and equipment during their life to ensure fitness-for-
service is an important duty for operators. The management includes all activities that 
can affect the life of an asset (e.g. design, manufacturing, operations, monitoring, 
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maintenance, etc.). There are a diversity of approaches to life management demanding 
increasing levels of information and judgement, running from the failure and 
replacement approach at one end of the spectrum, to the relatively more advanced risk-
based approach at the other end of the spectrum. The oil and gas industry, particularly 
the offshore operation, has moved into an era of pro-active risk assessment and safety 
management where the availability of various systems and equipment has been 
enhanced by the application of risk analysis. QRA is a novel approach in offshore 
operation systems, which has developed after the occurrence of some serious accidents, 
emphasising the need to use a risk-based management system in order to proactively 
ensure a strategic and scientific oversight of offshore operation systems. A proper 
methodology for making appropriate risk assessment of offshore operation systems is 
necessary, and the development of an advanced QRA is a vital part of this thesis as it 
sets the foundation of the whole scheme. From this overall goal, this thesis has the 
following lower-level objectives in order to achieve the stated aims: 
- To develop qualitative frameworks for representing the hierarchical relationships 
of components, subsystems and entire MODUs. Frameworks of risk assessment 
are developed based on the concept of an object-oriented approach (OOA) 
(Elshorbagy and Ormsbee, 2006) and characteristics of MODUs.  
- To identify the hazard group (HG) and the concepts of hazard and causing 
events.  
- To develop a method to evaluate risks of components, subsystems and overall 
MODUs failure. The modelling techniques used to achieve the objective are a 
combination of Fuzzy risk assessment method and AHP. The integration of 
Fuzzy risk assessment and AHP addresses the problems associated when a large 
amount of subjective expert judgements is required.  
- To provide a method for assessing FTs and BBN of MODUs. The results of this 
assessment are the likelihood of the occurrence of a specific event and important 
measures of possible contributing causes. 
- Considering the risk assessment as a basis for decision-making and based on the 
above risk analysis results, a multiple attribute decision making (MADM) 
technique Fuzzy techniques for order preference by similarity to an ideal 
solution (TOPSIS) is used to rank the alternatives RCOs.  
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The objectives are also carried out to test the hypothesis of the research. This thesis is 
designed to test the hypothesis that it is possible to develop a new QRA capable of 
tackling a variety of systems in industry, with special consideration placed on MODUs. 
This hypothesis requires historical data, current data and expert judgements to be 
presented in risk-based tools and techniques.  
1.4 Limitations and statement of problem  
The MODU’s field data are mainly obtained from the daily drilling reports that record 
the activities of rigs ordered chronologically. They also comprise records of most of the 
main system and equipment (e.g. BOP, Mud system, etc.) operations at whatever time 
they interact with the drilling unit activities. However, daily drilling reports either are 
not adequate or are not prepared for risk analyses and, in some circumstances, the data 
are incomplete and some aspects of MODU failures cannot be examined entirely. The 
data are principally concentrating on the operations and equipment; also, the data 
concerned specifically with human factors are not available. On the other hand, often 
the information available suggests that aspects of failure may be associated with human 
factors. The importance of human factors has already been emphasised in this research. 
Nevertheless, given the information available they cannot be evaluated objectively in 
order to establish the effect of human error on MODU failures and their associated 
risks. As mentioned above, due to non-existence of data or incompleteness of 
information, uncertainties may considerably undermine the conclusion developed based 
on the traditional QRA techniques. Consequently, the research limitations and problem 
for this thesis are presented as follows:  
- In order to develop a QRA framework, extracting the required information from 
objective and subjective sources is one of the challenges of this research. 
- The process of gathering data, the use of existing data or confidence in expert 
judgements has been shown to be a troublesome process in terms of accuracy (Pillay 
and Wang, 2003). 
- The gathering of objective data in order to apply a modelling technique can be 
difficult as it generally requires many months or even years to attain sufficient data.  
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- The use of subjective data collected from expert judgements can often come in a 
form that requires adjustment with existing data in order to establish a consistency of 
data to give certain confidence in the modelling results. 
- The combining of both objective and subjective data requires elicitation in order to 
establish the data that are required to apply advanced modelling techniques to the 
offshore operation systems. 
Since the objective of this research is to provide a platform for risk assessment 
addressing offshore operation systems’ safety with confidence in circumstances of the 
lack or incompleteness of data, the subjective data for the test cases demonstrated in this 
study are hypothetically prepared by the author together with supervisors and experts 
specialising in the offshore industry. This is because of the difficulty of acquiring real 
industrial data due to many reasons including the confidentiality of data of this kind. 
1.5 Justification of research  
In risk assessment and safety management research, management of the effects caused 
by uncertainty and complexity of systems is an important issue. A hierarchical 
framework is an effective way to deal with complexity. It decomposes the complex 
problem into more manageable subsystems or components, and represents the 
contributions to the overall system by its components and subsystems. Thus, it has the 
ability to perform risk evaluations at both the component and system levels. As 
aforementioned, causes of uncertainty are diverse. Thus, regardless of what approaches 
are to be applied, human judgement is always required to manage such negative effects. 
In other words, the deficiencies of risk modelling resulting from lack of data or high 
level of uncertainty must be addressed up by means of the general evaluation capacity 
of humans capable of grasping the essence of an object, even if it is vague and unclear. 
One feasible way to model such a situation under a high level of uncertainty is to use 
Fuzzy set theory. Fuzzy set theory, formalised in 1965, has been applied in different 
fields. Its application in system safety and reliability analysis could prove to be useful 
since such analysis often requires the use of subjective judgements and uncertain data. 
When dealing with the safety of a system using Fuzzy set theory, the parameters 
including occurrence likelihood and severity of possible consequences can be judged 
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and described using linguistic terms and their associated memberships. Over the years 
there have been successful applications and implementations of Fuzzy set theory in 
industrial engineering (King & Mamdani, 1977). Industrial engineers face many 
problems with incomplete and vague information. FST developed by Zadeh (1965) is an 
excellent tool to solve these problems. Kahraman (2006) presents some application 
examples of Fuzzy sets in different areas of industrial engineering which Fuzzy set 
theory can contribute. These areas are Fuzzy control and reliability, Fuzzy engineering 
economics and investment analyses, Fuzzy group and MCDM, human factors 
engineering and ergonomics, manufacturing systems and technology management, 
optimization, and statistical decision-making. Washing machine is an example of 
application of Fuzzy logic control in industrial engineering. The conventional washing 
machines required the human interruption to decide upon what should be the wash time 
for different cloths. Agarwal (2007) presents the idea of controlling the washing time 
using Fuzzy logic control and also describes the procedure that can be used to get a 
suitable washing time for different cloths. These Fuzzy variables can then be 
synthesised with confidence using an AHP (Lee, 1996; Chen, 2001; Sadiq & Husain, 
2005; Zeng et al., 2007; Wang & Elhag, 2008) or some other technique such as FTA 
(Andrews & Moss, 2002; Henley & Kumamoto, 1981; or TOPSIS (Hwang & Yoon, 
1981; Chen, 2000; Li & Yang, 2004; Herrera et al., 2005). With the awareness of the 
effectiveness of hierarchies in dealing with complexity, this study adopts hierarchies, 
but based on an object-oriented approach to represent the relationships in offshore 
operation systems, and to develop frameworks for risk assessment. Meanwhile, Fuzzy 
set theory, AHP, BBN and FTA are integrated with these hierarchies to generate 
quantitative results.  
1.5.1 OOA to MODUs 
Firstly, an OOA is proposed in this research to deal with the complexity (Simons, 1982; 
Courtois, 1985) of MODUs and to generate a hierarchical structure for risk assessment. 
OOA is a method that represents engineering systems in terms of objects (Booch, 1994; 
Solomatine, 1996; Ross et al., 1992; Black & Megabit, 1995; Liu & Stewart, 2003; 
Crossland, et al., 2003; Elshorbagy & Ormsbee, 2006). Every component in an MODU 
is viewed as an object, and the overall system is viewed as a set of objects that are 
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interconnected. All risk factors about the components are considered as attributes or 
behaviours of objects. Furthermore, with the generalisation and aggregation 
relationships, object-oriented hierarchical structures can be easily formed to represent 
the whole/part relationships and interconnections between objects in an MODU.  
Aggregative risk assessment is composed of two stages, the component level and the 
subsystem level. Firstly, the diagrams of objects describe the relationships between 
hazards, object failure, and object risks, which thus provide a hierarchical framework 
for risk assessment at the component level. In this hierarchical framework, the risk of an 
object is at the top level followed by its relative failure states, which are at its immediate 
lower level. Hazards or threats are at the bottom level in this framework. This indicates 
that risks of an object are determined by its failure states, which are in turn determined 
by the threats or hazards directly related to them. This research represents each hazard 
or threat in terms of its likelihood of occurrence and severity of possible consequences, 
which are represented by Fuzzy numbers. The risk of a component is thus an 
aggregative measure that is determined by aggregating the risks of threats or hazards 
along the hierarchical structure. Secondly, for the risk assessment at the system level, an 
object-oriented whole/part relationship structure is used to determine aggregative risks 
of MODUs. In this hierarchical framework, the MODU is at the top level; its 
subsystems and components are at relatively lower levels. Therefore, the risk of the 
overall system is an aggregative measure which is contributed to by the risks of its 
subsystems and components along the hierarchical structure. With the development of 
the conceptual framework for aggregative risk assessment, Fuzzy set theory and an 
aggregation method (i.e. AHP) (Leung & Cao, 2000; Bozdağ et al., 2003; Kwong & 
Bai, 2003; Kahraman et al., 2003; Büyüközkan, 2004; Büyüközkan et al., 2004; Erensal 
et al., Huang et al., 2005; 2006; Tüysüz & Kahraman, 2006; Chan & Kumar, 2007) are 
used to produce quantitative evaluations. 
1.5.2 Fuzzy FTA of MODUs 
FTA is considered in this study to represent the cause-effect relationships in MODUs. 
FTA, a deductive reliability and risk analysis technique, can answer the question of how 
the system could produce a failure. With the help of FTA, risk analysts will know which 
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component in the system is more critical and which risk scenario is more significant 
(Pillay & Wang, 2003). Meanwhile, risk contributions and uncertainty contributions can 
also be obtained to support selection of mitigation measures (Furuta & Shiraishi, 1984; 
Shu et al., 2006) and asset management. However, the development of FTs is still as 
much an art as a science. This research uses an object-oriented approach to generate FT 
structures via two steps. Firstly, the diagram is used to generate the FTs at the 
component level. Then, interconnections between components in an MODU are used to 
develop FTs at system level. After FTs have been constructed, Fuzzy FTA (Misra & 
Weber, 1990; Liang & Wang, 1993; Cheng & Mon, 1993; Lin & Wang, 1997; Dong & 
Yu, 2005; Ping et al., 2007; Pan & Wang, 2007) is adopted to obtain quantitative 
results. 
1.5.3 Application of BBN 
Fundamental to the idea of BBNs is the concept of modularity, whereby a complex 
system is built by combining simpler parts of components that are related in a causal 
manner. A BBN is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of random 
variables and their conditional dependencies through a directed acyclic graph. 
Quantitative probability information is specified in the form of conditional probability 
tables (CPT). For each node the table specifies the probability of each possible state of 
node given each possible combination of states of its parents. In general, a BBN is a 
graphical representation of a probability distribution over a set of variables and it 
consists of two parts: 
- The directed network structure in the form of a directed acyclic graph. 
- A set of the joint probability distributions, one for each node, conditional on each 
value combination of the parents. 
The reasons for choosing BNs can be summarised as follows: 
- They are graphical models, capable of displaying relationships clearly and 
intuitively. 
- They are directional, and are thus capable of representing cause-effect relationships. 
- They can be used to represent indirect causation in addition to direct causation. 
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The approach is based on conceptualising a model domain or system of interest as a 
graph of connected nodes and linkages. In the graph, nodes represent important domain 
variables and a link from one node to another represents a dependency relationship 
between the corresponding variables. Given their network structuring, Bayesian 
networks successfully capture the notation of modularity (i.e. a complex system can be 
built by combining simpler parts). Due to their Bayesian probability formalism, 
Bayesian networks provide a rational technique to combine both subjective (e.g. expert 
opinion) and qualitative (e.g. monitoring data) information (Das & Teng, 2000). The 
flexible nature of Bayesian networks also means that new information can easily be 
incorporated as it becomes available. Only the conditional probabilities of the affected 
variable require redetermination. Moreover, Bayesian networks are helpful for 
challenging experts to articulate what they know about the model domain, and to join 
those influences into a dependency network. The graphical nature of Bayesian networks 
therefore facilitates the easy transfer of understanding about key linkages. In addition, 
because subjective expert opinions are made explicit in the formal structure of the 
network, they can be challenged and revised, and can also be directly evaluated to 
determine whether the results are robust. In this research, BBN analysis for the 
assessment of the risk level of MODUs is presented and a combination of a BBN 
technique and an AHP method is used to determine the degree of influence and 
importance of factors of each HG.  
1.5.4 Application of MADM in a Fuzzy environment for selection of the best 
RCO in MODUs 
Due to the complexity of MODUs, conventional QRA may not be capable of providing 
sufficient risk management information. The selection of different mitigating and 
preventive alternatives (i.e. RCOs) often involves competing and conflicting criteria 
(cost and benefit), which requires sophisticated decision-making methods. The decision-
making in this study is the analysis of multiple objectives that have both a quantitative 
and a qualitative nature. It is obvious that much knowledge in the real world is Fuzzy 
rather than precise. In an MODU ranking/selecting problem, decision data of MADM 
problems is usually Fuzzy, crisp, or a combination of the two. Hence, a useful model 
should be capable of to handleing both Fuzzy and crisp data. Since imprecision and 
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ambiguity in the calculation of a performance rating are incorporated into MADM, 
Fuzzy set theory provides a mathematical framework for modelling them. The research 
method employed is a Fuzzy TOPSIS approach (Zimmermann & Zysno, 1985; 
Teodorovic, 1985; Zanakis et al., 1998; Chen, 2001; Yong, 2006; Li, 2007). It is one of 
the techniques that have been developed to solve MADM problems.  
1.6 Logic relationships among the methods 
By using this technique, subjective judgement with uncertainty and precise data can be 
consistently modelled under a unified framework. Figure ‎1.1 demonstrates the logical 
relationships among the proposed methods in this PhD research. As illustrated in 
Figure ‎1.1, in Chapter 3 the object-oriented approach and hierarchy structure are used to 
generate conceptual frameworks for risk assessment and to demonstrate the cause-effect 
relationships for specific risk in the MODUs. 
In the next step (Chapter 4), a combination of the Fuzzy-AHP and Fuzzy FMECA 
approaches is adopted to assess the risk of each HG quantitatively and to identify the 
most critical hazards in MODUs using Fuzzy set theory. Fuzzy sets are used to 
represent likelihood, severity, vulnerability and risk associated with each hazard, AHP 
is used to obtain risk levels of events, HGs, and the overall system by performing 
aggregation along the hierarchical structure.  
In Chapters 5 and 6, Fuzzy FTA and BBN are used to quantitatively evaluate the 
proposed hierarchy structure. Finally, in Chapter 7 Fuzzy TOPSIS is used to select the 
best RCOs for MODUs: Fuzzy TOPSIS is adopted here to identify the best RCO from a 
finite number of RCOs. 
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Figure ‎1.1: Logic relationships among the methods used in this research 
`
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1.7 Structure of the thesis 
The scope of this research is to develop an advanced QRA methodology, utilising 
varying information from both objective and subjective sources. The purpose of the 
advanced QRA is to:  
- Present the relationships among components, subsystem and the overall offshore 
operation system. 
- Estimate risk of components, subsystem and the overall offshore operation system.  
- Identify a HG: an event or a group of events that has the highest contribution to the 
failure of the MODU.  
- Provide the best RCOs for mitigating risk of the system. 
The chapters in this thesis have been organised to express a certain flow of thought or 
line of argument. This thesis consists of eight Chapters; Figure ‎1.2 illustrates the 
structure of the thesis.  
Logically, the structure starts with an introductory platform chapter that sheds light on 
the much-needed risk-based approach to the offshore operation system as it is Chapter 
1. This chapter has outlined a brief introduction relating to the background of the 
research, an introduction of the research principle, a statement highlighting the 
problems currently encountered, aim and objectives of the research, limitations, 
methodology and structure of the thesis.  
Chapter 2 comprises a literature review on offshore operation systems and risk 
assessment techniques that are appropriate to the study of the MODU risk assessment. 
The shortcomings of offshore operation systems’ risk assessment techniques commonly 
applied are measured, providing a critical review for their current practices. According 
to the review, comments are studied to express the limitations associated with the 
conventional methods and to propose possible determinants overcoming these 
limitations. Then the methodology background of the current study is justified and 
briefly discussed at the end of the chapter. The basis behind this section is to explore the 
framework of the offshore operation system risk assessment. The results of the analysis 
serve to explore what has been done in offshore operation system risk assessment, to 
identify the problems generated from the current system, and to verify what is needed 
for the continual improvement of offshore operation systems. 
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Chapter 3 states the methodologies applied in the research and aims to develop 
conceptual frameworks for aggregative risk assessment of MODUs. Firstly, it 
introduces the object-oriented approach and its potential application in categorising 
complex information in MODUs. Then a hierarchical structure of MODUs is developed 
based on the concept of the offshore operation system. Transition illustrations are used 
to represent the cause-effect relationships of risks at the component level (i.e. BEs). The 
proposed methodology is capable of identifying the hazards and possible consequences, 
estimating magnitude of consequences, estimating probability of consequences and 
determining significance of the risk. 
Frameworks of aggregative risk assessment are formed based on the hierarchical 
whole/part relationships of MODU operation systems and also these frameworks can 
provide beneficial information for decision-makers in offshore operation systems.  
Chapter 4 introduces the method to quantitatively evaluate the hierarchical frameworks 
of aggregative risk assessment developed in Chapter 3. Fuzzy set theory is adopted here 
to determine the risk levels of hazards, which are at the bottom level (i.e. BEs) of the 
hierarchical structure. Fuzzy-AHP is used to determine the degree of significance of 
each HG in relation to its influence on the MODU’s failure. By using the combination 
of the Fuzzy-AHP and Fuzzy FMECA, the risks of significant items are quantified and 
the most critical event will be identified for further analysis in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 5 applies Fuzzy FTA to quantitatively evaluate the FT of the most critical 
subsystem or event. Fuzzy FTA is used in QRA to identify the basic causes leading to 
an undesired event and to identify the most critical hazards of MODUs. In the Fuzzy 
FTA method, the likelihood of a top event (TE) and the importance measures of 
contributing factors are investigated. The results of this analysis are used to prioritise 
the components and hazards for specific risks and assist risk analysts in making rational 
decisions.  
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Figure ‎1.2: Thesis structure showing the organisation of the chapters 
`
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Chapter 6 presents a BBN analysis for the assessment of the risk level of MODUs and a 
combination of a BBN technique and an AHP method is used to determine the degree of 
influence and importance of factors of each HG. 
Chapter 7 uses the outcomes of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 to help the analyst select the best 
RCOs for mitigating the risk of a subsystem/event of MODU. Fuzzy TOPSIS is adopted 
to identify the best RCO and MADM is used in a Fuzzy environment for selecting the 
best RCOs in an MODU operation system. A decision-maker often encounters the 
problem of selecting a solution from a given set of alternatives. The chosen alternative 
is the one that most likely meets certain predefined objectives/goals. A MADM method 
provides engineering and management decision aids in evaluating and/or selecting the 
best RCO from a finite number of alternatives which are characterised by multiple 
attributes. Recommendations for decision-making can be provided based on the level of 
cost-effectiveness for each risk control measure.  
Chapter 8 summarises the knowledge obtained from this research as a whole with 
respect to the development of a proactive risk assessment methodology, as well as the 
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2 CHAPTER 2: Literature review, hazard identification and 
risk assessment technique 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the current status of the offshore industry is reviewed, which provides an 
overview of technical aspects of the offshore drilling operation system that is necessary 
for appropriate understanding of the course of the MODU’s risk assessment. This 
chapter also identifies the hazards groups associated with the MODU’s operation 
system. The main purpose of this assessment is to make sure that all categories of the 
most significant hazards related to normal operational activities are identified and that 
measures will be taken to reduce risks, with reference to statistical reports, and taking 
into consideration the events in the chain together with the functions which occur in 
offshore operations for different types of units. It is essential to note that the vast 
majority of events/occurrences happen during the drilling phase. Therefore this needs to 
be taken into consideration for risk assessment purposes. The frameworks of the safety 
regulations and offshore operation safety guidelines are also discussed. The strengths 
and shortcomings of risk assessment techniques currently and commonly applied are 
observed. 
2.1 Overview of technical aspects of the MODU 
This section provides basic information on the offshore drilling operation system and 




Drilling process: offshore drilling is similar in many ways to drilling on land. It uses 
drill pipe, casing, mud, and cement in a series of carefully calibrated steps to control 
pressure while drilling thousands of feet below the seafloor. A sophisticated blend of 
synthetic fluids, polymers, and weighting agents is used to lubricate and cool the drill 
bit during drilling.
4
 Drilling mud and drill bits are used to bore a hole into the earth. The 
                                                 
3
 Oil Spill Commission, Chief Counsel's Report. 
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/chief-counsels-report.  
4
 How to Improve Safety in Regulated Industries What Could We Learn From Each Other safety in EU” 
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mud is pumped down through a drill pipe that connects with and turns the bit. The mud 
flows out of holes in the bit and then circulates back to the rig through the space 
between the drill pipe and the sides of the well (the annulus or annular space). As it 
flows, the mud cools the bit and carries pulverised rock (called cuttings) away from the 
bottom of the well. When the mud returns to the surface, rig equipment sieves the 
cuttings out and pumps the mud back down the drill string. The mud thus travels in a 
closed loop (Williams, 1974). 
Pore and fracture pressure: The weight of the rocks above a pay zone can generate 
significant pressure on the hydrocarbons. The principal challenge in deep-water drilling 
is to drill a path to the hydrocarbon reservoir in a manner that simultaneously controls 
these enormous pressures and avoids fracturing the geological formation in which the 
reservoir is found. In addition to carrying away cuttings, drilling mud also controls 
pressures inside the well as it is being drilled. The pore pressure is the pressure exerted 
by fluids (such as hydrocarbons) in the pore space of rock. If the pore pressure exceeds 
the downward hydrostatic pressure exerted by mud inside the well, the fluids in the pore 
spaces can flow into the well, and unprotected sections of the well can collapse. An 
unwanted influx of fluid or gas into the well is called a "kick". An uncontrolled 
discharge is known as a "blowout". The fracture pressure is the pressure at which the 
geological formation will break down or “fracture”. When fracture occurs, drilling mud 
can flow out of the well into the formation such that mud returns are lost instead of 
circulating back to the surface. Both pore pressure and fracture pressure vary by depth 
(Walsh, 1981). 
Casing and cement: At some point as the drilling proceeds, the pore pressure in the 
bottom of an open hole section will exceed the fracture pressure of the formation higher 
up in this open hole section. When this happens, the drillers can no longer rely on mud 
to control pore pressure. Casing is high-strength steel pipe that comes in 20- to 40-foot 
sections that are screwed together on the rig to make a casing string. The casing string 
serves at least two purposes: (i) it protects more fragile sections of the hole outside the 
casing from the pressure of the drilling mud inside, and (ii) it prevents high-pressure 
fluids (like hydrocarbons) outside the casing from entering the well. Once cemented in 
place, it isolates the wellbore from the previously penetrated formations and serves as a 
conduit from the wellhead to the bottom of the well for drilling and any subsequent 
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production activity. The cement flows down the drill string, out the bottom of the casing 
and back up against gravity into the annular space around the casing (between the 
casing and open holes). When cementing is complete, the cement fills the annular space 
around the casing, reinforcing the casing and creating the mechanical foundation for 
further drilling. This process continues as the hole is drilled using progressively smaller 
diameter casing and cementing. Once set, the cement does two things: it seals off the 
interior of the well (inside the casing) from the formation outside the casing, and it 
anchors the casing to the rock around it, structurally reinforcing the wellbore to give it 
mechanical strength (Thiercelin et al., 1997). 
The blowout preventer (BOP): The BOP is a giant assembly of valves that latches on to 
the wellhead. The BOP stack serves as both a drilling tool and a device for controlling 
wellbore pressures. The BOP stack is connected back to the rig by the riser. The riser is 
a sequence of large diameter high-strength steel pipes that serves as the umbilical cord 
between the rig and the BOP during all remaining drilling operations. In the completed 
well, the BOP stack is a potential barrier that can prevent hydrocarbon flow up the well 
and into the riser. This is done by using either the annular preventers, which can slow or 
stop the flow, or the blind shear rams, which shut it off completely. The annular 
preventer is a large rubber element designed to close around the drill pipe and seal off 
the annulus. Upon activation, the annular preventer expands and fills the space within 
that part of the BOP; if there is something in the annular preventer (such as a pipe), the 
annular preventer seals around it. If there is no drill pipe in the hole, the annular 
preventer can close off and seal the entire opening. The blind shear ram consists of two 
metal blocks with blades on the inner edges. It is designed to cut the drill string and seal 
off the annulus and the drill string in the well below. It can withstand and seal a 
substantial amount of pressure from below. Blind shear rams are designed to cut 
through the drill pipe. BOP rams can be activated in several ways: manually from the 
rig, automatically or by remotely operated vehicle (ROV). Electrical signals are sent to 
subsea control pods on the BOP stack. The signals electrically open or close a solenoid 
valve, which in turn sends a pilot signal that activates the hydraulic system (Holland, 
1997). 
Drilling rigs: There are three types of MODUs, which are used for different 
environment. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, drilling ships are used in the very deep sea 
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(i.e. about 2000 m water depth); for water depth between about 120 m to 1500 m, semi-
submersible rigs are used; and jack-up drilling rigs are used in shallow water less than 
about 120 m deep  (Liao et al., 2012). 
 
Figure  2.1: Drill Rigs: (a) Jack-up rig; (b) Semi-submersible rig; (c) Drilling ship 
(Source: Deutsche bank) 
 
Jack-up rigs have lattice legs that are lowered to the seabed before the floating section 
carrying the derrick is raised above sea level.  
Semi-submersible rigs float at all times, but when in position for drilling they are 
moored and ballasted to float lower in the water with their pontoons below wave-level. 
The drilling rig itself is a derrick towering above the drill floor where most of the 
human activity is concentrated. The derrick supports the weight of the drill string, which 
is screwed together from nine-metre lengths of drill pipe. Hoisting equipment in the 
derrick can raise or lower the drill string up to three pipe lengths. At the bottom of the 
drill string is a drill bit, which can vary in size and type (Williams et al., 1998) 
An offshore single hull drilling ship having the characteristics of a tanker provided with 
a vertical drill well is located near the ship’s pitching axis. A double-sectioned vertically 
adjustable work platform is located within the well and a rail-mounted hoist mechanism 
travels from a position over each section to a position over the main deck transferring 
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gear between the areas. Pressure tanks, ballast water, and drill water are stored in the 
outboard wing tanks of the hull and mud pumps, agitators, and other equipment are 
located in the centre compartments on a mid-deck or fiat. A platform above the drill 
well supports the derrick for drilling operations. A passive stabiliser is provided to roll-
stabilise the ship. Making use of the reduced size drill ship concept with enhanced 
drilling technology enables the contractor to drill deep water wells (Fossli & Hendriks, 
2008, Liao et al., 2012).  
2.2 Introduction to offshore operation risk assessment 
Offshore operation safety has developed from a reactive manner towards a risk-based 
and goal-setting system since the 1990s. It has become an important issue in the 
offshore industry due to public concern resulting from several catastrophic accidents, 
and the introduction of safety regulations. The main objective of these safety regulations 
is to ensure that risks have been reduced to be as low as possible and that the best RCOs 
to be implemented are cost-effective.  
Offshore operators have been dealing with the operational risks for many years and 
have recognised that, in order to achieve a step change in improvement of operational 
performance, there is a need to formalise their extensive knowledge, experiences and 
work practices within a well-thought-out and structured framework represented by a 
management system. The development of an effective management system is to ensure 
appropriate risk management efforts will be consistently applied by people at the 
worksite to manage major hazards and other workplace hazards to ensure safe and 
reliable operations.  
In addition, due to the industry’s competitive nature, it is essential for the development 
of new approaches, proposal of new operational procedures and invention of innovative 
technology to constantly conduct risk assessment and safety management of the 
offshore industry with respect to environment, personnel, assets and reputation. This 
certainly brings new hazards and uncertainties. Therefore, risk assessment should cover 
all possible areas including those where traditional techniques are difficult to apply. 
Consequently, risk assessment has become an essential tool by which to develop 
strategies and policies to avoid an occurrence and formulate mitigative measures. It is of 
A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk            CHAPTER 2: Literature review, hazard  




great relevance and applicability in offshore operation systems due to challenges in 
protection measures arising from the harsh environment. Offshore environments are 
typically known as compact areas enclosing a high density of equipment and personnel. 
In addition, mobile offshore drilling rigs are complex systems having the potential for 
unexpectedly severe consequences during an occurrence. Complexity has many facets, 
most of which are increasing in the systems, particularly interactive complexity. The 
systems are designed with prospective interactions among the components that cannot 
be thoroughly planned, understood, anticipated or protected against. The operation of a 
number of systems is so complex that it challenges the understanding of all but a few 
experts and sometimes even the experts have incomplete information about their 
potential behaviour. For that reason, the development of a variety of novel risk-
modelling and decision-making techniques capable of resolving such encountered 
difficulties is essential. Risk assessment not only determines if the risk is acceptable, but 
also identifies major risk-contributing factors for which reducing measures should be 
applied. To conduct risk assessment for an offshore operation system both the 
likelihood and consequences of potential hazards need to be estimated.  
As a part of risk assessment modelling, the stage or phase of the offshore operation for 
risk assessment needs to be determined. The reason is that the type and placement of 
safety barriers for the drilling phase differ from those of the production phase. In 
addition, in the case of drilling, shallow water or deep water drilling and exploratory or 
development drilling must be identified; for instance, dividing the drilling phase into 
sub-operations such as drilling, casing and cementing helps to better identify the 
primary causes of failure. In the present study, risk analysis is performed for the drilling 
phase, and also it is assumed that drilling is performed in deep waters and for a 
development well. Therefore, both primary and secondary barriers are present. 
2.3 History of MODU risk assessment and regulations and standards of offshore 
operation systems 
The use of structured risk management in the offshore industry began in the Norwegian 
Sector of the North Sea. Use of QRA studies in the Norwegian offshore industry dates 
back to the second half of the 1970s. Several accidents in the Norwegian Sector at this 
time, including two on the Ekofisk field, demonstrated that even this arrangement 
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involved major hazards (Engen, 2009). A few pioneer projects were conducted at that 
time, mainly for research and development purposes, in order to investigate whether 
assessment methodologies and data of appropriate superiority and strength were 
available. The Norwegian petroleum directorate (NPD) issued their “Regulations 
Concerning Safety Related to Production and Installation” in 1976 (Vinnem, 2007). The 
next step in the development of QRA came in 1981 when the NPD issued guidelines for 
safety evaluation of platform conceptual design (Vinnem, 2007). These regulations 
required QRA to be carried out for all new offshore installations in their conceptual 
design phases. These included the requirement that, if the living quarters were to be 
located on a platform where drilling, production or processing was taking place, a risk 
evaluation should be carried out. At that stage, such an evaluation would have been 
mainly qualitative. As part of the approval procedure for a new production platform in 
the Norwegian Sector, the NPD required submission of a general development plan, 
containing a safety evaluation of the platform concept. NPD published a new set of 
regulations in 2001, which replaced the risk analysis and technical regulations from 1 
January 2002. The requirement of risk analysis and other analyses were stipulated in the 
Health, Environment and safety (HES) Management regulations. These regulations have 
requirements for analysis of risk as well as requirements for the definition of risk 
acceptance criteria. The NPD was divided into two organisations from 1 January 2004 
and its safety division was separated as a new organisation, namely the Petroleum 
Safety Authority (PSA). The HES management regulations were controlled by the PSA. 
The SCRs were modified in 2005 and these revisions came into force from 5 April 2006 
(Aven and Vinnem, 2007). The resulting studies became known as Concept safety 
evaluations (CSE). The CSE is a form of overall risk assessment of a platform, 
addressing the risk of impairment of safety functions. 
In the UK sector prior to Piper Alpha, QRA tended to be applied to specific aspects of 
the design, rather than to overall risks. Consequently, it was mainly used as part of the 
detailed design when the scope for changes was limited. The Piper Alpha accident in 
1988 tragically disproved that the major accident predictions which risk analysts had 
made were indeed realistic, and it was then felt that QRA could be useful in trying to 
reduce the risks.  
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QRA techniques were then applied to many platforms in the UK sector, as operators 
attempted to discover the extent of their exposure to fire and explosion hazards. QRA 
was found to be an appropriate tool for evaluating the relevant hazards (e.g. fire and 
explosion, dropped objects, etc.). As a result of this activity, significant reductions of 
risk were achieved on many platforms by moving or installing isolation valves on risers 
and sub-sea pipelines, and by relocating accommodation in extreme cases. The 
influential Lord Cullen Report on the Piper Alpha accident recommended a major 
change to a more modern system of safety regulation in the UK sector, symbolised by 
the transfer of responsibility to the health & safety executive (HSE) (Miller, 1991). The 
effects were not confined to the UK sector, because multi-national oil companies 
applied similar safety evaluations to their offshore operations. Thus, in the few years 
following the Piper Alpha accident, QRA was applied to platforms in areas as diverse as 
Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Brunei and Canada (Brandsæter, 2002). 
Subsequently, the HSE Offshore Safety Division launched a review of all offshore 
safety legislations and implemented changes. The objective of this work was to seek a 
more goal-setting regime to replace legislation which was regarded as viewpoint  
(Wang, 2002). In Australia, the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority 2004 
(NOPSA 2004) has issued safety case guidelines. These regulations call for safety cases 
to be prepared for all installations and to demonstrate that risk has been reduced to an as 
low a level as reasonably practicable (ALARP). 
The mainstay of the regulation is the Health and Safety at Work Act, under which a 
draft of the offshore installation regulations was produced (HSE, 1991). It was then 
modified to incorporate the comments arising from public consultation. The regulation 
came into force at the end of May 1993 for new installations and November 1993 for 
existing installations. The regulation requires operational safety cases to be prepared for 
all offshore installations, including both mobile and fixed ones. In addition, all new 
fixed installations are required to have a design safety case in place. For mobile 
installations, the duty holder is the owner. The Safety Case Regulations (SCR) establish 
a clear guidance as to what a safety case should include with respect to the design and 
operation of a particular type of offshore installation. Particular requirements to be 
included in a safety case for the design, operation, abandonment and well operations of 
different installations are also given. An installation cannot legally operate without such 
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a safety case demonstration that has been approved by the Offshore Safety Division of 
the HSE.  
Risk criteria are standards that represent the regulators’ view of how much risk is 
acceptable or tolerable (HSE, 1995a). In fact, risks in the intolerable region cannot be 
justified on any grounds. In the region of ALARP, the risks must be reduced by 
presenting control measures towards the acceptable region. The residual risks remaining 
in this region will be tolerable only if further risk reduction is impracticable or the cost 
required is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained. There is no need to 
demonstrate ALARP in the broadly acceptable region. However, it is necessary to take 
any measure to assure that the risks remain at this level. An accepted operational safety 
case must be capable of demonstrating that hazards with the potential to cause major 
accidents have been identified, and that associated risks have been evaluated and 
reduced to ALARP using appropriate measures. It is noted that since the uncertainties in 
input may be high the application of QRA may not always be appropriate (Wang, 2002). 
Therefore, the acceptance of a safety case is unlikely to rely solely on a QRA. QRA 
only provides one input to decision-making about safety issues, and most of its 
advocates recognise that it cannot be used to make the decision itself. There are other 
aspects, such as public dread of particular sources of risk, which QRA does not take into 
account at present. Decision-making about hazardous activities is legitimately 
influenced by many other economic, social and political factors besides risk, which need 
to be considered simultaneously in the decision-making process. 
2.4 Hazard identification and data collection 
This section identifies the hazards associated with the offshore operation system (i.e. 
MODU). The main purpose of this review is to ensure that all types of the most 
important hazards associated with normal operational activities are identified and that 
measures will be taken to reduce risks. The hazards identified within this research have 
been assessed to establish which ones are considered to pose a significant risk and thus 
require detailed evaluation. Hazard identification is a key provision in the regulatory-
based safety management systems (e.g., process safety management, safety and 
environmental management system). This process includes the methodical, systematic 
A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk            CHAPTER 2: Literature review, hazard  




examination of causes leading to potential releases of hazardous substances and 
safeguards that must be implemented to prevent and mitigate a loss of containment, 
resulting in occupational exposure, injury, environmental impact, or property loss.  
Identifying hazards is essential for ensuring the safe design and operation of an MODU. 
A number of techniques are available to identify hazardous situations, all of which 
require their rigorous, thorough, and systematic application by a multidisciplinary team 
of experts. Success rests upon first identifying and subsequently analysing possible 
circumstances that can cause occurrences with different degrees of severity. Without a 
structured identification system, hazards can be overlooked, so bringing about 
inadequate risk-evaluations and potential loss. The importance of adopting and 
implementing procedures to systematically identify major hazards arising from normal 
and abnormal operations and to assess their probability and severity is defined in Annex 
III of the Directive 2003/105/EC
5
.  
Hazard identification and analyses are mandatory for offshore operation systems (e.g. 
MODUs) that manage hazardous situations, and there are techniques for analysing 
equipment, instrumentation, utilities, human factors and external events that might 
impact on the offshore operations with the aim of identifying what can go wrong; 
therefore, identifying potential systems’ interactions and failures that could result in an 
occurrence. Hazard identification is the basis of risk assessment and should ensure 
complete risk evaluations and adequate protection barriers. While hazard identification 
may be the most important stage for risk assessment, it depends on subjectivity issues 
(e.g., human observation, good judgements and awareness, creativity, expertise, 
knowledge) which introduce bias. 
2.4.1 Introduction to hazard 
In the language of risk specialists, ‘hazard’ is mostly the preferred designation for 
something with the possibility to cause harm (HSE, 2001). A hazard is defined as a 
situation with a potential for causing harm to humans, the environment, property or 
                                                 
5
 Directive 2003/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2003 Amending 
Council Directive 96/82/EC on the Control of Major-accident Hazards involving Hazardous Materials. 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 345/97 Brussels, 31.12.2003. 
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reputation. In practice, the term hazard is often used for the combination of a physical 
situation with particular circumstances that might lead to harm. The essence of a hazard 
is that it has the potential to cause harm, regardless of the occurrence rate of the hazard. 
Hazard Identification (HAZID) is the process of identifying hazards, which forms the 
essential first step of a risk assessment. Hazard identification is usually a qualitative 
exercise based primarily on expert judgements. Most HAZID techniques involve a 
group of experts, since few individuals have expertise on all hazards, and group 
interactions are more likely to stimulate consideration of hazards that even well-
informed individuals might overlook. There are two possible purposes in identifying 
hazards: the first is to obtain a list of hazards for subsequent evaluation using other risk 
assessment techniques. This is sometimes known as failure case selection; and the 
second is to perform a qualitative evaluation of the significance of the hazards and the 
measures for reducing the risks from them. This is sometimes known as hazard 
assessment. Hazards are diverse, and many different methods are available for hazard 
identification. While some methods have become standard for particular applications, it 
is not necessary or desirable to specify which approach should be adopted in particular 
cases. The methodology should be chosen by the HAZID leader to meet the objectives 
as efficiently as possible given the available information and expertise.  
Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) techniques like hazard identification (HAZID), and 
hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies are the tabular hazard methods most widely 
used for operational hazard identification. HAZID studies are frequently used in 
exploration, production, and mid-stream operations, both onshore and offshore. 
However, compared to other worldwide best practices, such as HSE cases for onshore 




Transferring from the identification of hazards to qualitative risk assessment is achieved 
by the use of semi-quantitative matrices, which is essentially an interaction of the three 
attributes of risk severity, likelihood and vulnerability. The exercise amounts to the risk 
                                                 
6
International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC), Health, Safety, and Environment Case 
Guideline for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, Issue 3.3, Houston, Texas: IADC. 1 December 2010. 
International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC), Health, Safety, and Environment Case 
Guideline for Land Drilling Units, Issue 1.0.1, Houston, Texas: IADC, 27 July 2009. 
Dangerous Goods Safety Management Act 2001, Reprint No. 3, Queensland, Australia: Office of the 
Queensland Parliamentary Counsel, 18 December 2009. 
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ranking of these undesired events. The hazard evaluation team must identify ways to 
reduce the consequence or reduce the likelihood of high or medium risks through 
preventive or mitigation barriers to ensure that the risk level is either acceptable or as 
low as reasonably practicable. Although ALARP can be demonstrated for any system, 
regardless of design definition or focus level, complex, costly decisions often require 
more accurate information about potential consequences and frequency of occurrence. 
2.4.2 Major generic hazards list   
Major hazards (i.e. HGs) and other workplace hazards are defined as Hazards with the 
potential to result in: 
- Multiple fatalities or permanent total disabilities. 
- Extensive damage to structure at installation, MODU/rig or plant. 
- Massive effect on the environment (e.g., persistent and severe environmental damage 
that may lead to loss of commercial or recreational use, loss of natural resources over 
a wide area or severe environmental damage that will require extensive measures to 
restore beneficial uses of the environment). 
Table ‎2.1 shows the typical drilling contractor’s major hazards (e.g., toxic release, 
towing incidents, etc.).  
Table ‎2.1: Drilling contractor’s major hazards (typical)7 
 
Source: ADC (2011) 
Table ‎2.2 gives an example generic list of major accident hazards for an offshore 
operation system. It gives a list of major marine accident hazards including blowouts, 
                                                 
7
Reference: International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC), 2011, HSE Case Guidelines for 
Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, Issue 3.4 (1 Nov), Houston, TX.  
Toxic Release Fire
Towing Incidents Explosion 
 Mooring Ship Collision
Major Mechanical Failure Weather / Storms 
Loss of Stability Blowout 
 Structural Failure Dropped Objects
Events from Adjacent Installations  Helicopter Crash
Typical Drill ing Contractor’s Major Hazards
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riser/pipeline leaks, transport accidents and personal accidents. This list is applicable to 
a typical offshore operation system, and may be incomplete for uncommon offshore 
operations. 
Table ‎2.2: An example of a generic hazard list  
 
Source: (HSE, 2001/063) marine risk assessment. 
2.4.3 Accidental events in relation to offshore operations 
As has been dramatically demonstrated not only in the Macondo accident but in a 
variety of other cases, mobile offshore drilling rig activities entail the hazard of a major 
accident with potentially severe consequences to the life and health of workers, 
pollution of the environment, direct and indirect economic losses, and deterioration of 
the security of energy supply. The main hazards include a fire after the ignition of 
released hydrocarbons, explosion after gas release, formation and ignition of an 
explosive cloud and oil release on the sea surface or subsea (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 
2012). Table ‎2.3 illustrates the events in a chain together with the function where they 
Blowouts Structural events
- Blowout in drilling - Structural failure due to fatigue, design error, subsidence etc
- Blowout in completion - Extreme weather
- Blowout in production (including wirelining etc) - Earthquakes
- Blowout during workover - Foundation failure (including punch-through)
- Blowout during abandonment - Bridge collapse
- Underground blowout - Derrick collapse
Marine collisions - impacts from: - Crane collapse
- Supply vessels - Mast collapse
- Stand-by vessels - Disintegration of rotating equipment
- Other support vessels (diving vessels, barges etc) Marine events
- Passing merchant vessels - Anchor loss/dragging (including winch failure)
- Fishing vessels - Capsize (due to ballast error or extreme weather)
- Naval vessels (including submarines) - Incorrect weight distribution (due to ballast or cargo shift)
- Drilling support vessel (jack-up or barge) - Icing
- Offshore loading tankers - Collision in transit
- Drifting offshore vessels (semi-subs, barges, storage vessels) - Grounding in transit
- Icebergs - Lost tow in transit
Construction accidents - accidents occurring during: Transport accidents - involving crew-change or in-field transfers
- Construction onshore - Helicopter crash into sea/platform/ashore
- Marine installation - Fire during helicopter refuelling
- Construction offshore - Aircraft crash on platform (inc military)
- Hook-up & commissioning - Capsize of crew boats during transfer
- Pipe laying - Personal accident during transfer to boat
Dropped objects - objects dropped during: - Crash of fixed-wing aircraft during staged transfer offshore
- Construction - Road traffic accident during mobilisation
- Crane operations Riser/pipeline leaks 
- Cargo transfer  - leaks of gas and/or oil from:
- Drilling Personal (or occupational) accidents
- Rigging-up derricks Attendant vessel accidents
Example Generic Hazard list (CMPT 1999)
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occurred (e.g., construction, drilling, production, etc.) in an offshore operation system 
for different types of unit. It is remarkable to note that events have occurred even in Idle 
function. With reference to blowouts, it is important to note that the vast majority have 
happened during the drilling phase with a smaller number of accidents occurring during 
the operation and throughout production (i.e. 228 vs. 86 vs. 43). It is clear that there are 
lots of drilling events, and this needs to be taken into consideration for risk assessment 
purposes.  
Table ‎2.3: Accidental events in a chain in relation to the function where they occurred 
Source: (Safety of offshore oil and gas operations: Lessons from past accident analysis, 
2012).http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC77767/offshore-
accident-analysis-draft-final-report-dec-2012-rev6-online.pdf. 
2.4.4 Proposed MODU’s HGs 
The first activity is to identify all of the potential hazards to which personnel and 
equipment of the MODU could be exposed. The HGs describe the type of event which, if 
realised, has the potential to cause serious injuries or fatalities. These HGs are the main 
areas of interest as a first step of this study, as it is their direct consequences that have 
Event (s) Construction Dri l l ing Idle Operating Other Production Support Transfer 
Anchor/mooring failure 21 117 16 27 10 13 9 8
Blowout 0 228 1 86 1 43 0 0
Breakage or fatigue 32 141 7 98 23 379 9 70
Capsizing,overturn,toppling 12 44 3 18 8 156 1 43
Collision,not offshore units 17 28 14 2 26 142 1 21
Collision,offshore units 21 130 13 18 51 98 12 35
Crane accident 29 302 4 54 4 251 2 4
Explosion 11 49 0 16 13 98 1 4
Falling load / Dropped object 38 509 4 127 14 403 3 14
Fire 27 195 5 51 43 678 21 10
Grounding 11 18 4 4 5 1 1 40
Helicopter accident 1 14 1 2 1 38 2 0
Leakage into hull 11 17 4 3 8 6 4 31
List, uncontrolled inclination 10 37 2 32 6 9 1 20
Loss of buoyancy or sinking 20 36 0 18 120 27 0 45
Machinery/propulsion failure 1 9 2 0 4 0 3 14
Other 11 65 3 11 226 121 3 6
Out of position, adrift 16 87 15 16 10 4 3 103
Release of fluid or gas 11 240 7 107 22 1499 3 4
Towline failure/rupture 3 1 0 4 0 0 0 102
Well problem, no blowout 0 353 0 152 1 50 0 0
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the potential for significant adverse consequences. Individual HGs are described in 
Table ‎2.4. Hazard Sources are those systems or components which lead to the realisation 
of HGs. Generally, given adequate safeguards, they are not hazards in themselves as they 
alone do not have the capacity to cause injury, loss of life, environmental impacts, or 
extensive asset or earnings losses, but instead require subsequent events to occur in order 
for these outcomes to be reached. Individual HGs and consequences may be the initiating 
factor for other HGs (e.g. equipment failure may also result in various hazards).  
The main steps within this part of the assessment are: 
- To identify the hazards to which personnel and facilities and equipment are potentially 
exposed. 
- To estimate the consequences of these hazards. 
With respect to the requirements, either a qualitative or a quantitative analysis can be 
carried out to study the risks of a system in terms of the probability of occurrence (PO) 
of each hazard, its possible consequence severity (CS) and detection of vulnerability 
(DV). A severe hazard with a high occurrence probability requires priority attention 
whilst that which is not likely to occur and which results in negligible consequences 
typically needs least attention (Aldwinckle & Pomeroy, 1983). 
A proposed list of HGs, with reference to Tables 2.1 to 2.3 and based on in-house 
experience and expert judgements in performing risk assessments, has been used as the 
basis for this hazard identification exercise and is presented in Table ‎2.4. With respect to 
available data and expert judgements, considering a failure of drilling as the most 
undesired among such HGs, therefore the potential consequences of this hazard have to 
be determined and estimated. Drilling failure as a function depends on time and 
procedures, which have a wide variety of human error, natural hazard and operational 
failure. In this study, however, the emphasis is placed on probability estimation of 
operational failure as a significant influence in MODU drilling failure. 
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Table ‎2.4: Proposed MODU’s HGs 
 
2.4.5 Data collection 
QRA is a relatively new technique. In general, there is a lack of widely accepted and 
decided methodologies and approaches and poor circulation of data, resulting in a wide 
difference in study quality. In some areas, the data have not been collected or examined 
and no theoretical models are available so that risk estimates are unavoidably very 
unsophisticated. In other areas, availability of data and analytical techniques are being 
delivered promptly and the risk assessments have a tendency to fluctuate as a result. 





Mooring Failure Mooring failure due to:
- Using of inappropriate anchor handling and inappropriate  mooring system.
- Due to insufficient capacity 
- Uncertainty in the calculation of environmental forces due to wind load
- Potential for failures due to mooring points and abrasion (especially for 
quayside moorings). 
Release of a hydrocarbon/chemical/toxic substance may be caused either by a 
failure of the containment system or due to improper operation of the 
equipment. Ignition of flammable substances may cause fire and explosion 
hazards whilst simple contact with toxic chemicals can be hazardous to health 
and life. Smoke and/or radiation generated by a fire will affect personnel either 
by presenting them with an atmosphere, which is asphyxiating, or by 
obscuring/heating walkways and escape routes and so hindering escape and 
evacuation. These factors increase the risk of injury and death hence smoke and 
radiation are taken as a separate Hazard Group.
Collisions with visiting or passing vessels or adjacent barge may have the 
capacity to cause widespread damage and loss of life.
Fire and explosion/ 
miscellaneous
Proposed MODU’s Hazard Group
In this category both punch through and seabed problem are lumped together. 
There have been several cases when the MODU (e.g. Jack-up) became a total 
loss because of soil issues. 
This covers a number of hazards events, which result in stopping of drilling 
operation, injury, fatalities, blowout and loss of structure.
Drilling failure due to:
- Operational Hazard (i.e. drilling system failure, ring control system etc.) 
- Natural Hazard (i.e. presence of high-speed wind / wave/current etc.)
- Human error (i.e. organizational, management and individual)
This covers the events leading up to the operation delay, capsize and total loss 
of a jackup under and these towing are identified and assessed.
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Because it is quantitative QRA appears to be objective. However, in reality it is a very 
important judgements. These judgements may be explicit in circumstances where data is 
unavailable. There are also many implicit judgements in the analysis and application of 
available data which are often unrecognised. Therefore, it is essential to obtain reliable 
statistical failure and repair data of equipment/components and systems. In general, 
such failure and repair data of components can be obtained from field experience, 
lifetime testing under controlled conditions in a test site and/or laboratory testing of 
similar components (Misra, 2012). However, the collection of such data based on 
lifetime tests of offshore operation systems is precluded as a very expensive and labour-
demanding operation. Extensive use is made of the data collected from laboratory tests 
and field reports on similar components. Additionally, repair data may also be amassed 
from the agreed judgementsal estimates of experts (Misra, 2012). How critical the 
reliability of the failure and the repair data is depends on the aims of the analysis. If the 
purpose of the analysis is to obtain the best absolute estimate of system safety, as may 
be required by statutory requirements, the failure and repair data are obviously critical. 
In such cases, validation of the data becomes as important as the validation of the safety 
assessments themselves, and verification procedures should be implemented to ensure 
that the obtained data for components is reliable. Great care should be taken to use 
failure and repair data obtained from data sets to reflect the environment for which the 
product is designed. When no data for a component failure mode can be obtained, it 
may be possible to express the failure in terms of fundamental and quantifiable 
parameters and to analyse it using limited state reliability analysis (Wang et al., 1993), 
although there is uncertainty about the relevant distributions. It should be noted that, for 
some components, there is fairly close agreement between different databanks and, in 
other cases, there is a wide range of failure rates (Smith, 2011). The latter may be due to 
a number of reasons. For example failure rates are affected by so many factors that a 
variation in values exists and, although nominal environmental and quality levels are 
described in some databases, the range of parameters covered by these broad 
descriptions is large. The following sources may be useful for obtaining failure and 
repair data to carry out QRA. In addition, the reliability data of the various electronic 
and non-electronic components may also be obtained from various published papers and 
books such as Smith (2011). 
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i. OREDA- Offshore reliability data (DNV, 1992):   
This document contains a collection of offshore failure rate and failure mode data 
with an emphasis on safety-related equipment. It covers a great range of components 
and equipment. 
ii. Electronic reliability data - INSPEC/NCSR (1981):   
Published in cooperation between the National Centre of Systems Reliability 
(Warrington) in 1981 and the institute of electrical engineers, this comprises simple 
multiplicative models for semiconductors and passive electronic components with 
tables from which to establish the multipliers according to the environment, 
temperature and other parameters. 
iii. FARADIP.THREE (Smith, 2011):   
The databank is a summary of many useful databases and shows, for each 
component, the range of failure values. The failure data of various components such 
as alarms, mechanical items and instruments is included in this database. 
iv. US Military Handbook 217:  
This database is formed by the Rome air development centre under contract to the 
US Department of defence and is an electronic failure databank. 
v. Handbook of reliability data for electronic components Used in telecommunications 
systems, HRD4 (1986):  
This document is produced from field data by British telecom's materials and 
components centre. 
It is also becoming useful to record and utilise data from near misses and errors. 
Furthermore, to ensure that there is an accurate applicability of the risk assessment 
carried out, novel techniques should integrate expert judgements with the obtained data 
in a formal manner. Engineering judgements and experience is essential to carry out a 
qualitative risk assessment. Measures can be taken to eliminate or control hazards based 
on the information produced from such an assessment. It should become an integral part 
of the offshore operation system process. It may be performed with one or more of the 
following purposes: 
- To identify hazards in design and operation. 
- To document and assess the relative importance of the identified hazards. 
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- To provide a systematic compilation of data as a preliminary step to facilitate 
quantitative analysis.  
- To aid in the systematic assessment of the overall system safety. 
2.5 Risk assessment techniques 
The necessity to improve and continue the performance of offshore operation systems 
has prompted the application of reliable risk analytical techniques for carrying out their 
safety and assessment studies. The importance of these techniques is that the results are 
principally required to quantify risk, and also to facilitate sound risk-based decisions. 
The quantification process also requires reliable failure and repair data input. As the 
results of many risk-based studies have led to their high usage, it is very beneficial to 
apply these risk analytical techniques effectively and efficiently. Thus, the 
understanding of the techniques will aid risk managers and decision-makers. QRA 
utilises what is known and assumed about the failure characteristics of each individual 
component to build a mathematical model that is associated with some or all of the 
following information: 
- Failure rates 
- Repair rates 
- Mission time 
- System logic 
- Maintenance schedules 
- Human error 
- System layout 
 
Typical parameters that need to be obtained in a quantitative risk analysis include both: 
- The occurrence probability of each system failure event. A system failure event 
results from simultaneous occurrence of the basic events (BEs) associated with each 
of the HGs leading to this system failure. 
 
- The magnitude of its possible consequences. The possible consequences of a system 
failure event can be quantified in terms of possible loss of lives/human injuries, 
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property damage and the degradation of the environment caused by the occurrence 
of the failure event. Experts normally quantify the parameters with respect to the 
particular operating system. 
 
The formulation of a system model can be difficult for the large and sophisticated 
offshore operation systems (e.g. MODUs) and therefore requires approximations and 
judgements. Specialist teams who know the operation system comprehensively are 
usually consulted to provide such subjective inputs. While studying the risk assessment 
of an offshore operation system, it is almost impossible to treat the system in its 
entirety. A logical approach may be to break down the system into functional entities 
comprising subsystems and components. Risk assessment modelling of these functional 
entities can be carried out to fit such a rational structure, then the interrelationships can 
be examined and finally an analysis model can be formulated to assess the risk of the 
offshore operation system. 
It is very beneficial to apply risk analytical methods effectively and efficiently in the 
risk assessment process. Chapter 3 specifies how to deal with such problems. This 
necessitates an understanding of the concepts of qualitative and quantitative risk 
analysis and the concepts of top-down and bottom-up risk assessment. A number of 
methods are useful to aid the assessments of a risk-based nature. The appropriate 
technique(s) that can be applied to carry out assessment tasks would depend on the 
clarified hazards, their available data and the stage reached in the analysis. 
 
 What-if method: The purpose of this approach is to examine questions that will 
cause a multidisciplinary team to consider potential failure scenarios and 
ultimate consequences that such failures might create. Some studies of this 
method incorporate checklists at the end of the brainstorming. This technique 
may be beneficial in the problem definition and hazard identification phases of 
the risk assessment process (Menzies and Sinsel, 2000). 
 
 Preliminary hazards analysis (PHA): The first step of a risk assessment is 
preliminary identification of the system components or events that lead to 
hazards, including consideration of the event sequences that transfer a hazard 
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into an accident, as well as corrective measures and consequences of the 
accident. A preliminary identification analysis may provide an essential basis for 
additional analysis of individual hazards, with specific reference to FTA and 
event tree analysis (Sen, et al., 1989). 
 
HAZOP: A HAZOP study is an inductive technique and can be applied by a 
multidisciplinary team to stimulate systematic thinking for identifying potential hazards 
and operability problems, particularly in the process industries. A HAZOP study 
investigates the proposed scheme systematically for every conceivable deviation, and 
looks backward for possible causes and forward for the possible consequences 
(Frosdick, 1997):  
 Event tree analysis (ETA): An event tree is an adaptation of the more general 
decision-tree method. A logic tree diagram starts from a basic initiating event 
and provides a systematic coverage of the time sequence from event propagation 
to its potential outcomes or consequences. ETA has been used in the safety and 
reliability assessment of a wide range of technological systems. The ETA may 
be qualitative, quantitative, or both, depending on the objectives of the analysis, 
and may be developed independently or follow on from FTA. An event tree is a 
logic diagram applied to analyse the effects of unintended events. Such a 
technique first expresses the probability or frequency of an accident linked to the 
safeguard measures required to be implemented to mitigate or prevent escalation 
after the occurrence of the event. Success and failure paths lead to various 
consequences with different magnitudes. The likelihood of each consequence is 
finally obtained by multiplying the probability of occurrence of the accident by 
the likelihood of failure or success in each path (Khan and Abbasi, 1998). 
 
 Cause-consequence analysis (CCA): Cause-consequence analysis is a 
diagrammatic approach and it is a marriage of FTA (to show causes) and event 
tree analysis (to show consequences). Construction of cause-consequence 
diagrams starts with a choice of a critical event. The “consequence tracing” part 
of a CCA involves taking the initial event and following the resulting chains of 
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events through the system. The “cause identification” part of a CCA involves 
drawing the FT and identifying the minimal cut sets leading to the identified 
critical event (Khan and Abbasi, 1998). 
 
 Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA): FMECA is probably the 
most widely applied hazard identification method. It is a combination of failure 
mode and effects analysis (FMEA) and criticality analysis. Once the criticality 
numbers of the item under all severity classes have been obtained, a criticality 
matrix can be constructed to provide a means for criticality comparison. Such a 
matrix display shows the distributions of criticality of the failure modes of the 
item and provides a tool for assigning priority for corrective action. Criticality 
analysis can be performed at different system/subsystem levels and the 
information produced at low levels may be used for criticality analysis at a 
higher level (Wang, et al., 1995). 
 
 FTA: A FT is a logic diagram presenting the casual relationship between events 
which individually or collectively contribute to occurrence of a higher-level 
event. Thus, the probability of occurrence of a specific hazard can be 
determined. In addition, FTA is capable of considering common cause failures 
in systems with redundant or standby elements. It also has the capability of 
contemplating failure events or causes related to human errors. FTA is a top-
down approach, systemically considering the causes or events at levels below 
the top level. Prior to the use of quantitative FTA, the probability of occurrence 
of each basic event has to be obtained. If two or more need to occur 
simultaneously to cause the next higher-level event, a logic AND gate is 
employed to express the operation. If any of two or more lower-level events can 
cause the next higher-level event directly, an OR gate is applied to demonstrate 
such an operation. The logic gates determine the addition or multiplication of 
probabilities to obtain the values for the top event (TE).  
 
 Bayesian belief network (BBN): A Bayesian network is a modelling framework 
that has been used in many applications, such as in diagnostic systems and 
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general reliability modelling (Langseth and Portinale, 2007, Kjaerulff and 
Madsen, 2008). Bayesian networks offer a compact presentation of the 
interactions in a stochastic system by visualising system state variables and their 
dependencies. BBNs are at the cutting edge of expert systems research and 
development and also BBN has caught the interest of researchers in different 
research fields since the early 1990s. Perhaps the greatest testament to the 
usefulness of Bayesian problem-solving techniques is the wealth of practical 
applications that have been developed in recent years. Researchers succeeded in 
creating BBN models for practical applications in areas of intelligent decision, 
safety assessment, information filtering, autonomous vehicle navigation and 
computer network diagnosis. Since most real-life problems involve inherently 
uncertain relationships, BBN is a technique with enormous potential for 
application across various areas. Influence diagrams, which further extend the 
notion of BNs by including decision nodes and utility nodes, have been used in 
human reliability assessment (Humphreys, 1995). 
 
 TOPSIS: Techniques for Order preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution 
(TOPSIS) method is one of the most effective methods and is a widely accepted 
multi-criteria decision-making technique to identify the best solution from a 
finite set of points. (Hwang & Yoon, 1981b). In the traditional TOPSIS model, 
the measurement of weights and qualitative attributes did not consider the 
uncertainty associated with the mapping of human perception to a number 
(Makridakis & Wheelwright, 1983), due to this shortcoming, the logic 
simultaneous consideration of the positive ideal and the negative ideal solutions 
and easily programmable computation procedure is extensively acknowledged. 
The basic principle is that the chosen points should have the shortest distance 
from the positive ideal solution and the farthest distance from the negative ideal 
solution. The biggest advantages of the TOPSIS concept are that it is easily 
understandable, and has good computational efficiency and the ability to 
measure the relative performance for each alternative in a simple mathematical 
form (Yeh, 2002). 
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2.6 Decision-maker and decision-making environment 
Different types of decision-makers need support that is adapted to their problem 
contexts. The greatest advantage of the risk-based approach is its simplicity of use for 
the decision-maker. This is because risk assessment provides direct input to the decision 
as such, and not simply the process of decision-making (Aven, 2010). The categories of 
decisions and their associated decision-making procedures vary a lot between different 
sectors and levels in organisations. One should consider the whole decision cycle 
including the various decision activities to understand this problem area (Power, 2002). 
In general, the typical decision context consists of four elements, such as decision-
makers, decision environment, goals and relevant alternatives and, finally, ranking of 
alternatives.  
The classification of decision-makers has been utilised in different notions, such as 
individual decision-maker, multiple decision-makers, group decision-maker and team 
decision-maker (Murphy et al., 1999). The individual decision-maker stands alone in 
the final decision process. The decision rests on his/her unique characteristics with 
regard to knowledge, skill set, experience, etc., and individual biases come to bear in the 
decision process. Multiple decision-makers comprise several people interacting to reach 
a decision. Each member may come with a unique motivation or goal and may approach 
the decision process from a different angle. They do not necessarily meet in a 
formalised manner to conduct discussions as a unit. In contrast, a group decision-maker 
is characterised by membership in a more formal structure where members of the group 
share similar interests in the decision outcome. Each member is involved in the making 
of a decision based on consensus of the group, but none possesses any more input or 
authority to make the decision than any of the others. The team decision-maker is a 
combination of the individual and group classification. The team produces the final 
decision, but the formalisation of that decision and the authority to make it rest with an 
individual decision-maker. The decision support may come from several individuals 
empowered by the key individual decision-maker to collect information. In this context 
the team produces the final decision, but the authority to make it rests with the 
individual team leader. 
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The decision environment may be both internal and external. Factors in the internal 
environment influencing decisions include (Marakas, 2003): 
- People, and their goals, experience, capabilities, and commitments.  
- Functional units, including the technological characteristics, independence, 
interdependence, and conflict among units.  
- Organisational factors including goal and objectives, processes and procedures and 
the nature of the product or service.  
The decision process typically consists of different basic steps (i.e. define the problem, 
collect information, identify and evaluate alternatives, decide, implement and finally, 
follow-up and assess) (Marakas, 2003). A well-defined problem is of great importance 
for the quality of decisions. If the problem is wrongly or not thoroughly defined, it may 
be impossible to make a decision. The complexity of many organisations sometimes 
makes it hard to identify the real problem. The most creative part of decision-making is 
the identification of the set of alternatives and determining what criteria should be used 
in the evaluation of options. A decision or choice made among alternatives is the 
culmination of one specific decision process. Decisions made under conditions of 
uncertainty are the most common types for managers. Sometimes there is not enough 
information to estimate the probability of the potential outcomes. Thus, it is termed as a 
decision under uncertainty. In well engineering the potential outcomes from main 
decisions are typically known, but the probabilities are not. Uncertainty is then related 
to the restricted information or lack of information on which to base the analyses or to 
reliably estimate the probabilities of known outcomes (Hitt et al., 1983). Decisions 
made under uncertainty are perhaps the most difficult of all decision situations.  
2.7 Conclusion  
In order to ensure the originality of the research study, this chapter has provided a 
literature review associated with analytical methods of risk assessment. It gives 
emphasis to the explanation of applying uncertainty treatment methods and techniques 
to risk assessment and decision-making in earlier studies. The offshore industry has 
been moving towards a risk-based and goal-setting regime since the 1990s. Traditional 
risk assessment techniques such as FTA and ETA are capable of providing results with 
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confidence if historical data are available. The current offshore operation risk 
assessment provides appropriate proactive approaches for ensuring improvements in the 
safe operation of offshore installations and environmental protection, though the 
overriding problem on the handling of the uncertainty issue is still not well embraced in 
such risk assessment exercises, despite the fact that the application of both well-
established and newly developed (e.g., FTA and Fuzzy logic) risk assessment methods 
can be integrated in a transparent and justifiable manner. Some of the analytical 
methods, such as PHA, what-if, FMECA and HAZOP, are most usefully applied in the 
hazard identification phase, whilst others like FTA and ETA are used mainly in 
performing risk estimation. However, they may not be applicable in circumstances 
where there is a lack of data or the information available consists of a high level of 
uncertainty. Therefore, risk analysis in such circumstances strongly relies on human 
judgements. Different techniques including AHP, FTA and BBN can be incorporated 
into risk assessment with Fuzzy set theory to facilitate the analytical performance and 
provide results with confidence. In a decision-making process, many factors need to be 
considered when evaluating the best RCOs for an offshore operation system. Under 
such circumstances where the factors considered have different attributes, the best 
RCOs will be identified using the Fuzzy TOPSIS approach.  
Identification of the HGs, which have the potential for significant adverse consequences 
to personnel, and equipment of the MODU is the main area of interest in this research. It 
is important to note that each HG contributes a different weight value to the overall 
MODU at the system level. As drilling failure is considered to be undesired among the 
HGs, therefore the potential consequences of this hazard have to be determined and 
estimated. In order to establish a platform of risk assessment, one risk analysis 
technique may be used to process the information produced by another. Risk assessment 
techniques can also be used in an integrative manner to produce a more efficient and 
convenient risk assessment. The objective of this PhD research is to establish a platform 
of risk assessment consisting of various frameworks addressing MODU safe operation 
safety without jeopardising the efficiency of offshore operation systems under 
circumstances where a lack of data exists or a high level of uncertainty is present. 
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3 CHAPTER 3: Development of the framework of the MODU 
risk assessment 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the frameworks of risk assessment and hierarchy of the offshore 
operation system are developed to represent the methodology, a framework of 
aggregative risk assessment and relationships among equipment, subsystems and the 
overall MODU system. While studying the risk assessment of an MODU, it is almost 
impossible to treat the system in its entirety. A reasonable approach may be to break 
down the system into functional entities comprising equipment and subsystems. Risk 
assessment modelling of these functional entities can be carried out to develop an 
appropriate rational structure’, then the interrelationships can be examined and an 
analysis model can be formulated to assess the risk of the offshore operation system. 
The proposed framework will be used in conducting an aggregative risk assessment 
despite the fact that the latter will be used in the BBN and Fuzzy FTA in the ensuing 
chapters based on the object-oriented approach concept. 
3.1 Introduction 
The necessity to improve and continue the performance of offshore operation systems 
has encouraged the application of reliable methodology and analytical risk techniques 
for carrying out risk assessment studies. The importance of these frameworks or 
techniques is that the results are principally required to quantify risk, and also to 
facilitate sound risk-based decisions. The quantification process also requires reliable 
operation, failure, and repair data input. In most circumstances, reliable data are not 
available; therefore, it is very beneficial to apply the risk analytical techniques 
effectively and efficiently. Thus, understanding the methodology and using precise 
techniques will aid risk managers and decision-makers. This chapter is composed of 
five sections; this section presents an outline and a brief introduction relating to the 
research and the basic concepts of the object-oriented approach and its potential to deal 
with the complexity of an offshore operation system. Then, in Section 3.2, the risk 
assessment process and ordering action required in order to develop an efficient 
methodology are presented. Section 3.3 aims to develop a hierarchy to represent the 
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relationships among components, subsystems, and the overall offshore operation 
system. In addition, for the components at the lowest level in the hierarchical structure, 
BEs are used to describe the transitions due to the influences of each HG. Furthermore, 
a risk assessment methodology is developed and offered in Section 3.4 and, lastly, a 
framework of aggregative risk assessment is developed up to BEs and is presented in 
Section 3.5. Aggregative risk assessment is used to analyse the risk levels and influence 
of different HGs and events in an offshore operation system in view of their 
contribution to the failure of MODUs (e.g. component/equipment, subsystem and 
system). While FTs are used to describe the cause-effect relationships for a given risk in 
the system, these frameworks are developed at both the component/equipment and 
subsystem levels in order to meet the requirements of a comprehensive risk assessment 
and are presented in Chapter 5. Lastly, BBN is used to refer to the cause-effect 
relationships with dependency for a particular risk in the system. These frameworks are 
also established at both the component/equipment and subsystem levels in order to meet 
the necessities of a comprehensive risk assessment, which is discussed in Chapter 6. A 
Fuzzy MADM method, which is appropriate for considering group decision-making 
problems in a Fuzzy environment, is proposed for ranking of the RCOs with respect to 
cost and benefit, and is selected using a TOPSIS technique. 
The object-oriented analysis is a method that can logically represent real-world entities 
and phenomena in terms of objects. In an object-oriented modelling pattern, analysts 
can effectively manage complex engineering systems. The concept is also effective for 
classifying risk information in an offshore operation system such as an MODU. 
Applications of an object-oriented analysis have covered various areas in practice. In 
software engineering a subject-oriented pattern has been developed that enables the 
modelling of complex real-world problems, and which represents the solution of a 
major problem (Martin and Odell, 1994). This comprises development of a framework 
for decision-making (Liu and Stewart, 2004) and for presentation of pipeline networks 
(Lewandowski and Detroit, 1994). Objects are models which can be used to represent 
real-world entities with the capability of communicating with one another (Booch et al., 
1994; Martin & Odell, 1994; Embley et al., 1992). One of the most important 
characteristics of objects is summing up. This means that the attributes and behaviours 
of a component (e.g., riser, mud pump, etc.) or subsystem (e.g., drilling system, jacking 
system, etc.) are entirely summarised within the boundaries of an independent object. 
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These objects are interconnected to form a system of drilling an offshore well for 
producing hydrocarbons such as oil and gas. The entire system is thus viewed as the 
combination of individual objects with different functionalities. Meanwhile, the 
individual objects communicate with one another in a way that faithfully replicates their 
interactions in the real world (Booch et al., 1994). In an MODU, for example, a well 
can be looked at as a specific object encapsulating the attributes of an offshore 
operation system. Likewise, a drilling pipe in the drilling system can be viewed as an 
object which encapsulates attributes such as dimension, age and behaviour of delivering 
a drilling liquid like mud.  
The overall MODU is thus a compound object made up of interconnected individual 
objects including well, drilling pipes, etc. In a real operational system there are many 
objects of a specific kind. It would be extremely inefficient to repeat the use of the same 
methods in defining every single occurrence of that object. The effectiveness of using 
this approach to deal with the complexity of systems has also been illustrated in detail 
by many researchers (Weber & Jouffe, 2006;, Booch et al., 1994;, Martin and Odell, 
1994). However, its potential in risk assessment of complex systems has not been 
investigated to a significant degree in the previous research.  
All engineering systems including MODUs are designed, constructed, operated and 
managed in terms of objects. For an MODU, its performance is determined by the 
performance of the consistent components or objects. As a result, individual objects 
contribute to the overall MODU. The above discussion shows the possibility of using an 
object-oriented approach as an effective tool to organise complex risk information in the 
offshore operation system. Such awareness encourages this study to implement an 
object-oriented approach to develop frameworks of risk assessment. 
3.2 Risk assessment process 
No common definition of safety barriers can be found in the regulations concerning 
health, environment, and safety within the petroleum activities on the Norwegian 
continental shelf (NCS) issued in 2001
8
, and also no common definition of safety 
                                                 
8
 Regulations relating to management in the petroleum activities (The Management Regulations). 
3 September 2001 
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barriers has been found in the literature, even though different aspects of the concept 
have been discussed, are required in legislation and standards and have been applied in 
practice for several decades (Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2011; Sklet, 2006a). 
Different risk assessment approaches have been applied in various schemes but, so far, 
no approach has been commonly applied for practical purposes. Traditional quantitative 
risk analyses of offshore installation focus on consequence and the main interest has 
been to estimate the consequences of the assumed initiating event, the harm to humans 
and environment, and to assess their frequency; the identification of the most effective 
safety measures to avoid initiating events was very limited (Kafka, 2006). 
A QRA approach for an offshore operation system should be exclusive, in which any 
hypothetical risk to the system can be evaluated to reflect where there may be a need for 
possible risk reductions or design modifications. Such a risk evaluation process should 
follow on from the establishment of an occurrence probability or possibility for the 
defined hazards, and their relative consequence magnitude. QRA can make available an 
effective approach that will serve as the foundation for avoiding further offshore 
operation catastrophes. A quantitative approach for an offshore operation system risk 
assessment should be exclusive, in which any hypothetical risk to the system can be 
evaluated to reflect where there may be a need for possible risk reductions or design 
modifications.  
The purpose of a QRA is to help the designer to be conscious of the characteristics of 
the system and to provide him/her with the quantified occurrence probability of each 
critical failure condition and the associated consequences. The main focus in QRA is on 
technical safety systems and one of the weaknesses of current QRA is the missing link 
between the models applied in the analyses and human, operational, and organisational 
factors (Vinnem et al., 2003). Through risk analysis, it is possible to identify hazards, 
and evaluate and then mitigate the associated risk. Such an assessment requires the 
development of an efficient methodology, constructed upon the following ordering of 
actions: 
- Outline the operation system being considered (i.e. offshore operation system). 
- Classify/categorise the HGs and the hazard associated with those 
subsystems/equipment/components of the operation system. 
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- Data collection and estimation of the likelihood of the hazards occurring and in 
what way each might progress to different consequences and estimation of the 
consequences associated with each outcome.  
- Aggregation of the risks associated with the outcomes to produce an overall risk. 
- Analyse the risk level and check if the risk is acceptable based on the criteria. 
- With respect to the overall risk level, carry out risk mitigation for reducing or 
controlling the risk. 
- Decision-making and selecting the best RCOs. 
Once the above activities are defined, it is then possible to select from amongst the wide 
range of methods for risk assessment (Bahr, 2014). Typical ones include: 
 Hazard identification tools: 
- Judgements 
- FMECA 
- Structured what-if checklist technique (SWIFT) 
- HAZOP study  
 Risk assessment approaches: 
- Rule-based approaches  
(e.g. regulations, codes and practice and classification rules) 
- Engineering judgements 
- Qualitative risk assessment / QRA 
- Value-based approaches 
 Risk assessment techniques: 
- Qualitative (e.g. risk matrix) 
- Semi-qualitative use of structured tools (e.g. FTA, ETA, Bow-Tie approach). 
- QRA  
 Hierarchy of options approaches for risk reduction: 
- Eliminate the hazard 
- Prevent the occurrence 
- Mitigate the consequences 
- Escape, evacuation, rescue and recover 
 Decision-making: 
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- Level within organisation and tools (i.e. senior management, judgements, cost-
benefit analysis). 
Such an assessment process can formally be carried out qualitatively or quantitatively, 
conditional on how much information and data are or have been obtainable / available, 
in addition to the competence of expert judgements that can be provided to the analyst / 
risk managers or decision-makers. 
3.3 MODU’s operational system hierarchy and complexity  
An operational system is any user-defined group of components, equipment, or facilities 
that support an operational function. These operational functions are defined by mission 
criticality or by environment, health, safety, regulatory, quality, or other defined 
requirements. Most systems can be divided into unique subsystems along boundaries. 
The boundaries are selected as a method of dividing a system into subsystems when its 
complexity makes an analysis by other means difficult. Since complexity is one of the 
hurdles limiting the application of conventional risk assessment methods, it is necessary 
to explicitly discuss the potential of an object-oriented approach in dealing with the 
complexity of the MODU. In order to effectively analyse complex systems, many 
researchers have carried out extensive studies on their characteristics. Courtois (1985) 
suggested a few attributes common to all complex systems following on from the work 
of Simons (1982). Such attributes are mentioned in the following parts. The 
characteristics of the MODU make it possible to deal with the complexities effectively. 
Being one of the complex engineering systems, a general MODU inherently has these 
attributes and the following discussion is about the effectiveness of using this approach 
to deal with the MODU attributes.  
 Complexity takes the form of a hierarchy, whereby a complex system is 
decomposed of interrelated subsystems that have in turn their own 
subsystems/equipment/components until some lowest level (BEs) is reached. 
This hierarchical structure also provides a possible framework for risk 
assessment. It is obvious within the hierarchy that risk levels of an MODU are 
determined by the risk levels of its subsystems as well as the hierarchical 
relationships among them. The risk levels of a subsystem are further determined 
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by the risk levels of its own components. Once the risk levels of each individual 
component have been determined, aggregation can then be conducted along the 
hierarchy to generate risks of the subsystems and the overall system. The object-
oriented hierarchical structure depicts the whole/partial relationships in an 
MODU system, which enables us to understand, describe, and analyse the 
system and its parts better (Booch et al., 1994). 
 Hierarchical systems are usually composed of only a few different kinds of 
subsystems in various combinations and arrangements. This attribute indicates 
that complex systems have common patterns (Booch et al., 1994). This is also 
obvious in the object-oriented structure of MODUs. A general MODU is 
composed of some common elements (e.g. gas, wells, blow-out preventer, risers, 
mud treatment facilities, etc.). All these elements are further abstracted as fewer 
common element types such as pipes, compressors and tanks.  
 The collection of what components in a system are primitive is relatively 
arbitrary and is largely up to the discretion of the observer of the system. 
Primitive elements in this study are deemed as the components that are 
indecomposable and at the lowest level of a hierarchical structure. They play 
important roles in risk assessment. On the other hand, the determination of 
primitive elements is arbitrary and depends a lot on the observers of the system 
because they have different choices of what components are primitive in 
practical risk assessment. 
 Definition of the subsystem/components’ relationships. This information has the 
effect of separating the high-frequency dynamics of the components, involving 
the internal structure of the components, from the low-frequency dynamics 
involving interaction among components. This provides a clear picture of 
separating various parts of an MODU, which makes it possible to study risk 
levels of each part in relative isolation.  
 A complex system designed from scratch never works and cannot be patched up 
to make it work, and a complex system that works is invariably found to have 
evolved from a simple system that worked. This attribute indicates that an 
MODU will work successfully if all its components and subsystems work 
normally. An MODU will fail to drill the wells if some components or 
subsystems have failed. However, direct determination of risk levels of a 
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complex MODU is difficult or almost impossible. A possible solution to this is 
indirect evaluation by aggregating the risks of its subsystems (i.e. mud treatment 
system, BOP, etc.) due to their lower complexity. Therefore, risk information 
can be obtained for a complex MODU by studying the risks of simpler objects in 
an object-oriented hierarchical structure. 
The above discussions not only demonstrate the potential abilities of object-oriented 
hierarchy in dealing with all of the attributes of complex systems, but also support the 
development of risk assessment frameworks. With respect to this concept, a hierarchy 
of an MODU operation system is constructed and presented in Figure  3.1, by viewing 
all the physical elements in an MODU as objects that encapsulate specific attributes and 
behaviours and interact with one another. 
3.3.1 Proposed operational hierarchy of an MODU  
A hazard is defined as a physical situation with the potential for human injury/fatality, 
damage to property, damage to the environment, economic loss or combination of these. 
Hazards are classified according to the severity of their potential effects, either in terms 
of safety, economics or other consequences. Such classifications alone are purely 
subjective, and usually require qualification and quantification by definition of the 
precise form of the hazard, and quantified evaluation of the consequences (Warner, 
1992). The result from this investigation shows that drilling failure is a critical item 
within identified events or HGs, and so it is selected to be the decision problem and 
separated into smaller, manageable subsystems and events of different hierarchical 
levels as necessary. A four-level hierarchy of an MODU system is developed and is 
illustrated in Figure  3.1. The highest level of the hierarchy corresponds to the goal 
prioritisation of importance of the MODU’s risk, and the last layer corresponds to the 
evaluation of BEs. It starts with the MODU system’s overall analysis where the HGs 
are compared with their significance and possible effects of MODU failure are studied. 
Then, the most important HGs are summarised and their failures investigated according 
to the operational phases of the MODU. Furthermore, each MODU HG is studied 
according to its failure modes, causes and criticality. Lastly, the effect of the HG is 
examined according to failures that occurred whilst the MODU was in operation.  
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Figure ‎3.1: Hazard identification and MODU’s operational hierarchy model; the highest level of the hierarchy corresponds to the goal 
prioritisation of significance of the MODU’s risk, and the last layer corresponds to the evaluation of BEs.  
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3.4 Proposed risk assessment methodology 
It has been appreciated that use of the risk assessment methods in an integrated manner 
may make risk assessment comparatively efficient and convenient since safety 
information and the advantages of each method may be more efficiently explored by 
doing so (Wang et al., 1993). 
Several lessons still need to be learnt from the earlier offshore operation systems failure 
events. There is also no doubt that accidents and incidents which cause few effects, or 
which are less publicised, as well as certain unsafe acts bringing about errors and those 
of recovery occurrences, do provide equally valuable lessons from which to learn. In 
fact, it is possible that accidents may have been propagated from the latter and yet these 
are often overlooked as likely sources of the safety issue problem in the offshore 
industry. Therefore, within existing offshore operation regulations, there are several 
amendments to be undertaken that may be helpful in preventing even the likely 
occurrence of an incident from developing any further. It is extremely difficult to 
prevent events in the absence of an understanding as to how they are caused. In 
complex systems, events usually develop through relatively lengthy sequences of 
changes and errors. According to Petersen (1978), behind every accident there are 
improper contributing factors, causes and sub-causes. Hence, throughout offshore 
operation system risk assessment and in the causal modelling studies, there is a 
necessity to identify as many of these sources as possible. In order to implement the 
outlined risk assessment methodology effectively, Figure ‎3.4 provides a proposed 
framework for which the risk assessment settings of this research can also be achieved 
by identifying the best RCOs via a cost-effective means. The previous sections have 
outlined several risk analysis methods that are widely applied in offshore operation risk 
assessment. However, in some situations where there is a lack of data, it may be 
difficult to apply them with confidence to the assessment task.   
The selection of the outlined methods, or the decision as to which methods are more 
appropriate for risk assessment of a particular offshore operation, are primarily 
dependent on consideration of the level (e.g. system, subsystem or component level) of 
the operation system breakdown at which the hazard identification is carried out. In 
addition, it is dependent on the degree of complexity of the inter-relationships of the 
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items at the investigated level of the offshore operation system breakdown. Finally, it is 
also dependent on the degree of innovation associated with the system design (e.g. the 
availability of operation failure data for risk assessment). The outlined analytical 
methods, classified as either top-down or bottom-up event-based, may be applied to 
study the operational conditions, environmental conditions and other design 
considerations which contribute to the occurrence likelihood of the hazardous 
conditions associated with an offshore operation system and define the magnitude of 
possible resulting consequences. 
An innovative methodology framework for risk assessment of an MODU system is 
developed and demonstrated in Figure ‎3.4, consisting of the different stages (i.e. 5 
stages) which provide a demonstrative view of a generic framework proposed for the 
purpose of the MODU risk assessment; it comprises the following stages: 
Stage 1: 
A hierarchy model is illustrated that reflects the operational failure of the mobile 
offshore drilling units. To have a manageable risk model, a three-level hierarchy is 
developed and is illustrated in Figure  3.2. The highest level of the hierarchy 
corresponds to the goal prioritisation of significance of the MODU’s risk and the 
last layer corresponds to the evaluation of BEs. By using the combination of the 
Fuzzy-AHP and Fuzzy FMECA, the risks of significant items (i.e. HGs) are 
quantified and the most critical ones will be identified for further analysis. Fuzzy-
AHP is used to determine the degree of importance of each HG in terms of its 
contribution to the MODU’s failure. The AHP and the Fuzzy theory are combined 
in this stage by a different means. Moreover, the Fuzzy-AHP is applied in the risk 
assessment of the MODU operation system. The method includes four steps, as 
follows: 
- Establish the risk factor hierarchy model. 
- Define the basic event risk factors that consist of the BE factors; as an example: 
Rf(L3,N1) to Rf(L3,N3) for the Natural Hazard BEs and their contributory factors 
WD3N-1 to WD3N-5; Rf(L3,O1) to Rf(L3,O8) for the Operational BEs an`d their 
contributory factors WD3O-1 to WD3O-8; and Rf(L3,H1) to Rf(L3,H3) for the Human 
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BEs and their contributory factors WD3H-1 to WD3H-3 are considered and are 
illustrated in Figure ‎3.2. 
- Define the quantitative basis for risk factors. 
- Establish the comprehensive risk assessment model. 
The details of the combination of the Fuzzy-AHP and Fuzzy FMECA approaches are 
presented in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Figure  3.2: Hazard identification and MODU’s operational hierarchy model and a 
three-stage structural model for risk aggregation; the highest level of the hierarchy 
corresponds to the goal prioritisation of significance of the MODU’s risk, and the last 
layer (level 3) corresponds to the evaluation of BEs. 
Stage 2 & 3: 
These stages identify the relationships between subsystem, events and establishing an 
operational hierarchy system diagram with a detailed breakdown of the most 
significant HG (i.e. Drilling Failure: L1D). The hierarchical structure consists of 
different levels; the aim is to identify the sources of hazards of the top event (i.e. 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































L1D-Drilling Failure      
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possibly be influenced by other subsystems or events at other levels (e.g. levels 2 to 
5). In fact, the components/subsystems and BEs describe the MODU’s operation 
system, and the failure of each component may influence another component or 
system at the different levels. 
 
Figure ‎3.3: Drilling system failure and its subsystem/events in levels 4 and 5 
respectively. 
As stated in stage 1 of the methodology, by using a combination of the Fuzzy-AHP 
and Fuzzy FMECA the risks of important systems/events are calculated and the most 
serious ones are acknowledged (e.g. L3D-O1-01: Drilling system failure) for further 
analysis. As shown in  
Figure ‎3.3, the event of drilling system failure is expanded to its subsystem and events 
in two lower levels (i.e. levels 4 and 5).  
Stage 4: 
QRA by using Fuzzy FTA and BBN to identify the basic causes leading to an 
undesired event; in order to identify the most critical hazards of MODUs, AHP theory 
is used to determine the degree of influence and importance of factors of each HG. 
L5D-O1-01-1-1 : Mud Pump #1 Failure
L5D-O1-01-1-2 : Mud Pump #2 Failure
L5D-O1-01-1-3 : Bulk Handling system Failure 
L5D-O1-01-1-4: High Pressure route failure (HP 
hoses, Standpipe Manifold, Choke and  Kill  Manifold) 
L5D-O1-01-2-1 : Shale Shaker Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-2 : Desander Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-3 : Disilter Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-4 : Degasser Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-1 : Draw Work Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-2 : Rotary Table Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-3 : Top Drive Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-4 : Pipe Handling System Failure
Level  3                        Level 4  (Sub-system)                            Level  5  (Basic Events)
L5D-O1-01-4-1 : BOP Stack Failure
L5D-O1-01-4-2: BOP control SystemFailure
L5D-O1-01-4-3 : Component Failure/Leak  
L5D-O1-01-2-4 : Drilling Control System Failure
L4D-O1-01-03 : Drilling 
Equipment Failure























   
   
   
   
   
   
  
L4D-O1-01-04 :   Drilling Failure due 
to Blow out Preventer (BOP) System 
Failure / Drilling Failure due to Failure 
of Managed Pressure Drilling Stack
L4D-O1-01-01 : High 
Pressure Mud System 
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Figure  3.4: Proposed framework for implementation of the risk assessment methodology  
A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk                  CHAPTER 3: Development of the 




By focusing on mud circulation and the BOP systems through using Fuzzy-FTA 
and BBN, the particulars of the MODU’s risk assessment methodology and 
analysis are presented in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
Stage 5: 
The aim of this stage is to select the best RCO and barrier to improve the safety 
level of the MODU in the drilling and operational phase. Fuzzy TOPSIS is 
implemented to identify the best RCO and MADM is used in a Fuzzy environment 
to select the RCOs. Different RCOs and barriers with different purposes could be 
recommended. With consideration of the research findings and recommendations, 
the best RCOs with respect to cost and benefit in three different aspects are 
proposed and listed below, and the details are presented in Chapter 7. 
- Engineering (Eng-RCO)  
- Equipment redesign/replace(Equip-RCO)  
- Regulatory/Human error (Regul-RCO) 
3.5 Aggregative risk assessment framework  
A framework of aggregative risk assessment is developed up to BEs and is presented in 
Figure ‎3.5 in which the failure at the top level (level 1) is directly related to 
consequences or risks in different levels. Thus, the risk level is determined directly by 
the risk levels of its failure subsystem and BEs. Furthermore, the change from the 
normal state to a failure state is directly related to and driven by its specific hazard. A 
specific hazard is usually evaluated in terms of its likelihood of occurrence and severity 
of possible consequences. Then risks can be estimated for such hazards, by using Fuzzy 
aggregative risk assessment. A coding system that consists of the BE factors and their 
contributory factors has been developed and is presented in Figure ‎3.5. There are three 
HGs of interest, L2D-N1, L2D-O1 and L2D-H1, which belong to level 2 of the 
operational hierarchy. L2D-N1, L2D-O1 and L2D-H1 can be inferred directly from the 
BEs in level 3, which are: L3D-N1-01 to 5, L3D-O1-01 to 8 and L3D-H1-01 to 3 
respectively, while the event L3D-O1-01 was expanded to two more levels (levels 4 & 
5).  
A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk                                                                                                                                  CHAPTER 3: Development of the 





Figure ‎3.5: Proposed framework for aggregative risk assessment at component level. 
L3D-N1-01                                                          WD3N-1 Rf(L3,N1) L5D-O1-01-1-1                                                          WD5O-1-1-1 Rf(L5,O-1-1)
L3D-N1-02                                                         WD3N-2 Rf(L3,N2) L4D-O1-01-1                                                          WD4O-1-1 Rf(L4,O1) L5D-O1-01-1-2                                                        WD5O-1-1-2 Rf(L5,O-1-2)
WD2N Rf(L2,N1)
L3D-N1-03                                                        WD3N-3 Rf(L3,N3) L5D-O1-01-1-3                                                      WD5O-1-1-3 Rf(L5,O-1-3)
L3D-N1-04                                                          WD3N-4 Rf(L3,N4) L5D-O1-01-1-4                                                        WD5O-1-1-4 Rf(L5,O-1-4)
L3D-N1-05                                                         WD3N-5 Rf(L3,N5)
L3D-O1-01 WD3O-1 Rf(L3,O1) L5D-O1-01-2-1                                                         WD5O-1-2-1 Rf(L5,O-2-1)
L3D-O1-02 WD3O-2 Rf(L3,O2) L4D-O1-01-2                                                         WD4O-1-2 Rf(L4,O2) L5D-O1-01-2-2                                                       WD5O-1-2-2 Rf(L5,O-2-2)
L3D-O1-03 WD3O-3 Rf(L3,O3) L5D-O1-01-2-3                                                      WD5O-1-2-3 Rf(L5,O-2-3)
WD2O Rf(L2,O1)
WD1 Rf (L1,N) L3D-O1-04 WD3O-4 Rf(L3,O4) L5D-O1-01-2-4                                                        WD5O-1-2-4 Rf(L5,O-2-4)
L3D-O1-05 WD3O-5 Rf(L3,O5)
L3D-O1-06 WD3O-6 Rf(L3,O6) L5D-O1-01-3-1                                                         WD5O-1-3-1 Rf(L5,O-3-1)
L3D-O1-07 WD3O-7 Rf(L3,O7) L5D-O1-01-3-2                                                        WD5O-1-3-2 Rf(L5,O-3-2)
L4D-O1-01-3                                                   WD4O-1-3 Rf(L4,O3)
L3D-O1-08 WD3O-8 Rf(L3,O8) L5D-O1-01-3-3                                                       WD5O-1-3-3 Rf(L5,O-3-3)
L3D-H1-01 WD3H-1 Rf(L3,H1) L5D-O1-01-3-4                                                         WD5O-1-3-4 Rf(L5,O-3-4)
WD2H Rf(L2,H1) L3D-H1-02 WD3H-2 Rf(L3,H2) L5D-O1-01-3-5                                                      WD5O-1-3-5 Rf(L5,O-3-5)
L3D-H1-03 WD3H-3 Rf(L3,H3)
L5D-O1-01-4-1                                           WD5O-1-4-1 Rf(L3,N-4-1)
L4D-O1-01-4                                                         WD4O-1-4 Rf(L4,O4)
L5D-O1-01-4-2                                                   WD5O-1-4-2 Rf(L3,N-4-2)
L5D-O1-01-4-3                                                          WD5O-1-4-3 Rf(L3,N-4-3)
     L2D-N1:              
Natural Hazard       
L2D-O1:   
Operational hazard
    L2D-H1:        
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The framework of risk assessment of each subsystem and the overall MODU is 
determined by the whole/partial relationships represented in an object-oriented 
structure. In this framework, primitive BEs are at the lowest level, whose risk levels are 
determined by the framework proposed for aggregative risk assessment. This 
aggregative process explicitly shows that the risk of the overall system is determined by 
the risks of its subsystems, which are in turn determined by the risks of their consistent 
events. This hierarchical assessment has the ability to model the intricate relationships 
among the BEs and subsystems and to account for all the relevant and important 
elements of risk and uncertainty, therefore rendering the assessment process more 
tractable and representative. A possible quantitative evaluation of these aggregative 
frameworks is particularly studied in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
3.6 Conclusion 
The current study utilises qualitative risk assessment for offshore operation systems, and 
an outline of the methodology adopted in the research is presented in this chapter. 
Before the scene of this thesis was set, the background work had revealed safety in the 
offshore operation system as being a reactive response to major accidents. A change in 
such culture provided for proactive approaches to be applied. A proposed framework for 
the risk assessment settings of this research has been developed in a generic sense to be 
effectively applicable to the offshore operation systems. The framework incorporates 
risk analysis for which data were obtained from industrial databases and/or by expert 
judgements. Fuzzy logic (FL) was utilised as the modelling tool that dealt with the 
vague/subjective uncertainties. This study has shown that an object-oriented approach is 
effective in dealing with the complexity in offshore operation systems and can be used 
to develop frameworks of risk assessment for the MODUs. Some of the analytical 
methods, such as FMECA, are most usefully applied in the hazard identification phase, 
whilst others, like FTA and BBN, are used mainly in performing risk estimation and 
probability of failure. A framework of aggregative risk assessment is used to evaluate 
the risks associated with BEs, subsystems, and the overall system. Different hierarchies 
are proposed to be used in order to represent the cause-effect relationships for specific 
undesired events in an offshore operation system. By using the effective combination of 
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the different methods as presented in the proposed methodology framework, risk 
analysts can obtain a more comprehensive view of the risks in an MODU operation 
system. In particular:  
- The proposed methodology can be used by different users. The frameworks can 
be flexibly established at different hierarchical levels according to the 
requirements of system observers and/or available information. 
- Also, the frameworks can be reused in different offshore operation systems. The 
frameworks are developed from a general point of view, encapsulating the 
common features of various offshore operations and being capable of reuse in 
any specific application.  
- It is possible to use and evaluate risks by considering multiple hazards. The 
frameworks can aggregate natural hazards and human error as well as 
operational risk along with a consistent hierarchy to generate useful risk 
information for decision-makers.  
The developed risk assessment models provide useful integrative tools for a proactive 
offshore industry but have limitations owing to the complex nature of the offshore 
operation systems. And there is still further work required to improve the frameworks 
developed in this study, which can be summarised briefly as follows: 
- A framework for vulnerability assessment needs to be developed. Vulnerability 
also plays an important role in introducing risk into an MODU. However, detailed 
study is required in order to make the assessment closer to the real world.  
- The process of generating the FMECA, FT and BBN structures at the system level 
is based on the normal flow directions of an MODU, which is a conservative 
approximation of the real cases. However, the flow directions might change in 
real cases of failures.  
- On every occasion data for risk assessment are sparse, it may become very 
challenging for the risk analyst to precisely obtain the influences of basic failure 
events in order to carry out quantitative analysis using the analytical methods 
outlined before, since a great deal of uncertainty is involved. Therefore, the need 
for models that reflect subjective reasoning or understanding will dominate which 
choices are considered. 
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4 CHAPTER 4: Fuzzy risk assessment of MODUs  
Chapter Summary 
The main purpose of this chapter is to propose a methodology to improve the current 
procedures used in the risk assessment of mobile offshore drilling units; this chapter 
will develop a method that can quantitatively evaluate the frameworks of aggregative 
risk assessment for the MODUs. The failure of MODUs has been considered, focusing 
on drilling failure due to rig equipment issues including human error, operational hazard 
and natural hazard. The purpose is to prevent a critical event occurring during drilling 
rather than focusing on measures that mitigate the consequences once an event has 
occurred. The aim is achieved by using a combination of the Fuzzy-AHP and Fuzzy 
FMECA approaches. A generic hierarchy model is presented that considers the 
operational failure of the MODUs. In this chapter the risks of significant items (i.e. HGs 
and BEs) are quantified and the most critical ones will be identified for further analysis 
in Chapter 5. Two mathematical theories will be employed for these frameworks. One is 
a mathematical evaluation of risks associated with hazards and the other is the 
mathematical method that can aggregate risk estimates along the hierarchical structure 
to obtain the risks associated with an MODU. Fuzzy theory is used to represent the 
characteristics of a hazard such as likelihood of the occurrence, severity of consequence 
and detection of vulnerability consequences. A Fuzzy-AHP is used to determine the 
degree of importance of the factors and sub-factors in the model of each HG in terms of 
their contribution to the MODU’s failure. The proposed methodology provides a 
rational and systematic approach for the unit’s risk assessment and comprises a number 
of stages: 1) Identification of probable critical HGs that may lead to the unit’s 
operational failure, 2) Unique applications of a combination of a Fuzzy-AHP technique 
and Fuzzy FMECA approach are used, 3) Ranking of events using a Fuzzy-AHP to 
determine the degree of influence of each HG, and 4) Construction of a hierarchy for 
the offshore operation system. 
4.1 Introduction 
Pursuant to the reviewed cycle of potential hazards and consequence mechanisms 
associated with loss or failure of the MODUs in Chapter 3, the aim of this chapter is to 
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propose a methodology for the MODUs’ risk assessment in order to assess the overall 
risk level of the MODUs, i.e. identify the important HG and its contributory weight 
factors to classify the BEs. Due to the lack of data, the uncertainty experienced may 
considerably undermine the conclusion acquired based on the traditional QRA 
techniques. For that reason, how risk assessment is conducted with confidence under 
circumstances where a high level of uncertainty is present is still a problem for most 
academics. Therefore, the first objective of this research is to propose a framework, 
which is capable of performing risk assessment of the MODUs in situations where a 
lack or insufficiency of information exists. Thus, this chapter establishes a novel 
conceptual framework for the QRA and also proposes a methodology that addresses the 
frequency of the limitations of risk assessment techniques. The purpose of a QRA is to 
assist the decision-maker to be aware of the characteristics of the system and inform the 
designer of the quantified occurrence probability of each critical failure condition and 
the associated consequences. Additionally, it may be essential to carry out risk 
assessment based on multiple hazards which are represented in different forms, such as 
probabilistic data, experts’ opinions and linguistic representations. Traditional 
probabilistic risk assessment approaches may be deficient in the ability to deal with 
such multi-form data and information input. Therefore, there is a need to develop an 
effective method to address the above characteristics of risk assessment. In risk 
assessment under circumstances where a high level of uncertainty exists, fairly accurate 
reasoning methods using the Fuzzy rule-based technique have been demonstrated to be 
useful. However, such applications may become impractical, as there are multiple 
parameters to be evaluated, which are described by multiple linguistic terms. In this 
chapter detailed fundamentals of the Fuzzy approach are discussed to demonstrate how 
its principles have been integrated within the framework of the proposed methodology 
for the assessment of risks associated with the MODUs.  
The proposed integrated methodology can quantitatively evaluate the frameworks of 
aggregative risk assessment of the MODUs proposed in Chapter 3. Two aspects are 
required to be mathematically represented for these frameworks. The first aspect is a 
mathematical assessment of risks associated with each basic event. A basic event in a 
hierarchical framework is expressed by a trapezoidal Fuzzy number, which results from 
the composition of the likelihood of the occurrence, severity of consequence and 
detection of vulnerability consequence of an MODU operation system. Since the 
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contribution of each HG to the failure of the MODUs is not the same, the weight of 
each HG should be taken into consideration to represent its relative contribution and 
importance in terms of its capacity to lead to the failure of the MODUs. Therefore, the 
second aspect is a mathematical method that aggregates risk along the hierarchical 
structure to obtain the risks of the BEs, subsystems, HGs, and the MODU. A Fuzzy-
AHP methodology is designed to deal with an alternative selection and relative 
contribution by integrating the concept of Fuzzy set theory (FST) and hierarchical 
structure analysis. Fuzzy-AHP is then employed to calculate and introduce the weight 
factors, which indicates the magnitude of the relevant importance of a HG to its 
belongings in a risk tree. The outcomes of risk assessment of the MODUs are 
represented by the risk degrees and risk contribution factors that provide analysts, 
managers, engineers and decision-makers with useful information to improve their 
safety management and set safety standards for the MODU’s operation systems. 
The use of a Fuzzy theory based methodology allows decision-makers to incorporate 
both qualitative and quantitative data into a decision model. Decision-makers usually 
feel more confident to provide interval judgements rather than fixed-value judgements 
(Li, 2007; Chang, 1996). In this approach, Fuzzy numbers are used for the preferences 
of one criterion over another and then, by using the extent analysis method, the 
synthetic extent value of the pair-wise comparison is calculated. This chapter concludes 
with a discussion on the main aspects of the methodology and novelties tailor-made in 
the direction of effective assessment of the MODU’s associated risks. 
4.2 Literature review  
QRA techniques were first given wide application in the Norwegian offshore oil and gas 
industry in the early 1980s. QRA has traditionally been used for optimisation and 
verification of design. The focus of QRA is on technical measures and resolutions but 
substantial assumptions are made with respect to the following event processes and 
measures (Standard, 2001): 
- Organisational: Qualifications, emergency teams and staffing. 
- Operational: Procedures for transportation, lifting, installation, repair, 
maintenance and visiting marine vessels. 
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- Activities: Simultaneous operations, modification and number of helicopter visits. 
Among research subjects from the risk assessment aspects of the oil and gas drilling 
operation there are few on HSE risk management of drilling operations. During the 
period between 1970 and about 2000, there was extensive new building activity in the 
North Sea. Since 2000, the new builds have been reduced to one or possibly a couple of 
new production facilities per year in the entire North Sea, and the trend towards more 
extensive use of mobile and floating production systems, operations in the Arctic and 
deepwater suggests that operational aspects of safety will be more important in the 
future, in order to mitigate hazards and control risks. QRA is therefore of great 
importance to the oil and gas industry (Skogdalen et al., 2011). An enormous number of 
methods/approaches exist for the identification of hazards and hazard situations as well 
as for use in risk estimation. These well-established methods have seen continuous 
practice within industries because knowledge about the methods is well documented 
(Mannan, 2004). Besides, use of different techniques/methods might make it easier to 
discover events for definite hazards, e.g. using deductive logic or top-down approaches, 
and to find new hazards, e.g. using inductive logic or bottom-up methodologies and 
approaches (Hansen et al., 2002)When a complex marine and offshore system involves 
various related risk items with uncertain causes and scales, it often cannot be treated 
with mathematical thoroughness during the initial or screening phase of decision-
making (Lee, 1996). When studying the safety features of offshore structures, it is 
almost impossible to treat the system in its entirety, owing to the nature of its complex 
engineering structure (Wang, 1998). It is often challenging to assess likelihood, severity 
and detectability associated with a hazardous event using probabilistic theory. To begin 
with, some hazards may be related to many uncertain factors which are hard to express 
in terms of probabilities. All such factors are subjective and difficult to characterise by a 
single precise probability distribution function. Furthermore, historical records of some 
risk scenarios, particularly extreme hazardous events, are often incomplete and 
insufficient. Therefore, a specialist may have difficulty in developing appropriate 
probability distribution functions with limited information. Due to lack of data, risk 
analysts may be more confident with linguistic representations (e.g. very high, slightly 
low, etc.). However, probabilistic variables have limited ability to represent this 
linguistic or descriptive information. Zadeh (1965) introduced FST as an alternative to 
probabilistic theory to deal with the problems in which vagueness is present. 
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Applications of FST have been extensively studied with respect to the ambiguity and 
vagueness involved in the risk analysis in different engineering areas. FST can be used 
to represent subjective, vague, linguistic and imprecise data and information effectively. 
For example, Sadiq and Sadiq and Husain (2005) applied a Fuzzy-based methodology 
for an aggregative environmental risk assessment of drilling waste. Wang & Elhag 
(2007) used Fuzzy group decision-making for bridge risk assessment. Zeng et al. (2007) 
applied a Fuzzy-based decision-making methodology to construction project risk 
assessment. Chen (2001) used Fuzzy group decision-making for evaluating the rate of 
aggregative risk in software development. Lee (1996) applied FST to evaluate the rate 
of aggregative risk in software development.Risk assessments are required to identify 
and to document the significant risk to the environment, health and safety of employees 
and any others who may be affected by an undertaking. However, what is the main 
purpose of performing a risk assessment? The only reason for undertaking a risk 
assessment is, according to Bley, et al. (1992), to understand a risk in order to do 
something about it. Such a view, in which risk reduction is considered the main 
objective of risk assessment, is a typical misconception according to Aven (2010). Risk 
reduction is never a goal in itself. This is due to the recognition that creating value 
necessitates risk-taking. The purpose of risk assessment is thus not mainly to facilitate 
risk reduction, but to provide input to a particular decision in a larger context. The vast 
majority of references confirm this point, unanimously stating that risk assessment is a 
tool to inform decision-making in management of risk (HSE, 2001; NASA, 2002; 
NUREG, 2009; NORSOK, 2001; and IMO, 2002). Common to all situations is the 
decision-maker’s need to reduce their uncertainty regarding the outcome of a decision. 
At a deeper level, risk assessment can thus be seen as a tool to address and a language to 
express the uncertainty about the future (Bley et al., 1992). A logical approach may be 
to break down the system into functional entities comprising sub-systems and 
components, so that the interrelationships can be examined and, finally, a system safety 
model can be formulated to assess the safety parameters. This will therefore necessitate 
risk analysts to utilise some very well-dependable analytical tools and techniques in the 
formulation of the assessment model. Uncertainties in risk analysis inputs are 
propagated through the risk assessment and evaluation steps of the safety assessment to 
obtain estimates of the level of confidence in the assessment outcomes (Chauhan and 
Bowles, 2004). Such uncertainties require techniques that can handle their treatment 
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efficiently and effectively. Several techniques are used to predict how the systems 
would behave if they were to be hit by unforeseen catastrophic events such as fire, 
explosions, collisions and loss of hull integrity. Therefore, a review of related work is 
necessary for the development and application of uncertainty analysis methods that can 
appropriately deal with qualitative and quantitative factors of the risk assessment study. 
The proposed methodology in this chapter is built upon the previous development, and 
the novel parts of the proposed methodology are to combine both qualitative and 
quantitative information, and also the weight of the contribution of each hazardous 
event has been taken into consideration in order to represent its relative contribution and 
importance in terms of its capacity to lead to the MODU’s failure. Each failure mode 
can be evaluated by three factors: probability of occurrence, consequence of severity 
and vulnerability of the failure mode. By multiplying the values for these factors, a risk 
value would be obtained (Chin et al., 2008). Then the risk value of the BE will be 
aggregated along with its hierarchy by employing a Fuzzy-AHP. AHP technique 
achieves pairwise comparisons among the criteria or factors in order to prioritise them 
at each level of the hierarchy using the eigenvalue calculation. In addition to AHP, 
Analytic network process (ANP) technique is a generalization of the AHP, by 
considering the dependence between the components/systems, that allows inter-
dependencies, outer-dependencies and feedbacks among decision elements in the 
hierarchical or non-hierarchical structures(Görener, 2012). AHP and ANP are 
essentially ways to measure especially intangible factors by using pairwise comparisons 
with judgments that represent the dominance of one element over another with respect 
to a property that they share (Chung et al., 2005). Many decisions problems cannot be 
structured hierarchically because they involve the interaction and dependence of higher 
level elements in a hierarchy on lower level elements (Saaty & Özdemir, 2005). While 
the AHP represents a framework with a uni-directional hierarchical AHP relationship, 
the ANP allows for complex interrelationships among decision levels and attributes 
(Yüksel & Dağdeviren, 2007). In fact the ANP uses a network without the need to 
specify levels as in a hierarchy. Influence is a central concept in the ANP. (Anand & 
Kodali, 2009). Despite the fact, the AHP technique is appropriate and workable for the 
MODU operation system, for the reason that the relationship between the 
components/systems is possible to structure and present with a uni-directional 
hierarchy. 
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4.3 Proposed integrated methodology for the MODU risk assessment  
QRA can be implemented using many methods, such as failure mode and effects 
analysis, preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), etc. (Kirchhoff et al., 2007). In situations 
where there is a lack of data, it is required to incorporate expert judgements into the risk 
study. A framework is established based on Fuzzy set theory, which is capable of 
quantifying judgements from experts who express their opinions qualitatively. As 
shown in Figure ‎4.1, the proposed methodology involves many stages, starting with the 
establishment of the membership functions for the linguistic terms describing the seven 
parameters, followed by the risk calculation and aggregations. The aim of the thesis is 
an assessment of the MODU’s risk posed through its BEs and HGs by applying 
principles of QRA; and also the core of the risk assessment is an evaluation of the 
MODU’s risk with the association of failure probabilities of BEs at the lowest level by 
means of consideration of the HGs’ contribution to the failure of the MODU. Such 
assessment is required to combine methods of Fuzzy-AHP for calculation of risk 
contribution factors and Fuzzy FMECA for estimation of basic event risk factors. To 
achieve that, the proposed method would allow a combination of two sources of 
information: i) Fuzzy linguistic input typically used for quantifying BE failure and ii) 
The weight input from the magnitude of the relevant importance of an HG to its 
belongings in a risk tree from the viewpoint of its capacity to contribute to the failure of 
the MODU. 
Thus, the proposed method, which is based on Fuzzy-AHP and Fuzzy FMECA, has the 
advantage of an application of different sources of information including expert 
knowledge. The overall elements of the generic risk model are illustrated in Figure 4.1 
and show the different types of input data. Obviously, as such an approach has not been 
developed in the field of risk assessment of MODUs until now, this thesis could help an 
operator to carry out MODU risk assessment in a realistic and methodological way. The 
following steps are used in the proposed risk assessment.The first step of the proposed 
framework is to obtain the risk factors of each BE by using FST. This step includes a 
few sub-steps for the application of Fuzzy risk assessment, which are explained in the 
following sections. The magnitude of a risk can usually be assessed by considering 
three fundamental risk parameters: Probability of occurrence (PO), Consequence 
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severity (CS) and Detection of vulnerability (DV). PO defines the number of times an 
event occurs over a specified period. Risk can be obtained by Equation (‎4.1), where the 
risk is associated with each basic event in the MODU’s system. Rf represents the 
likelihood of the hazard and ⊗ denotes the multiplication relationship between 
likelihood, severity and vulnerability. This calculation can be performed by using Fuzzy 
operation rules. 
The second step is to calculate weight factors for each HG in the framework. Since the 
study incorporates FST into an AHP method, a set of linguistic priority terms along 
with the membership functions describing the relationship between elements in each 
hierarchy of the AHP is adopted. Thus, the pair-wise comparisons between the elements 
in each hierarchy using FST are established. The Fuzzy expressions are subsequently 
converted into a single crisp value using an appropriate defuzzification method. The 
third step is the aggregation and calculation of risk level. The magnitude of a risk can 
usually be assessed by considering the BE factors and their contribution's weight factor 
calculation so as to obtain the relative importance of the elements. By repeating the 
steps above, the risk of each element in the hierarchy is acquired based on the 
normalised weight factors calculated. Risk assessment can be carried out for each sub-
system for the MODU’s operation system.To have a manageable risk model, a limited 
number of generic operation basic hazard events are defined, covering operational risk, 
which may directly cause an event or introduce latent failures into the system which 
may cause an event at a later point in time. In this approach, a four-level hierarchy (i.e. 
Level 0 to Level 3) is developed. The highest level of the hierarchy corresponds to the 
goal prioritisation of significance of the MODU’s risk. Fuzzy-AHP is used at the higher 
levels to synthesise the weight factors that will help to prioritize the MODU’s risk. The 
Fuzzy inference system is applied at the lower levels of the hierarchy to infer the BE 
parameters. Subsequently, the scores representing the extent of risk are calculated. The 
methodology consists of many stages, providing an illustrative view of a generic risk 
assessment framework proposed for the purpose of this research upon which the 
methodology will be directed. An application of the proposed approach is demonstrated 
through a case study for the risk assessment of a Jack-up drilling rig (JDR) in Section 
4.4. 
Rf = PO ⊗ SC ⊗ DV ( 4.1) 
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Figure ‎4.1: Illustration of a generic risk methodology for the MODU’s risk assessment, 
which involves several stages, starting with the setting up of the membership functions, 
followed by the risk calculation and aggregations. 
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4.3.1 Fuzzy failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) 
When assessing a risk level of a specific failure mode, the risk priority number (RPN) 
method uses linguistic priority terms to evaluate the elements of PO, SC and DV on a 
numeric scale from 0 to 1. By multiplying the values for these factors, a RPN is 
obtained. Failure modes with a higher RPN are deemed to be more risky and give a 
higher priority than those having a lower RPN. There are some shortcomings raised 
when applying the RPN calculation method, and also traditional approaches lack 
adequate data concerning the relative frequencies for causes and effects of hazardous 
events. Some criticisms have been raised with regard to the application of the RPN 
method (Deng, 1989) as follows:  
i. In situations where various sets of PO, SC and DV produce an identical value of RPN, 
the risk implication may be totally different. 
ii. There is no precise algebraic rule to assign a score to the possible failure 
occurrence rate and detection rate. The reason for that is that the relationship 
between detection rate and its corresponding score is linear, whereas the failure rate 
and its score do not follow a linear relationship. 
iii. The RPN value does not consider the relative importance between PO, SC and DV. 
FMECA under a Fuzzy environment can be regarded as another solution to prevail over 
the limitation of the traditional approach. In a Fuzzy FMECA, linguistic variables such 
as PO, SC and DV can be represented as Fuzzy membership functions and described 
using linguistic priority terms associated with corresponding membership values. In the 
course of using FST, it is possible to manage the fuzziness involved in the phrase of the 
occurrence of a basic event or a consequence. Moreover, the state of each basic event or 
consequence can be explained in a simpler way. 
4.3.2 Fuzzy analytical hierarchical process 
Since the criteria for the evaluation of the HGs have diverse significance and meanings, 
we cannot assume that each HG is of equal importance and weight in terms of its 
capacity to contribute to the failure of the MODU. Therefore, we need to consider the 
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contributory factors of each HG to the failure of the MODU. Four evaluation criteria are 
considered (i.e. 1- People, 2- Environment, 3- Asset and 4- Reputation) for the 
hierarchical structure that is used in this chapter. There are many methods that can be 
employed to determine such weights such as the eigenvector method, weighted least-
square method, entropy method, AHP and linear programming technique for 
multidimensional analysis of preference. The selection of the method depends on the 
nature of the problems. To evaluate the HGs is a complex and wide-ranging problem, 
requiring the most inclusive and flexible method. The AHP developed by Saaty (1980 
and 1996) is a very useful analysis tool in dealing with multiple criteria decision 
problems and has been successfully applied to many construction industry decision 
areas (Cheong and Lan-Hui, 2004). Saaty (2001) also suggested the use of AHP to solve 
the problem of independence of alternatives or criteria and the use of analytic network 
process (ANP) to solve the problem of dependence among alternatives or criteria AHP 
is a popular technique, which is often used to model subjective decision-making 
processes based on multiple attributes. AHP is widely used in both individual and group 
decision-making environments (Bolloju, 2001).  
Traditional methods of AHP cannot be used when improbability in data of problems is 
observed. As mentioned, in order to address such uncertainties and as an alternative 
method, Zadeh (1965) introduced the FST, which was based on the rationality of 
uncertain due to imprecision or vagueness of data available. A major contribution of 
FST is its capability to represent uncertainty knowledge. Because of the fact that the 
world around us is actually full of ambiguities and is of a Fuzzy nature, several 
researchers have combined Fuzzy theory with AHP. Van Laarhoven & Pedrycz (1983) 
proposed the first method of implementing Fuzzy-AHP, in which triangular Fuzzy 
numbers were compared according to their membership functions. Buckley (1985) 
extended Saaty’s AHP to the case where the evaluators are allowed to employ Fuzzy 
ratios in place of exact ratios to handle the difficulty of assigning exact ratios when 
comparing two criteria and deriving the Fuzzy weights of criteria by the geometric 
method. Furthermore, the relative importance derived from these pair-wise comparisons 
allows a certain degree of inconsistency within a domain. Saaty used the principal 
eigenvector of the pair-wise comparison matrix derived from the scaling ratio to 
determine the comparative weight among the criteria (Chiu et al., 2006). Therefore, 
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Fuzzy-AHP is used for the proposed methodology to determine the relative 
contribution's weight factors of each HG, sub-system and BE of the MODU and also 
will be implemented on JDR risk assessment as a case study in order to illustrate the 
applications of the proposed methods. The required steps for application of Fuzzy-AHP 
in evaluating risk factors will be described in the following sections.  
4.3.2.1  Establishing a hierarchical structure  
The purpose of this section is to establish a hierarchical structure for aggregative risk 
assessment for the MODUs. The contents include building a hierarchical structure and 
determining the evaluation of risk contribution factors at different levels. Pursuant to the 
reviewed cycle of potential hazards and consequence mechanisms and also based upon 
literature and expert opinions, the contributory factors of each HG in view of its 
capacity to contribute to the failure of the MODUs are identified and ranked with the 
Fuzzy-AHP method. The result from this analysis shows that the drilling failure (L1D-
O1-01) is a critical item within identified HGs, as shown in Figure ‎4.2, and it is selected 
for assessment.  
Developing the hierarchical model includes the decomposition of the complex decision 
problem into smaller, manageable elements of different hierarchical levels as necessary. 
To have a manageable risk model, a four-level hierarchy is developed and is illustrated 
in Figure ‎4.2. The highest level of the hierarchy corresponds to the goal prioritisation of 
significance of the MODU’s risk, and the last layer corresponds to the evaluation of 
BEs. The Fuzzy inference system is applied at the lowest level of the hierarchy to infer 
the major risk parameters. These judgements will be carried out in the form of the pre- 
defined linguistics variables which will be explained in Section 4.3.3.3. Fuzzy-AHP is 
used at the higher levels to synthesise the contributory weight factors that will help to 
prioritise the MODU’s hazards.  
The risk factors will be ranked directly as per their numerical priorities in order to show 
their significance. By use of the experts’ judgements and pair-wise comparison matrices 
the local weights of the risk factors at different levels will be determined (e.g.. in Level 
1: WD1, WT1, WS1, WM1, WF1 and WC1). The global weights for Level 0 risk  
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Figure ‎4.2: Hazard identification and MODU’s operational hierarchy model; the highest level of the hierarchy corresponds to the goal 
prioritisation of significance of the MODU’s hazards, and the last layer (level 3) corresponds to the evaluation of BEs. 




L2D-H1:   Human Error 
L3D-N1-03:Wellbore influx / Kick                                    WD3N-3 
L3D-N1-04:Punch Through                                                WD3N-4
L3D-N1-05:Ground movement                                         WD3N-5
L3D-O1-01: Due to Drilling System  Failure              WD3O-1
L3D-O1-02: Due to Power System Failure                     WD3O-2
L3D-O1-03: Due to  Rig Control System Failure            WD3O-3
L3D-O1-05: Due to Water Handling System Failure    WD3O-5
L3D-O1-04: Due to Jacking System Failure                    WD3O-4
L3D-O1-06: Due to  ESD System Failure                         WD3O-6
L3D-H1-02: Management / Supervision / Staff             WD3H-2
L3D-H1-03: Individual- Competence/Motivation WD3H-3
L3D-N1-01:Present of high speed wind/wind/Current WD3N-1                                            
L3D-N1-02:Hole instability                                                WD3N-2    
L3D-O1-07: Due to Fuel System Failure                         WD3O-7
L3D-O1-08: Due to  Air/Hydraulic System Failure        WD3O-8
Level 0 Level  1 Level  2 Level 3
























L1C - vessel 
collision    WC1
L1D-Drilling 
Failure    WD1
L1S- Soil     Failure 
WS1
L1T-Towing Failure     
WT1
L1F-Fire / Expl. 
Misc WF1
L1M-Mooring 
Failure    WM1
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factors will be calculated directly by multiplying each local contribution’s weight 
factors at each level to its risk factors. After this calculation, the scores representing the 
degree of the risk for each event. The hierarchy is structured in such a way that the 
prioritisation of significance of the MODU’s risk is the main goal and is placed on the 
top of the hierarchy, labelled main goal. 
4.3.2.2 Establishing pair-wise comparison matrices 
The procedure for determining the contributory weights factors by Fuzzy-AHP can be 
summarised as follows: 
Step 1: Construct pair-wise comparison matrices among all the HGs in the dimensions 
of the hierarchy system. Assign linguistic terms to the pair-wise comparisons by asking 
which is the more important of each pair of HGs in terms of their capacity to contribute 
to the failure of the MODU. In AHP, multiple pair-wise comparisons are based on a 
standardised comparison scale of nine levels, as illustrated in Table  4.1 (Chen et al., 
2009; Yeh & Chang, 2009). Let C = [Cj / j = 1, 2 . . . n] be the set of criteria. The result 
of the pair-wise comparison on n criteria can be summarised in an (n x n) evaluation 
matrix, A, in which every element aij (i, j = 1,2, . . . ,n) is the measure of weights of the 
criteria, as shown below:  
Table  4.1: Nine-point intensity of importance scale and its definition 
Definition Intensity of Importance 
Equally important 
Moderately more important 
Strongly more important 
Very Strongly more important 
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 ( 4.2) 
The mathematical procedure begins to normalise and discover the relative weights for 
each matrix. The relative weights are identified by the eigenvector (W) corresponding to 
the maximum of Eigen value ( max ), which is essentially the underlying standard scale 
for the ranking of each element in the ratio matrix. Hence, determining the rankings for 
a set of elements essentially comes down to solving the eigenvector problem (Dag et al, 
2009). 
 AW = max W ( 4.3) 
If the pair-wise comparisons are completely consistent, the matrix A has rank 1 and 
max = n. In this case, weights can be achieved by normalising any of the rows or 
columns of matrix A (Wang & Yang, 2007). 
The concept of pair-wise comparison for solving AHP is given below: 
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 nWw w  ( )n  0W I w      and      1 2( , ,..., )nw w ww  (‎4.5) 
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In real circumstances, /i jw w  is unknown, but /ij i ja w w  and 1/ij jia a  (positive 




( )  0A I w  (‎4.6) 
find max  and find w  with max , and the C.I. can be calculated by Equation (‎4.7), 
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(‎4.9) 
iv.  When maxAw w , then max  can be estimated by max
1








The concept of pair-wise comparison for solving Fuzzy-AHP is given below: 
I.  Fuzzy [ ]ij n na A                 Fuzzy  1 2( , ,..., )nw w ww    ( 4.11) 
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w r r r r         ( 4.13) 
 Inverse operation of triangular Fuzzy number:  
1( , , ) (1/ ,1/ ,1/ )a b c c b a   ( 4.14) 
II.  Fuzzy [ ]ij n na A                      Crisp 1 2( , ,..., )nw w ww  ( 4.15) 
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( 4.16) 
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where lij and uij are the lower level and upper level of the Fuzzy number respectively 
and for a triangular Fuzzy number, ( , , )
j j j j
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 0,iw   1,2,...,i n                                                                               ( 4.18) 
III.  Crisp [ ]ij n na A   ( 4.19) 
         1
( ,..., ,..., )
j n
w w ww
;                                                                                        ( 4.20) 
4.3.2.3 Defuzzification and Fuzzy weight calculation 
The defuzzification process is capable of creating a single crisp value based on the 
Fuzzy conclusion set describing the priority level. The defuzzification process is the last 
step of the Fuzzy inference algorithm where the aggregated Fuzzy output is converted 
into a crisp number. In other words, defuzzification is a technique to translate the Fuzzy 
number into a crisp real number, or defuzzification is defined as a function mapping a 
Fuzzy set to a certain crisp number. The procedure of defuzzification is to locate the 
best non Fuzzy performance value. There are many defuzzification methods that 
convert the Fuzzy consequents into crisp values (i.e. weighted by the degree of truth at 
which the membership functions reach their maximum values (Pillay & Wang, 2002), 
the algorithm that averages the points of maximum possibility of each priority level and 
α-cut Method). This research employs the Center-of-Area method due to its simplicity 
of calling for the analyst’s personal judgement and providing sensible results 
(Abdolvand et al., 2008). The method to calculate the crisp number for a Triangular 
Fuzzy Number (TFN) is to calculate the centre of the Fuzzy number’s triangular area, 
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shown in Figure ‎4.3 (Mikhailov, 2004 & Karahalios, 2009). The defuzzified value of a 








 ( 4.21) 
  
Figure ‎4.3: Defuzzification of a triangular Fuzzy number 
4.3.2.4 Hierarchy consistency ratio checking 
Calculating a consistency ratio is the next stage of the AHP process in order to measure 
how consistent the judgements have been, where the Consistency Index is CI, the 
Consistency Ratio is CR, λmax is the largest eigenvalue of the pair-wise comparison 
matrix, n is the matrix order and Random index is RI. Table 4.2 shows a set of 
recommended RI values presented by Saaty (2005). 
Table ‎4.2: Random index (RI) 
 
When CR values are larger than 0.10 for a matrix larger than 4×4, it indicates an 
inconsistent judgement. Decision-makers should revise the original values in the pair-
wise comparison matrix. 
4.3.2.5 Risk aggregation and risk ranking 
In order to convert the linguistic expressions into Fuzzy numbers and aggregate the 
experts’ opinions, there are various methods to aggregate Fuzzy numbers. In the process 
N 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RI 0 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.4 1.45 1.49
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of a ranking, every measure under consideration is ranked in the direction of the 
decision-makers’ preference. To produce principle values for each HG, each factor was 
weighted according to the estimated contribution to and significance for the MODU’s 
operation system failure. Clemen & Winkler (1999) elucidated that, due to different 
opinions regarding the possibility of the BEs, it is essential to combine or aggregate the 
opinions into a single one; Figure ‎4.4 illustrates the basic building blocks of the 
proposed hierarchical structural model for the risk aggregation. Each basic event is 
partitioned into its contributory factors, which are the result of Fuzzy-AHP and each of 
those can be further partitioned into upper-level contributory factors. 
A coding system is considered consisting of the BE factors, i.e. Rf(L3,N1) to Rf(L3,N3), for 
the Natural Hazard BEs and their contributory factors WD3N-1 to WD3N-5, Rf(L3,O1) to 
Rf(L3,O8) for the Operational BEs and their contributory factors WD3O-1 to WD3O-8, 
and Rf(L3,H1) to Rf(L3,H3) for the Human BEs and their contributory factors WD3H-1 to 
WD3H-3. As was explained, a risk unit without contributory factors is called a BE.  
The evaluation of aggregative risk of the MODUs is carried out using a three-step 
procedure, as shown in Figure ‎4.4. As illustrated in Table ‎4.3, the BE factors is 
described by seven linguistic variables (i.e. Lf1, Lf2, Lf3, Lf4, Lf5, Lf6, and Lf7). These 
linguistic variables were defined as Very Low, Low, Mol. Low, Medium Low, Mol. 
High, High, and Very High, respectively (Chen & Hwang, 1992).  
Table ‎4.3: Logistics variable where the BEs are described by seven linguistic variables  
  
(Chen and Hwang, 1992) 
 
a b c d
Very Low 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
u(x) 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
Low 0.1 0.2 0.3
u(x) 0.0 1.0 0.0
Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
u(x) 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6
u(x) 0.0 1.0 0.0
Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
u(x) 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
High 0.7 0.8 0.9
u(x) 0.0 1.0 0.0
Very High 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0
u(x) 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
Lf7
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Figure ‎4.4: A three-stage structural model for risk aggregation 
L3D-N1-01                                                          WD3N-1 Rf(L3,N1)
L3D-N1-02                                                         WD3N-2 Rf(L3,N2)
WD2N Rf(L2,N1)
L3D-N1-03                                                        WD3N-3 Rf(L3,N3)
L3D-N1-04                                                          WD3N-4 Rf(L3,N4)












WD2H Rf(L2,H1) L3D-H1-03 WD3H-3 Rf(L3,H3)
     L2D-N1:              Natural 
Hazard       
L2D-O1:   Operational 
hazard
    L2D-H1:        Human error    











   
   
A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk                             CHAPTER 4: Fuzzy Risk Assessment 




These linguistic variables were then defined by Trapezoidal Fuzzy Numbers (TPFNs) 
with membership functions shown in Table ‎4.3. The assessment matrix for risk items of 
attribute in Level-2 can be established for Rf (L2, N1), Rf (L2, O1) and Rf (L2, H1) 
individually. As shown in the Risk Aggregation Matrix in Table ‎4.4, for the Rf (L2, 
H1), the BEs involved are Rf (L3, H1), Rf (L3, H2) and Rf (L3, H3) while the 
corresponding contributory weight factors of risk are WD3H-1, WD3H-2 and WD3H-3 
respectively. 
Table ‎4.4: Risk aggregation matrix 
 
4.3.3 Assessment of Fuzzy model 
The probability of detecting a failure in advance is not a crisp event and uncertainty is 
associated with it. When performing FMECA, it may be difficult or even impossible to 
precisely determine the probability of failure events. Much information about FMECA 
is expressed linguistically, such as ‘likely’, ‘important’ or ‘very high’. This uncertainty 
can be better handled with FL using an appropriate membership function to arrive at an 
estimated appropriate possibility level. It is always difficult to evaluate these linguistic 
















Basic Events Risk 
Factor 
L3D-N1-01                                                          WD3N-1 Rf(L3,N1)
L3D-N1-02                                                         WD3N-2 Rf (L3,N2)
L2D-N1 WD2N Rf (L2,N1) L3D-N1-03                                                        WD3N-3 Rf (L3,N3)
L3D-N1-04                                                          WD3N-4 Rf (L3,N4)
L3D-N1-05                                                         WD3N-5 Rf (L3,N5)
L3D-O1-01 WD3O-1 Rf (L3,O1)
L3D-O1-02 WD3O-2 Rf (L3,O2)
L3D-O1-03 WD3O-3 Rf (L3,O3)
L1D-D WD1N Rf (L1,N) L2D-O1 WD2O Rf (L2,O1) L3D-O1-04 WD3O-4 Rf (L3,O4)
L3D-O1-05 WD3O-5 Rf (L3,O5)
L3D-O1-06 WD3O-6 Rf (L3,O6)
L3D-O1-07 WD3O-7 Rf (L3,O7)
L3D-O1-08 WD3O-8 Rf (L3,O8)
L3D-H1-01 WD3H-1 Rf (L3,H1)
L2D-H1 WD2H Rf (L2,H1) L3D-H1-01 WD3H-2 Rf (L3,H2)
L3D-H1-01 WD3H-3 Rf (L3,H3)
Level  1 Level  2 Level  3 (Basic events) 
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relative and subjective. It is usually a Fuzzy concept in the sense that there is not any 
unique risk associated with a hazardous event occurring in a given period (Karwowski 
& Mital, 1986). Therefore, risk assessment deals with quantities which are inherently 
imprecise and whose future values are uncertain. Linguistic categories or levels (e.g., 
very high, high, medium, low, very low), instead of absolute numbers, are adopted 
because each linguistic category or level can deal up to certain extend with the various 
and uncertain risk values by including a range or set of numbers.  
Figure ‎4.5 shows an overall view of the proposed Fuzzy FMECA assessment system, in 
which there are three major steps to carry out the assessment, namely fuzzification, rule 
evaluation, and defuzzification. The system firstly uses linguistic variables to describe 
the severity, frequency of occurrence, and detectability of the failure. These inputs are 
then ‘fuzzified’ to determine the degree of membership in each input class. The 
resulting ‘Fuzzy inputs’ are evaluated using a linguistic rule base and FL operations to 
yield a classification of the riskiness of the failure mode and an associated degree of 
membership in the risk class. This ‘Fuzzy output’ is then ‘defuzzified’ to give the 
prioritisation level for the failure mode.  
 
Figure ‎4.5: Structure of FMECA based on Fuzzy theory. 
                    Source: Ruey (2010) 
4.3.3.1 Fuzzy membership functions 
The membership function is a curve that defines how each point in the input space is 
mapped to a membership value between 0 and 1. However, the determination of a 
membership function is difficult and complicated. Any shape of a membership function 
is possible, but the selected shape should be justified by the available information. Ross 
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(2004) discussed several methods of determining membership functions. It is also 
believed that in some cases the expressions of membership functions are not the 
dominant factors in engineering applications (Klir & Yuan, 1995). 
A Fuzzy number is a Fuzzy subset of a real number and it represents an expansion of 
the confidence interval. According to Dubois and Prade’s (1978) definition, a Fuzzy 
number means a Fuzzy set and its membership function. FST has developed as an 
alternative to ordinary (crisp) set theory and is used to describe Fuzzy sets and that 
membership in a Fuzzy set is a matter of degree (Friedlob & Schleifer, 1999). 
Let X denote a universal set. Then a Fuzzy subset of X is defined by its membership 
function: )1,0(:~ x
A
  which is assigned to each element           a real number )(~ x
A
  
in the interval (0, 1), where the value, of )(~ x
A
 at x represents the grade of membership 
of x in .
~
A Thus, the nearer the value of )(~ x
A
  is to unity, the higher the grade of 
membership of  x in A
~
(Sakawa, 2002).  
A Triangular Fuzzy Number (TFN) is a special type of Fuzzy number with three 
parameters, each representing the linguistic variable associated with a degree of 
membership of 0 or 1. Since it is shown to be very convenient and easily implemented 
in arithmetic operations, the TFN is also commonly used in practice (Liou & Chen, 
2006). A TFN A
~
 is defined by a triplet (a, b, c). The membership function )(~ x
A
  of x 


























  ( 4.22) 
Suppose a Trapezoidal Fuzzy Number (TPFN), A
~
 is defined by a quadruplet (a, b, c, 
d). The membership function )(~ x
A
  of x is as below:  
Xx
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)(~  ( 4.23) 
The algebraic operation for the TFN can be displayed as follows (Chiu, 2006; 
Abdolvand et al., 2008) and the same algorithm is applicable for TPFNs.  
Addition ( ):   
 ),,(),,(),,( 212121222111 uummllumluml   ( 4.24) 
Multiplication ( ): 
 ),,(),,(),,( 212121222111 uummllumluml   ( 4.25) 
Any real number of k:         
                         ),,(),,( kukmklumlk    ( 4.26) 
Subtraction (-): 
 ),,(),,(),,( 212121222111 uummllumluml    ( 4.27) 
Division (÷): 
 ),,(),,(),,( 212121222111 uummllumluml    ( 4.28) 
4.3.3.2 Linguistic variables 
According to Zadeh (1975), it is very challenging for conventional quantification to 
sensibly express those circumstances that are obviously complex or hard to define; 
therefore, the perception of a linguistic variable is essential in such situations. A 
linguistic variable is an adjustable whose values are words or judgements in a natural or 
artificial language. The concept of a Fuzzy number plays an essential role in 
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formulating quantitative Fuzzy variables. These are variables whose states are Fuzzy 
numbers. When, in addition, the Fuzzy numbers represent linguistic concepts, such as 
very small, small, medium, and are understood in a particular environment, the resulting 
hypotheses are usually called linguistic variables (Klir & Yuan, 1995). Subjective 
linguistic variables will be further defined in terms of membership functions in order to 
find out how each point in the input space is plotted to a membership value between 0 
and 1 (see Figure ‎4.6, Figure ‎4.7 and Figure 4.8) and the simplest are the TFN and 
TPFN (Li & Liao, 2007). In this chapter, it is preferred to use TPFNs to represent the 
linguistic variables shown in Table ‎4.3. In creating use of the FL, the experts were 
invited to define each membership function and the values using the interpretations of 
the linguistic terms referred to in Table ‎4.7 (Pillay & Wang, 2003). 
Estimating weights of experts 
The weighting of experts is determined according to Table  4.5. If an expert is 
considered better than others, then he/she is given a larger weight. 
Table  4.5: Experts’ weighting scores  
 
Experts’ weights are obtained by estimating weight scores and weight factors of experts. 
Weight scores and weight factors of experts can be obtained by using Equation (‎4.29) 
and Equation (‎4.30) respectively and the weight of each expert is presented in Table ‎4.6 
(e.g. weight factor for Expert 1 is 0.3) 
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Weight score of expert = Score of expert (F1) + Score of expert (F2) + Score of 
expert (F3)   
(‎4.29)    
Weight factor of expert = (Weight score of expert )/ (       Weight score of expert    ) 
 (‎4.30) 
 
Table  4.6: Experts’ weights estimating by using weight from Equation (‎4.29) and 
Equation (‎4.30) 
 
4.3.3.3 Linguistic risk levels 
This research uses linguistic variables to denote the risk events, i.e. PO, SC and DV, of 
each failure mode. With consideration of some limitations on our ability to treat 
information, in 1956, Miller published a paper entitled “The magical number seven, 
plus or minus two” (Miller, 1956). With respect to this, it is often suggested that the 
number of linguistic terms for judgements should be limited to between five and nine 
(Karwowski & Mital, 1986). In this research, each linguistic variable has seven 
descriptive linguistic terms and these linguistic terms can be represented quantitatively 
by a range of probabilities, as illustrated in Table ‎4.7. Chen & Hwang (1992) 
recommended different scales of linguistic terms for expert assessment. Scale 6, which 
encloses trapezoidal membership functions, is implemented to present mathematically 
the PO, SC and DV levels of hazards in this research.  
After the determination of the linguistic levels for PO, SC and DV, one must determine 
the appropriate mathematical expressions using membership functions for Fuzzy 
numbers. In the proposed Fuzzy FMECA approach, several experts are required to 
develop the membership functions of the three variables. Furthermore, the numbers 
associated with linguistic risk levels are also considered as an important factor in 



















Expert 1 Engineer 3 Bachelor (B.Sc.) 3  20-30 4 10 0.30
Expert 2 Engineer   3 Master (M.Sc.) 4  > 30 years 5 12 0.36
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2003). Experts generally use the linguistic variable to assess the importance of a 
criterion over another criterion or even to rate the alternatives with respect to different 
criteria.  
Table ‎4.7: Linguistic definitions of grades for PO, SC and DV  
 
A Fuzzy number describes the relationship between an uncertain quantity and a 
membership function, µ, ranging between 0 and 1. Let the PO of a failure be defined by 
TPFNPO, the SC of failure by TPFNSC and also DV by TPFNDV. Table ‎4.7 demonstrates a 
seven-grade qualitative scaling system for the PO, SC and DV and the membership 
functions. Experts need to select linguistic terms for presenting their opinions by their 
preference. It is not demanded that all experts must use the same linguistic terms and it 
is not required for all linguistic terms to be placed symmetrically and to have an 
outcome. Therefore, experts and decision-makers have more independent right to 
present their opinions; also, each linguistic term should be treated as a whole and the 
only concern is about its determinacy and consistency (Ma et al., 2007; Karahalios, 
2009). Based on the definition of risk, Equation ( 4.1) and seven grades for PO, SC and 
DV (Table ‎4.7), the relative grades of risk are obtained and demonstrated in Figure ‎4.6, 
Figure ‎4.7 and Figure ‎4.8. 
a b c d
Very Low Minore Very High 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
u(x) u(x) u(x) 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
Low Very Low High 0.1 0.2 0.3
u(x) u(x) u(x) 0.0 1.0 0.0
Mol. Low Low Moderate 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
u(x) u(x) u(x) 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
Medium Moderate Low 0.4 0.5 0.6
u(x) u(x) u(x) 0.0 1.0 0.0
Mol. High High Remote 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
u(x) u(x) u(x) 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
High Very High Very remote 0.7 0.8 0.9
u(x) u(x) u(x) 0.0 1.0 0.0
Very High Hazardous without warning Absolutely impossible 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0
u(x) u(x) u(x) 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
Scaling system for severity of 
consequence (SC)
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Figure ‎4.6: Linguistic terms of probability of occurrence (PO) 
 
 
Figure ‎4.7: Linguistic terms of severity of consequence (SC) 
 
 
Figure ‎4.8: Linguistic terms of detection of vulnerability (DV) 
According to the definition in the standard categories of risk level can be determined as 
shown in the following example: Rf Moderate = PO Low ⊗ SC Moderate ⊗ DV Remote 
denotes Fuzzy risk variable and is presented in Figure ‎4.9 and Table ‎4.8 shows the 
qualitative scales for risk and TPFNs.  
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Figure ‎4.9: Linguistic terms of Rf . 
 
 
Table ‎4.8: Qualitative scales for risk and TPFN 
 
4.4 Case study: Fuzzy risk assessment of a JDR 
In Section 4.3 of this chapter, a methodology for the MODU’s risk assessment is 
presented and formalised. In this section, the application and how the proposed 
methodology is implemented and deployed will be discussed. A JDR, one of the most 
popular types of mobile offshore units, which plays a very important role in the drilling, 
exploration and production processes in offshore industries, is selected as a case study. 
MODUs and JDRs also share the common problems of data uncertainty. Therefore, to 
N0.
1 Very Low 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.008
U(x) 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
2 Low 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.027
U(x) 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
3 Mol. Low 0.008 0.027 0.064 0.125
U(x) 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
4 Medium 0.000 0.064 0.125 0.216
U(x) 0.000 1.000 0.000
5 Mol. High 0.125 0.216 0.343 0.512
U(x) 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
6 High 0.000 0.343 0.512 0.729
U(x) 0.000 1.000 0.000
7 Very High 0.512 0.729 1.000 1.000
U(x) 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
Scaling system for Rf
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obtain a general evaluation of the risk level of the JDR, it is necessary to consider the 
hazards due to operation. It must be noted that the principles used for the HAZID which 
were presented in Chapter 3 are similar to the ones for the JDR, and the same HG for 
risk assessment of the JDR is considered. The main step of the research’s practical work 
is that the hierarchy of system components of the JDR is defined and the relevant 
weight of each of the components has been calculated. As is shown in Figure ‎4.10, there 
are many hazards with different natures and categories but in this study only the ones 
with a high potential failure rate (i.e. Failure due to Drilling) which can directly affect 
people, the environment, asset and reputation will be examined. That means failure of 
the JDR will be regarded as an illustrative risk factor for the purpose of this case study. 
Therefore, the most critical events on the JDR operation can be mitigated in a timely 
manner before they turn to failure. 
4.4.1 Implementation and evaluation of the proposed framework 
The general Fuzzy-AHP evaluation method should be an effective approach, because 
there are many factors that have an effect on the JDR’s risk assessment and it is usually 
very difficult to fully quantify all the factors. However, there is little convincing 
technical research regarding the use of this method in the JDR’s risk assessment. On the 
basis of investigation and consulting relevant documentations and experts, the HAZID 
index is established. The data collection process consists of two stages, which are 
required to develop the Fuzzy expert judgement system, as well as collecting 
information required for model building and data for the case study of a JDR system. 
The case study is gathered and analysed to prove the concept of the developed model. 
An expert panel can determine the grade and importance of risk for each risk item. 
Expert judgement was used to develop a qualitative scale for both contributory factors 
and risk factors for BEs. With this qualitative scale, the aggregative JDR risk can then 
be determined from the hierarchical structural model shown in Figure ‎4.10. 
The JDR’s HG consists of six categories, i.e. L1S- Soil Failure, L1D-Drilling Failure, 
L1T-Towing Failure, L1M-Mooring Failure, L1V - Vessel Collision, L1F-Fire / 
Explosion Misc. Each category also contains many single performance indexes; for 
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example, L1D-Drilling Failure contains Natural Hazard risk (L1D-N1), Operational 
Failure risk (L1D-O1) and Failure due to Human risk (L1D-H1). 
 
Figure ‎4.10: JDR’s HG ranking 
The framework of the evaluation index is demonstrated in Figure ‎4.2. Linguistic terms 
are assigned to the pair-wise comparisons by asking which is the more important of 
each pair of HGs in terms of their capacity to contribute to the failure of the JDRs. 
Table ‎4.9 illustrates the pair-wise comparison matrices among all the HGs in the 
dimensions of the hierarchy system. The result of the pair-wise comparisons of HGs is 
summarised and ranked in Table ‎4.10. The result from this analysis shows that the 
Drilling Failure (L1D) is a critical item within the identified HGs as shown in 










People 0.481 People 0.341 People 0.432 People 0.339 People 0.384 People 0.377
Asset 0.145 Asset 0.175 Asset 0.130 Asset 0.178 Asset 0.158 Asset 0.132
Environment 0.263 Environment 0.332 Environment 0.328 Environment 0.327 Environment 0.286 Environment 0.334
Reputation 0.111 Reputation 0.153 Reputation 0.109 Reputation 0.157 Reputation 0.173 Reputation 0.158












Mobile Offshore Drilling Failure                                                                         
[ Jack-up Drilling Rig (JDR) Failure ]  (W=1)
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Table ‎4.9: Pair-wise comparisons matrix of HGs of JDR 
 
 
Table ‎4.10: Ranking of HGs of a JDR 
 
4.4.1.1 Constructing the hierarchical framework of a JDR 
Figure ‎4.2 represents a hierarchical structural model of aggregative risk involving three 
major attributes of the JDR, i.e. Natural hazard (L2D-N1) with the relevant weight of 
contribution (WD2N), Operational failure (L2D-O1) with the relevant weight of 
contribution (WD2O) and failure due to Human error (L2D-H1) with the relevant 
weight of contribution (WD2H) at attribute Level-2. Each Level-2 attribute is divided 
further into its Level-3 attributes, (e.g. Failure due to Human error is divided into three 
























   



























































L1S- Soil Failure  1 0.90 1.25 1.58 1.75 1.81
L1D-Drilling Failure      1.111 1 1.167 1.542 1.729 1.792
L1T-Towing Failure 0.803 0.86 1 1.450 1.675 1.750
L1M-Mooring Failure  0.631 0.65 0.69 1 1.409 1.545
L1V - vessel collision 0.570 0.58 0.60 0.71 1 1.231
L1F-Fire / Explosion Misc 0.552 0.56 0.57 0.65 0.81 1
No Ranking Value
1 L1D-Drilling Failure      0.22
2 L1S- Soil Failure  0.21
3 L1T-Towing Failure 0.19
4 L1M-Mooring Failure  0.15
5 L1V - vessel collision 0.12
6 L1F-Fire / Explosion Misc 0.11
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(L3D-H1-01), Drilling failure due to management/supervision/staff (L3D-H1-02) and 
individual competence/motivation (L3D-H1-O3)). 
The risk factors for BEs are proposed to be implemented at the lower levels of the 
hierarchy. The hierarchical model structure consists of sixteen BEs at Level 3, which 
correspond to the three main categories in level 2. The basic risk factor of level 3 will 
be combined with the results of these fifteen contributions’ weight factors of the Fuzzy-
AHP hierarchy in order to generate the risk of the JDR’s failure. The crisp defuzzified 
results of the three categories, i.e. Natural hazard (L1D-N1), Operational Failure (L1D-
O1) and failure due to Human error (L1D-H1) are combined together through a model 
hierarchy which calculates the risk of failure index of the JDR. 
4.4.1.2 Constructing a Fuzzy-AHP framework and Fuzzy judgement matrix  
Table ‎4.11 shows the comparison matrix for comparing dimensions in level 3 in terms 
of relative contribution and importance of their capacity to lead to the JDR’s failure. 
After each element has been compared, a paired comparison matrix is formed in 
Table ‎4.12 where 8 is the order of matrix. 
Table ‎4.11: Pair-wise comparison matrix for BEs 
 
Then the consistency property in the pair-wise comparison is examined by the stepwise 
procedure as presented in Section 4.3. 



















































L3D-O1-01 1.00 1.26 1.37 1.47 1.53 1.58 1.68 1.63 WD3O-1 0.17
L3D-O1-02 0.8 1.00 1.14 1.29 1.4 1.43 1.57 1.5 WD3O-2 0.15
L3D-O1-03 0.7 0.88 1.00 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.50 1.4 WD3O-3 0.14
L3D-O1-04 0.7 0.78 0.86 1.00 1.10 1.20 0.60 0.80 WD3O-4 0.11
L3D-O1-05 0.66 0.74 0.80 0.91 1.00 1.11 1.33 1.22 WD3O-5 0.11
L3D-O1-06: 0.63 0.70 0.8 0.83 0.9 1.00 1.25 1.1 WD3O-6 0.11
L3D-O1-07 0.59 0.64 0.67 1.7 0.75 0.8 1.00 0.83 WD3O-7 0.10
L3D-O1-08 0.61 0.67 0.71 1.25 0.82 0.89 1.20 1.00 WD3O-8 0.11
Ranking alternatives for L2D-O1: Operational 
Contribution 
weight Factor
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Table ‎4.12: Weights of contributory factors for BEs  
 
 
Figure ‎4.11: A three-stage structural model for risk aggregation of a JDR 
 
Figure ‎4.11 shows the building blocks of the JDR’s hierarchical structural model for 
risk aggregation. Each BE is partitioned into its contributory factors, which are the 
result of Fuzzy-AHP, and each of those can be further partitioned into upper-level 
contributory factors. Each factor was weighted according to the estimated significance 
of the JDR’s failure. 
Basic Event Basic Event
L3D-O1-01 WD3O-1 0.17 L3D-N1-01                                                          WD3N-1 0.08
L3D-O1-02 WD3O-2 0.15 L3D-N1-02                                                         WD3N-2 0.37
L3D-O1-03 WD3O-3 0.14 L3D-N1-03                                                        WD3N-3 0.26
L3D-O1-04 WD3O-4 0.11 L3D-N1-04                                                          WD3N-4 0.09
L3D-O1-05 WD3O-5 0.11 L3D-N1-05                                                         WD3N-5 0.20
L3D-O1-06 WD3O-6 0.11 L3D-H1-01 WD3H-1 0.33
L3D-O1-07 WD3O-7 0.10 L3D-H1-02 WD3H-2 0.33
L3D-O1-08 WD3O-8 0.11 L3D-H1-03 WD3H-3 0.33
AHP-Weight AHP-Weight
Crisp Value
      Risk      
(Level 3)
      Risk      
(Level 2)
      Risk      
(Level 1)
L3D-N1-01                                                          WD3N-1 0.08 0.44 0.036
L3D-N1-02                                                         WD3N-2 0.37 0.64 0.236
WD2N 0.20
L3D-N1-03                                                        WD3N-3 0.26 0.46 0.119
L3D-N1-04                                                          WD3N-4 0.09 0.44 0.040
L3D-N1-05                                                         WD3N-5 0.20 0.42 0.084
L3D-O1-01 WD3O-1 0.17 0.38 0.064
L3D-O1-02 WD3O-2 0.15 0.47 0.070
L3D-O1-03 WD3O-3 0.14 0.43 0.060
WD2N 0.35 L3D-O1-04 WD3O-4 0.11 0.53 0.059
WD1 0.22
L3D-O1-05 WD3O-5 0.11 0.59 0.065
L3D-O1-06 WD3O-6 0.11 0.41 0.045
L3D-O1-07 WD3O-7 0.10 0.38 0.038
L3D-O1-08 WD3O-8 0.11 0.47 0.052
L3D-H1-01 WD3H-1 0.45 0.58 0.263
L3D-H1-02 WD3H-2 0.30 0.56 0.168
WD2N 0.45 L3D-H1-03 WD3H-3 0.25 0.56 0.140
L2D-O1: Operational   WD2O 





L2D-N1:             Natural 
Hazard       
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4.4.2 The estimation of the risk and decision-making 
The full view of the hierarchical Fuzzy model is shown in Figure ‎4.2, which details the 
processing of the observed characteristics of the JDR system. The proposed framework 
is capable of quantifying judgements from experts who express their opinions 
qualitatively. The first step of the proposed framework is to obtain the risk of each 
hazard by using FST.  
The second step is to calculate weight factors for each hazard in the framework. Since 
the study incorporates FST into a Fuzzy-AHP method, a set of linguistic priority terms 
along with the membership functions describing the relationship between elements in 
each hierarchy of the AHP is adopted. Thus, the pair-wise comparisons between the 
elements in each hierarchy using FST are established. The linguistic variables which 
were defined by Rf s with membership functions are shown in Table ‎4.13. Then, the 
Fuzzy expressions are subsequently converted into a single crisp value using an 
appropriate defuzzification method. This is followed by the weighting contributory 
factors calculation so as to obtain the relative importance of elements illustrated in 
Table ‎4.14. By repeating the steps above, the risk of each element in the hierarchy is 
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Table ‎4.13: Linguistic definitions of grades for PO, SC and DV  
 
PO High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.303 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.333
SC Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.364 Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.333
DV Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.364 Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.333
PO Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.333
SC Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.303 Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.364 Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.333
DV Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.333
PO Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.333
SC High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.333
DV Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.333
PO High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.303 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.333
SC Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.364 Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.333
DV Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.364 Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.333
PO Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.333
SC High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.303 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.364 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.333
DV Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.333
PO Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.333
SC Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.333
DV Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.333
PO Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.333
SC Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.333
DV Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.333
PO Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.333
SC Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.333
DV Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.333
PO High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.333
SC Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.333
DV Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.333
PO High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.333
SC Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.303 Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.364 Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.333
DV Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.333
PO Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.333
SC Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.333
DV Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.333
PO Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.333
SC Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.333
DV Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.333
PO Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.333
SC High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.333
DV Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.333
PO Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.333
SC High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.303 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.333
DV Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.333
PO Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.333
SC Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.333
DV Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.333
PO Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.333
SC Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.333












L3D-N1-05                                                        0.13
L3D-N1-04                                                         0.13
L3D-N1-03                                                         0.14
L3D-N1-02                                                         0.19
L3D-N1-01                                                          0.13
Linguistic 
terms 








Expert (1) Expert (2) Expert (3)
Crisp 
No.
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Table ‎4.14: Weights of contributory factors and crisp value of BEs  
 
4.4.2.1 Risk aggregation and risk ranking matrix 
As illustrated in Table ‎4.15, the risk aggregation matrix for the JDR is established and 
as showed in Figure ‎4.12 the contributory factors as well as the BE calculated factors 
for all three levels are presented. 
Table ‎4.15: Risk aggregation matrix  
 
Basic Event Fuzzy-Crisp Value
L3D-N1-01                                                          WD3N-1 0.08 0.44
L3D-N1-02                                                         WD3N-2 0.37 0.64
L3D-N1-03                                                        WD3N-3 0.26 0.46
L3D-N1-04                                                          WD3N-4 0.09 0.44
L3D-N1-05                                                         WD3N-5 0.20 0.42
L3D-O1-01 WD3O-1 0.17 0.38
L3D-O1-02 WD3O-2 0.15 0.47
L3D-O1-03 WD3O-3 0.14 0.43
L3D-O1-04 WD3O-4 0.11 0.53
L3D-O1-05 WD3O-5 0.11 0.59
L3D-O1-06 WD3O-6 0.11 0.41
L3D-O1-07 WD3O-7 0.10 0.38
L3D-O1-08 WD3O-8 0.11 0.47
L3D-H1-01 WD3H-1 0.33 0.58
L3D-H1-02 WD3H-2 0.33 0.56

















Basic Events Risk 
Factor 
L3D-N1-01                                                          0.08 0.44
L3D-N1-02                                                         0.37 0.64
L2D-N1 WD2N 0.20 L3D-N1-03                                                        0.26 0.46
L3D-N1-04                                                          0.09 0.44










L2D-H1 WD2H 0.45 L3D-H1-01 0.33 0.56
L3D-H1-01 0.33 0.56
Level  1  Level  2  Level  3 (Basic events) 
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Figure  4.12: Risk aggregation hierarchy and risk ranking  
Crisp Value
      Risk      
(Level 3)
      Risk      
(Level 2)
      Risk      
(Level 1)
L3D-N1-01                                                          WD3N-1 0.08 0.44 0.036
L3D-N1-02                                                         WD3N-2 0.37 0.64 0.236
WD2N 0.20
L3D-N1-03                                                        WD3N-3 0.26 0.46 0.119
L3D-N1-04                                                          WD3N-4 0.09 0.44 0.040
L3D-N1-05                                                         WD3N-5 0.20 0.42 0.084
L3D-O1-01 WD3O-1 0.17 0.38 0.064
L3D-O1-02 WD3O-2 0.15 0.47 0.070
L3D-O1-03 WD3O-3 0.14 0.43 0.060
WD2N 0.35 L3D-O1-04 WD3O-4 0.11 0.53 0.059
WD1 0.22
L3D-O1-05 WD3O-5 0.11 0.59 0.065
L3D-O1-06 WD3O-6 0.11 0.41 0.045
L3D-O1-07 WD3O-7 0.10 0.38 0.038
L3D-O1-08 WD3O-8 0.11 0.47 0.052
L3D-H1-01 WD3H-1 0.45 0.58 0.263
L3D-H1-02 WD3H-2 0.30 0.56 0.168
WD2N 0.45 L3D-H1-03 WD3H-3 0.25 0.56 0.140
L2D-O1: Operational   WD2O 





L2D-N1:             Natural 
Hazard       
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4.5 Results and discussion 
In this study, a model is established in order to assess the MODU’s risk level. This 
model is based on determining the most significant HG that may cause failure of the 
MODUs. Risk assessments of MODUs provide valuable information to the decision-
maker regarding the risk level of an operation system, although the quality of risk 
assessment not only relates to the scientific building blocks of the assessments but is 
also dependent on the role of the assessments in the decision-making process.  
The application and how the proposed methodology takes into account the challenging 
characteristics of the MODU’s risk assessment effectively provides information for 
decision-makers as well as a reduced risk to the MODU, by estimating risk levels and 
assessing their significance. This helps decide whether the risks need to be reduced, 
whist identifying the main contributors to the risk, helps in understanding the nature of 
the hazards and suggests possible targets for risk-reduction measure. Evaluating risk 
reduction measures can be linked to a cost-benefit analysis and help choose the most 
cost-effective ways of reducing the risk. 
4.6 Conclusion 
QRA is a necessary and critical task for offshore operations. Understanding risk 
assessment entails understanding the underlying factors that contribute to the MODU’s 
failure, which are often the same regardless of the nature of the offshore installation 
activities. In this study, Fuzzy set theory is used to represent the characteristics of a 
hazard such as likelihood of occurrence and consequence severity, and Fuzzy-AHP is 
used to determine the degree of importance of the factors and sub-factors in the model 
of each HG in terms of its contributions to the MODU’s failure. In risk assessment, the 
issue of how to manage uncertainty is a major concern. However, the causes of 
uncertainty are diverse. Thus, regardless of what approach is to be applied, it is always 
dependent upon human judgement to manage such negative effects. In other words, the 
deficiencies of risk modelling resulting from the lack of information or a high level of 
uncertainty must be addressed by means of the general evaluation capacity of humans, 
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who are able to grasp the essence of an object, even if it is vague and unclear. 
Therefore, the experience of experts consulted is crucial, since the cornerstone of such 
uncertainty treatment is the professional judgement of such personnel. The risk 
assessment frameworks proposed and based on FST in this study are capable of 
handling imprecise, ambiguous and qualitative information from experts in a consistent 
manner. These can be regarded as reliable reasoning processes with the capability of 
quantifying the judgement from experts who express their opinions qualitatively. The 
frameworks have been developed in a generic sense to be applicable to deal with both 
engineering and managerial problems. It is also believed that these methods can be 
tailored to practical applications of dealing with safety problems in other industries, 
especially in situations where a high level of uncertainty exists. The implementation of 
the described approaches could have a highly beneficial effect in real life. More 
importantly, these frameworks can be integrated to formulate a platform to facilitate risk 
assessment of the MODU’s operations system without jeopardising the efficiency of 
operations in a variety of situations where traditional techniques may not be applied 
with confidence. In offshore safety, under circumstances where a lack of data or a high 
level of uncertainty exists, a large number of assumptions, judgements and opinions are 
involved subjectively in the reasoning process. Other than an approximate reasoning 
approach, new approaches capable of addressing uncertainty and combining expert 
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5 CHAPTER 5: Fuzzy FTA for MODU’s risk assessment 
Chapter Summary 
Risk is a quantitative value which reflects the adverse outcome of an activity or event in 
terms of the probability of occurrence. Probabilistic risk assessment is a comprehensive, 
structured method for identifying hazards and assessing risk in complex systems. Many 
techniques and methodologies are available to conduct both qualitative and QRA. FTA 
is used in qualitative risk assessment to identify the basic causes leading to an undesired 
event, to represent the logical relationships of these basic causes in leading to the event, 
and finally to calculate the probability of occurrence of this event in a system. A new 
methodology for the assessment of the risk level of the MODUs is presented that 
considers in detail the operational failure of the drilling systems focusing on mud 
circulation and the BOP systems. The main purpose is to propose a methodology to 
improve the present procedures used in the risk assessment of Mobile MODUs. The 
proposed methodology comprises a number of stages: i) Identifying critical events that 
may lead to the MODU’s operation system failure, ii) Establishing an operational 
hierarchy system diagram with a breakdown of the events in detail for the most 
significant HG, iii) Translating into FT and performing the analysis in order to identify 
areas for further safety improvement, and iv) Determination of minimal cut sets (MCSs) 
probability analysis and measures to rank the MCSs according to their contributions to 
the failure of MODU systems. FTA is a widely used reliability assessment tool for 
complex engineering systems. However, due to the inherent imprecision and uncertainty 
of the available data, it is often impossible to obtain an exact estimation of the rate of 
occurrence of an event or its probability distribution function. To reduce the ambiguity 
and imprecision arising from the subjectivity of data, a Fuzzy approach may be used 
with the FTA method. The aim is to prevent a critical event occurring during drilling 
rather than focusing on measures that mitigate the consequences once an event has 
occurred. For the purpose of developing a risk analysis and decision support model, a 
realistic and practical approach has been chosen. 
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5.1 Introduction  
Offshore installation and operations involve a very complicated process with attendant 
risks to people, the environment and property or economic assets. As an offshore 
operation system, an MODU faces hazards from many different sources which threaten 
its integrity; thus, it is exposed to a wide range of uncertain threats and hazards. 
Therefore, its performance under various conditions has received considerable attention. 
Ensuring the system’s operational safety is often a complex problem. The main purpose 
of this chapter is to introduce a methodology to improve the current procedures using 
risk assessment and to facilitate decision-making for reducing risk. The traditional 
methods of carrying out risk assessment during construction or after the occurrence of 
accidents have proved to be costly and often lack the flexibility to apply alternative 
remedial options (Khan & Amyotte, 2002). This chapter presents a comprehensive and 
transparent study on the evaluation of the risk assessment of an MODU using the Fuzzy 
FTA technique. A methodology for quantification and evaluation of the FT in a Fuzzy 
environment is proposed. Frameworks of risk assessment are developed based on the 
concept of object-oriented assessment and characteristics of MODUs, together with an 
object-oriented hierarchy to represent the relationships between components, sub-
systems, and the overall system. 
Risk assessment provides a logical and qualitative and/or quantitative base for analysing 
the circumstances that can lead to the system’s failure and for sub-dividing them down 
into system and component contributions to this failure. Therefore, a risk assessment 
approach provides a platform for identifying, structuring, and evaluating safety 
performance measures at different stages of design, construction, transportation, 
installation and operation. Also, risk assessment provides a convenient basis for linking 
safety performance with reliability. The objectives of this research are to ensure the 
achievement of the above through the various steps. The safe performance of any 
operation and/or production system is to a great extent reliant upon the condition of its 
components. Closely monitoring the condition of the critical components and carrying 
out timely system analysis would help to reduce the risk and the frequency of failures. 
Several analytical methods of reliability analysis and risk management are available. 
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured and logical approach 
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aimed at identifying hazards and assessing the risks of complex systems (Mohaghegh et 
al., 2009), of which FTA is one technique (Figure ‎5.1). The purpose of each method and 
its individual or combined applicability in evaluating the reliability and availability of a 
given system or component should be examined by the analysts before starting any 
analysis, and consideration should also be given to the results available from each 
method. 
 
Figure  5.1: Relationship between probabilistic risk assessment and risk  
FTA is widely used to evaluate the reliability of complex engineering systems from 
both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. It provides a graphical representation of 
combinations of component failures leading to an undesired system failure (Haasl et al., 
1981b). However, in many situations, the behaviours of components in a complex 
system and their interactions, such as failure priority, sequentially dependent failures, 
functional dependent failures and dynamic redundancy management, cannot be 
adequately addressed by traditional FTA due to its limited modelling capability. An 
FTA is a technique for analysing the Top event (TE), which causes the system failure. It 
is a top-down, deductive analysis structured in terms of events leading to the occurrence 
of the top event (Ericson, 2005). The FT is useful for understanding the mode of 
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occurrence of an accident. Furthermore, given the failure probabilities of the BEs, i.e. 
system components, the occurrence probability of the TE can be calculated. In the 
conventional approach, the probability of the BEs is considered either as a precise point 
value or as a random, time-dependent variable. However, due to the inherent 
imprecision and uncertainty of the available data, it is often impossible to obtain an 
exact estimation of an event’s occurrence rate or its distribution function. In such cases, 
the Fuzzy approach is among the best choices for analysing the system (Sallak et al., 
2008). In addition, in calculating the likelihood of a top-level event, FTA also shows the 
contributions of each of the BEs. There are a number of approaches to FTA, among 
them minimum cut set is widely used. For a complex FT, thousands of MCSs may be 
possible. Even if the MCSs can be successfully determined, there exists another 
problem, which is to rank the MCSs according to their contributions to the top event. 
The method that is presented in this chapter considers measures of both risk and 
uncertainty importance associated with each of the BEs. Therefore, a new importance 
distribution function during the defuzzification process is proposed. Furthermore, the 
proposed method extends the conventional minimum cut sets, Fussell-Vesely 
importance measures and risk reduction measures into the Fuzzy environment. These 
importance measures can be effectively used for the ranking of the minimum cut sets 
and the BEs according to their contribution to the top event probability (Aksu et al., 
2007).  
A new methodology for the risk assessment of the MODUs is presented that considers 
the operational failure of the drilling systems, concentrating on the high-pressure mud 
circulation including the blow-out preventer system, in which the mud column is the 
primary barrier and the secondary barrier is the blowout preventer, which protects the 
well from a disaster as the last resort (NORSOK D-010, 2004). The proposed 
methodology provides a rational and systematic approach for risk assessment. The main 
steps in the methodology start with identifying the probable critical events that may lead 
to operational failure, followed by establishing an operational hierarchy system 
diagram, and breaking down the events in detail with respect to the main function and 
then finally translating the operational hierarchy to FT and performing the analysis to 
identify areas for safety improvement.  
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5.2 Literature review 
FTA is one of many symbolic analytical techniques used in operations research and 
system reliability. This review is conducted to establish a basis for this research, 
particularly in identifying the areas where gaps exist as well as supporting decisions 
about the most appropriate modelling processes to be developed for processing data in 
order to achieve the objectives. FTA was first introduced in 1961 by H. A. Watson of 
Bell Telephone Laboratories in connection with a US Air Force contract to study the 
Minuteman missile launch control system (Watson, 1961). It was implemented 
relatively quickly into other fields, such as the reliability analysis of computing and 
electrical systems (Nieuwhof, 1975; Dugan et al., 1993). It was also adopted and 
extensively applied by the Boeing Company. Another early user was the National 
aeronautics and space administration (NASA). NASA began using risk analysis by 
conducting simple analysis of observed failures, and then progressed over time to the 
use of probabilistic models to predict probability of failures within their systems (Paté-
Cornell & Dillon, 2001). One of the main handbooks of FTA, the "Fault Tree 
Handbook", was written by the US nuclear regulatory commission (NRC) in 1981 to 
serve as a reference text for the system safety and reliability course (Haasl et al., 
1981a). The technique has also been frequently used for accident investigation, as it 
identifies the relations between causes and their logic. It is a typical tool for system 
engineering, designed for safety and reliability applications, which has gradually been 
used in several industrial sectors such as the offshore industry (Umar, 2010).  
Probability risk assessment is commonly used to assess uncertainty within a system. 
One of the strengths of the approach is that it provides a systematic means of 
quantifying the effect of uncertainties by combining probability estimates for different 
possible failure mechanisms within the system so that an overall probability of system 
failure can be assessed. FTA emphasises the causes of failure for a system as a series of 
individual BEs and provides a visual representation of the series of events that can lead 
to failure of that system. FTA is useful as not only does it give a visual representation of 
the system but it also provides a basis for identifying and combining the probabilities of 
events impacting on system failure through Boolean logic statements (Bedford & 
Cooke, 2001). Boolean algebra of probability theory and mathematical statistics are the 
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basis of FTA. However, the environmental fuzziness and the imprecision of data have 
an impact on the probability of the event’s occurrence. Thus, it is difficult to estimate 
the probability of the event’s happening by using an exact value. As a result, it is 
necessary to introduce the Fuzzy concept into FTA (Markowski et al., 2009). The Fuzzy 
extension principle combined with the FT approach makes it possible to determine the 
occurrence probability of a top event (Mentes & Helvacioglu, 2011). Singer (1990) 
reported the analysis of Fuzzy reliability using Fuzzy numbers. In order to facilitate the 
calculations in Singer’s method, Chen et al. (1995) presented revised methods to 
analyse the FT by specifically considering the failure probabilities of BEs as triangular 
Fuzzy numbers. Huang (2004) adopted probability theory to analyse a Fuzzy FT and 
Shu et al. (2006) used intuitionistic Fuzzy methods to analyse an FT in a study on a 
printed circuit board assembly. He et al. (2007) avoided the deficiency in the traditional 
FT approach by using a Fuzzy FT approach that was based on probability measures and 
FL.  
These approaches have proven to be very effective in modelling of the risks in complex 
systems, where causal relations among binary probabilistic events are deterministic 
(Crowl and Louvar, 2001). However, those causal relationships are often uncertain and 
non-deterministic. This has led to increased interest in expanding the FT methods to 
incorporate non-deterministic causal factors. Therefore, a new formal approach is 
required to capture the fuzziness and imprecision of likelihoods of multiple hazards. 
With respect to this inadequacy of the conventional FTA, extensive research has been 
performed by using Fuzzy set theory in FT analysis. The pioneering work on this 
belongs to Tanaka et al., (1983), who treated probabilities of BEs as TPFNs, and 
applied the Fuzzy extension principle to determine the probability of a top event. Based 
on work of Tanaka et al., (1983), further extensive research has been performed (Misra 
& Weber, 1990; Liang & Wang, 1993). Their analysis is based on the possibility 
distribution associated with the BEs and a Fuzzy algebra for combining these events. 
Parallel with this, Singer (1990) analysed Fuzzy reliability by using L-R type Fuzzy 
numbers. In order to facilitate the calculation of Singer’s method, Cheng & Mon (1993) 
& Chen (1994) proposed revised methods to analyse the FT by specifically considering 
the failure probabilities of BEs as triangular Fuzzy numbers. Yuhua & Datao (2005) 
used a hybrid method to analyse failure probability of oil and transmission pipelines. 
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Sawyer and Rao (1994) applied α-cuts to determine the failure probability of the top 
event in Fuzzy FTs of mechanical systems. Kai-Yuan et al. (1991), Cai et al. (1991) and 
Huang et al. (2004) adopted possibility theory to analyse Fuzzy FTs. Shu et al. (2006) 
used intuitionistic Fuzzy methods to analyse FTs on a printed circuit board assembly.  
It is obvious from the above reviews that Fuzzy FT analysis has been extensively 
studied for a long time and effectively applied to many engineering problems. However, 
its application in risk assessment of mobile offshore drilling units is rarely considered. 
As stated in Chapter 4, the complex nature of MODUs is associated with high-level risk 
arising from continuous expansion and the increased level of innovation demanded by 
the offshore industry. Many researchers have written about the need for risk assessment 
but fail to adequately satisfy risk mitigation. Lois et al. (2004) stated that the scale of 
the offshore safety problems requires continuous efforts with a view to eliminating or 
reducing hazards. The task of risk assessment in this context will mainly concentrate on 
the prevention and/or mitigation or control of risks through the entire life of the project. 
Wang et al. (1995) described the risk correlated with marine systems as a measure of 
exposure to the possibility of economic or financial loss, physical damage or injury or 
delay as a consequence of the uncertainty associated with the pursuance of a particular 
course of action. In considering this topic, a combination of several factors – such as the 
importance of the subject of safety management for an offshore platform and its overall 
importance in the oil and gas industry, as well as the applicability of the proposed 
research work to enhance QRA in the field – provides the basis for the topic. Based on 
the review conducted so far, it is evident that most efforts made previously are still 
grappling with the issue of uncertainties associated with data on most marine systems 
such as MODUs. In this chapter, therefore, the risk assessment methodology to be 
proposed will deal with such uncertainties to enable informed decision-making based on 
cost-benefit evaluation. Even though Fuzzy FTA has been applied extensively in many 
engineering problems, it is still necessary for this study to consider specific 
characteristics of the MODU systems. One of the most important characteristics is 
failure dependencies in MODU systems. This indicates that the failure of a component 
in an MODU system can be either independent or dependent on the failure of another 
component. Therefore, for proper risk assessment it is necessary to simultaneously 
consider independency and dependency. Hence, in this chapter the Fuzzy FTA method 
A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk                                              CHAPTER 5: Fuzzy FTA for 
Assessment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units                                       MODU’s‎risk‎assessment 
  
111  
has been considered for independent failure of a component, and the BBN technique is 
employed to deal with dependency of events in the process of risk assessment for 
MODUs in Chapter 6. 
5.3 A proposed integrated Fuzzy FTA methodology of MODUs  
The information generated through the evaluation of different methods of QRA will be 
used to establish a firm basis for the development of an appropriate modelling technique 
to allow for the efficient and effective analysis and assessment of the MODU failure 
data. The method is critical for the assessment of risk information related to the MODU 
operation system, especially with consideration of its associated uncertainties; the 
choice of processing techniques needs to be well thought out. This lays the foundations 
on which to base a framework for modelling the risk assessment of the system. Many 
tools and methodologies have been developed in order to assess and analyse risk, either 
qualitatively or quantitatively, in an extensive variety of disciplines. The particular 
method used eventually depends upon the environment in which the risk is placed, and 
upon the system under consideration. The proposed methodology uses the Fuzzy FT 
technique to express the causal relationship between events, their influence and their 
contribution to the failure of the system. The methodology focuses on the assessment of 
the failure of offshore operational systems (i.e. MODUs) posed through the HGs and 
their BEs. The risk analysis process includes hazard identification from a vulnerability 
analysis at the start point and is followed by adapting an operational hierarchy of the 
system into the FT. This allows representation of the MODU operation system with its 
HGs at different levels of detail. The proposed methodology is created via an object-
oriented approach to develop frameworks of FT at the component level by extracting 
the logic relationships between negative consequences, failure events and hazards, so 
that it graphically represents the system down to the lowest component level and also 
describes the influence of hazards. The quantitative solution of the Fuzzy FTA is also 
presented in order to quantitatively evaluate the cause-effect relationships in an MODU 
operation system and to facilitate decision-making. This is achieved through detailed 
examination of related risks, and a review of relevant literature and traditional safety 
assessment methods. After hazard identification and construction of an operational 
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hierarchy model, a framework is established which is capable of quantifying the 
judgements from experts.  
Since the criteria for the evaluation of the HGs have diverse significance and meanings, 
it cannot be assessed that each HG is of equal importance and weight in terms of its 
capacity to contribute to the failure of the MODU. Therefore, it is necessary to consider 
the contributory factors of each HG to the failure of the MODU. The proposed 
methodology framework, as illustrated in Figure ‎5.2, consists of the different stages 
which provide an illustrative view of a generic Fuzzy FTA framework proposed for the 
purpose of the MODU risk assessment, and comprises the following: 
- Identifying risk contribution factors for each HG which can contribute to the 
occurrence of the potential risk. This was performed by the Fuzzy-AHP technique 
described in Chapter 4. The Fuzzy-AHP technique is employed for hazard ranking 
and also for hazard and operability studies for identifying the probable critical 
events that may lead to the MODU’s operational failure.  
- Identifying the relationships between events and establishing an operational 
hierarchy system diagram with a detailed breakdown of the most significant HG. 
- Data collection (using input from experts where there is a lack of data). After 
hazard identification and construction of an operational hierarchy model, a 
framework is established which is capable of quantifying the judgements from 
experts. 
- Translating the operational hierarchy system diagram into a detailed Fuzzy FT, 
which depicts all possible routes for the occurrence of the probable risk, commonly 
referred to as the TE, and performing the analysis in order to identify areas for 
further safety improvement. 
- MCS determination, probability analysis and importance measures to rank the 
MCSs according to their contributions to the failures of the MODU system. 
The top event probability is calculated using both a probabilistic approach and a FL 
approach. The details have been structured from the definition of the research aim 
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and objectives to data collection and analyses leading up to the development of a 
proposed risk assessment model. In a real system, the amount of analysis required may 
be enormous because of the number of nodes and links of the entire system and 
associated HGs. Because of the complexity of integrating the information, and in order 
to simplify the assessment processes, a manageable group of hazards has been 
considered. Each HG may be broken down into a number of simpler system 
components in different levels, as illustrated in Figure ‎5.3. This model will then go 
through practical application of the drilling failure of an MODU, focusing on the high-
pressure mud circulation systems including the blow-out preventer. The data are 
collected from the industry in order to validate its efficiency based on the results 
obtained. The data collection methods involve surveys, interviews and questionnaires, 
which together constitute vital information required for testing the model and 
conducting preliminary validation studies with regard to MODU risk assessment.  
5.3.1 The hierarchical structure of the proposed methodology  
Complexity is one of the hurdles limiting the application of conventional risk 
assessment methods. It is therefore necessary to explicitly discuss the potential of an 
object-oriented assessment in dealing with complexity of the MODU. In order to 
effectively analyse complex systems, a hierarchical structure of the proposed 
methodology is developed in a few different stages and presented in Figure ‎5.3. The 
hierarchical structure consists of different levels. The aim is to identify the sources of 
hazards of the TE, in this case Drilling Failure: L1D-O1-01 is positioned at the highest 
level, while in the second level, three HGs (i.e. Natural hazard: L2D-N1, Operational 
hazard: L2D-O1 and Human error: L2D-H1) are presented, and in level 3 the sub-
systems and the BEs are listed. Each component in this level may be influenced by 
another event or system at levels 4 and 5, in which the components/systems and BEs 
describe the MODU’s operational system, and the failure of each component may 
influence another component or system at the different levels (e.g. Drilling Control 
System Failure (L5D-O1-01-2-4) in level 5 has consequences for Drilling Equipment 
Failure (L4D-O1-01-03) at level 4 and Drilling System Failure (L3D-O1-01) at level 3
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Natural Hazard  
L2D-O1: 
Operational 
L2D-H1:   
Human Error 
L3D-N1-03: Wellbore influx/Kick                             
L3D-N1-04: Punch Through                                          
L3D-N1-05: Ground Movement                                  
L3D-O1-01:  Due to Drilling System  Failure                    
L3D-O1-20:  Due to Power System Failure
L3D-O1-03:  Due to  Rig Control System Failure       
L3D-O1-05: Due to Water Handling System Failure
L3D-O1-04:  Due to Jacking System Failure 
L3D-O1-06: Due to ESD System Failure                     
L3D-H1-02: Managment / 
Supervision / Staff          
L3D-H1-03: Individual -
Competence/Motivation  
L3D-N1-01: Present of high 
speed wind/wave/current                                           
L3D-N1-02: Hole instability                                          
L3D-O1-07: Due to Fuel System Failure                             












L4D-O1-01-04 :   Drilling 
Failure due to Blow out 
Preventer (BOP) System 
Failure / Drilling Failure 
due to Failure of 
Managed Pressure 
Drilling Stack
L5D-O1-01-1-1 : Mud Pump #1 Failure
L5D-O1-01-1-2 : Mud Pump #2 Failure
L5D-O1-01-1-3 : Bulk Handling suystem Failure 
L5D-O1-01-1-4 : High Pressure route  Failure 
(HP hoses, Standpipe Manifold, Choke and Kill 
Manifold) 
L5D-O1-01-2-1 : Shale Shaker Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-2 : Desander Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-3 : Disilter Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-4 : Degasser Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-1  : Draw Work Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-2 : Rotary Table Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-3 : Top Drive Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-4 : Pipe Handling System Failure
Level  1               Level  2                                                            Level  3                          Level 4                                                           Level  5
L5D-O1-01-4-1 : BOP Stack Failure
L5D-O1-01-4-2 : BOP control SystemFailure
L5D-O1-01-4-3 : Component Failure/Leak  
L3D-H1-01: Organizational -
Polices and Procedures   
L5D-O1-01-2-5 : Drilling Control System Failure
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and finally to Operational Failure (L2D-O1) at level 2). The process follows an 
investigation of the successive combinations of failures of the components until 
reaching the BEs. In circumstances where a lack or incompleteness of data exists, there 
is a need to incorporate expert judgements. A framework is proposed based on the 
Fuzzy set theory and the FTA method that is capable of quantifying the judgement from 
experts who express opinions qualitatively. 
5.3.2 Fuzzy FTA  
Fundamentally, a FTA consists of a top-down analysis structured in terms of certain 
specific causes leading to the occurrence of the top event of interest, through a 
deductive process that, from a predefined undesired event, searches for the possible 
causes of such an event. In conventional reliability analysis, the outcome of the top 
event is certain and specific as long as the assignment of the BEs originates from 
reliable information. However, in a real operation system the information is rather 
imprecise and incomplete. In this case, Fuzzy set theory can be used to define the 
probabilities of various BEs. The probability of the TE calculated thus takes into 
account the uncertainties associated with the BEs. The great popularity of the FTA 
results is basically due to the following features: 
- The large flexibility of the graphical representation of a complex operation system 
proportionate to the specific symbology. 
- The large computational easiness in function for the probabilities calculation. 
5.3.2.1 FTA 
FTA is based on boolean algebra and probability theory and is consistent with 
conventional reliability theory. FTA has traditionally been used in large complex 
systems in order to find fault-sensitive constructions, e.g. single points of failures that 
lead to a dangerous or unacceptable event (FTA, 2006). It assumes that the probabilities 
of events are given and sufficient failure data are available. However, it is often very 
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difficult to obtain sufficient failure data to estimate precise failure rates or failure 
probabilities. Based on this description, the system is analysed with a top-down 
approach that starts with the hazardous or unacceptable event, called TE, from which a 
graphical logical tree is created that consists of independent lower-level BEs combined 
with logical operators such as AND or OR. The analysis is carried out in iterations until 
a desired level of detail is achieved in different steps (e.g. single component failure). It 
assumes that the causes are in a lower level which cannot be sub-divided (i.e. BEs). The 
first step in a FTA is the selection of the TE, which is a specific undesirable system 
state or failure. Then the experts analyse the system or process to discover logical 
dependencies between the TE and all BEs. To represent logical dependencies, basically 
the AND or OR logical gates and so-called intermediate events can be used. As 
illustrated in Figure ‎5.4-a, the AND logical gate should be used if an output event 
occurs only if all input events occur simultaneously. If an output event occurs or if any 
of the input events occurs, either alone or in any combination, the OR logical gate 
should be used, as shown in Figure ‎5.4-b. A combination of BEs which leads to the 
hazard is called a cut set. An MCS is a cut set which cannot lead to the top-level hazard, 
if only one event of the set is prevented in Figure ‎5.5. This information helps to identify 
failure events whose elimination secures the system. If, for example, one event occurs 
in different MCSs, the occurrence probability of the top-level hazard will significantly 
decrease, if this event can be excluded. Traditionally, it is always assumed that the BEs 
contained in a FT are independent and could be represented as probabilistic numbers 
(Andrews, 2002; Henley & Kumamoto, 1981). 
In the above formulation, P denotes the probability of the TE, pi denotes the occurrence 
probability of BEi and n is the number of BEs associated with the “OR” gate. The OR 
gate event probability is presented by Equation (‎5.1)-b, and similarly for an AND gate 
event, its probability is obtained by Equation (‎5.1)-a. 
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Figure  5.4: a) Structure of an “AND” event           b) Structure of an “OR” event 
                (a)                                                                   (b) ( 5.1) 
The aim at this stage is to identify causes or initiating events and their logic 
combinations using “AND”/“OR” symbols of Boolean algebra (Wang & Ruxton, 1997). 
The construction of the tree depends on the analyst’s skills and ability to conduct the 
reliable analysis, as the analyst can miss some causes (Suresh et al., 1996) 
5.3.2.2 Fuzzy FTA basic concept 
Due to the unreliable and vague data, the failure rate is difficult to deal with solely by 
means of the conventional probabilistic reliability theory. These fundamental problems 
with probabilistic reliability theory have led researchers to look for new models or new 
reliability theories which can complete the classical probabilistic definition of 
reliability. Fuzzy set theory can be used to deal with these issues. Therefore, a Fuzzy 
FTA algorithm is developed to deal with such issues. Towards this end, Fuzzy sets can 
help to overcome this situation. Experts utilise Fuzzy sets to subjectively describe the 
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uncertainties of each given failure event and then perform a mathematical operation to 
evaluate system reliability. The failure events are modelled to be trapezoidal Fuzzy sets 
(Tanaka et al., 1983). These Fuzzy sets are considered as the possibilities of occurrence 
of the failure events. Therefore, the problem is to calculate the possibility of failure of 
the TE as a Fuzzy set, given the occurrence possibilities of the BEs. FL can be 
described as a type of mathematical logic in which truth value is assumed to belong to a 
continuum of values ranging between 0 and 1  
5.3.2.3 Input failure rate and data collection  
As illustrated in Figure ‎5.2, this stage of the methodology is to separate hazards with 
known failure rate from vague hazards. Failure rates of some hazards are available in 
certain sources. By using this data, it is possible to separate hazards with a known 
failure rate from vague hazards associated with MODU. 
5.3.2.3.1 Obtaining failure probability of hazards with known failure rate 
Failure rates of some hazards are available in different sources. Offshore drilling takes 
place in a unique operating environment and has several industry-specific components. 
As a result, publicly accessible reliability data may be unavailable or may be invalid for 
deep, subsea conditions. However, one public report on the reliability of subsea BOPs 
provided some useful failure data (Holand, 1999). If having ample reliability data is 
necessary, the OREDA handbook can be purchased. Another valuable source of data is 
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Reinforcement (Bureau of 
ocean energy management, Regulation and enforcement, 2010). The PDS Data 
handbook also provides reliability data estimates for components of control and safety 
systems. Data for field devices (e.g. sensors and valves) and control logic (electronics) 
are presented, including data for subsea equipment.  
5.3.2.3.2 Calculation of failure probability  
The available failure rate should apply to the particular application of a component, its 
operating environment, and its non-operating environment. There are three main 
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methods that could be used to determine the occurrence probability of an event, namely  
the Statistical method, the extrapolation method and expert judgement (Preyssl, 1995). 
The statistical method uses the treatment of direct test of experience data and the 
calculation of probabilities. The extrapolation method involves the use of model 
prediction and similar condition or using the standard reliability handbook. The expert 
judgement method uses direct estimation of probabilities by specialists. A dimension of 
the quality of a product’s design or a process is reliability. Reliability refers to the 
probability that the product or process will be functional when used. For example, 
reliability of a product being 93% means that 93 out of 100 products produced will 
perform as intended for a stated period of time under specified operating conditions. 
Failure rate is a measure used to ascertain reliability of a product or a process. For 
products that must be replaced because they fail, a relevant measure of interest is the 
mean time to failure (MTTF), and for products that may be repaired and put to service 
again, a relevant measure of interest is the mean time between failures (MTBF). In 
order to calculate MTTF and MTBF, ideally, a large number of products would be 
operated and tested until failure and the time of the failure for each would be recorded. 
The information about MTTF and MTBF helps ascertain reliability. However, it is time-
consuming and costly to collect enough data to build a probability distribution and 
cumulative distribution curve of time to failure or time between failures. One way we 
can deal with this problem is by analysing a smaller set of data and identifying a 
distribution that approximates the distribution of time to failure, such as the 
Exponential, Weibull, or Gamma distributions. Once we have identified a distribution, 
we can easily calculate failure rate, MTTF, etc. A component is tested periodically with 
test interval. A failure may occur at any time in the test interval, but the failure is only 
detected in a test. This is a typical situation for many safety-critical components, like 
sensors and safety valves. If an event failure is of a kind which can be inspected, the 
component failure probability can be obtained from Equation (‎5.2) (Spouge, 1999; 
Høyland & Rausand, 2009). The following notation is used: 
= Component failure rate  
P(t) = Component failure probability at t 
R(t) = Reliability )(1)( tPtR    

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= Inspection interval 
 
( 5.2) 
In the case that the distribution functions are approximated by an exponential 
distribution P(t) is determined from Equation (‎5.3) 
 
( 5.3) 
5.3.2.4 Fuzzy failure assignment for the failure probability 
As an alternative to using the failure rate in probability, a Fuzzy modelling approach is 
used to assign the failure rate in the FTA. Several experts are required to develop the 
membership functions of the failure rates. The numbers associated with linguistic risk 
levels are also considered an important factor for the failure rate. Experts usually use 
linguistic variables to assess the importance of one criterion or event over another to 
rate alternatives with respect to various criteria. With consideration of some limitations 
on the capacity for processing information, Miller (1956) proposed a magical number of 
seven, plus or minus two. With respect to this, it is often recommended that the number 
of linguistic terms for judgements should be restricted to between five to nine 
(Karwowski & Mital, 1986). In this research, each linguistic variable has seven 
descriptive linguistic terms and these can be represented quantitatively by a range of 
probabilities, as shown in Figure  5.15. Chen et al. (1992) proposed different scales of 
linguistic terms for expert assessment. After the determination of the linguistic levels 
for each hazard failure rate, one must determine the relevant mathematical expressions 
using membership functions for Fuzzy numbers. Expert knowledge is influenced by 
individual perspectives and goals (Ford and Sterman, 1998). Therefore, complete 
impartiality of expert knowledge is often difficult to achieve. An important 
consideration in the selection of experts is whether to use a heterogeneous group of 
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scientists). The weighting factors of experts are determined according to Table ‎4.5 and 
Table ‎4.6. 
Scale 6 in Chen et al. (1992), which contains trapezoidal membership functions, is 
adopted to present mathematically the failure rates of hazards in this research. 
Therefore, the conversion scale of 6, which contains seven verbal terms, is selected for 
performing the subjective assessment of hazards with an unknown failure rate. 
Figure ‎5.15 introduces the Fuzzy linguistic scale that is used in this study to determine 
the judgements of experts with respect to hazards with unknown failure rate. 
5.3.2.5 Aggregating algorithm for linguistic terms 
In this stage, all ratings are aggregated for each subjective basic event. Since each 
expert may have a different opinion according to their experience and expertise in the 
relevant field, it is necessary to aggregate experts’ opinions to reach a consensus. Hsu 
and Chen (1996) presented an algorithm to aggregate the linguistic opinions of a 
homogeneous or heterogeneous group of experts. Suppose each expert,  
 expresses their opinion on a particular attribute in a specific context 
using a predefined set of linguistic variables. The linguistic terms can be converted into 
corresponding Fuzzy numbers. The detailed algorithm is described as follows: 
a) Calculate the degree of agreement (degree of similarity)  of the opinions 
of a pair of experts, and , where . According to this 
approach,  and  are two standard TPFNs. The 
degree of similarity between these two Fuzzy numbers can be obtained by the similarity 
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where . The larger value of , the greater similarity between two 
Fuzzy numbers and  










d) Estimate the consensus coefficient (CC) degree, , of expert, Eu (u=1,2,…or‎
M): 
 ( 5.7) 
 where   is a relaxation factor in the proposed method. It shows the 
importance of over .When , no importance has been given to the 
weight of an expert and hence a homogeneous group of experts is used. When , the 
consensus degree of an expert is the same as its importance weight.  
e) Finally, the aggregated result of the experts’ judgements, , can be obtained as 
follows:  
 ( 5.8) 
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5.3.2.6 Defuzzification process 
Defuzzification is the process of producing a quantifiable result in FL. Fuzzy number 
defuzzification is an important procedure for decision-making in a Fuzzy environment. 
The centre of area defuzzification technique is used here. This technique was developed 
by Sugeno (1985) and Spouge (1999). This is the most commonly used technique and is 





 is the defuzzified output, 𝜇𝑖(𝑥) is the aggregated membership function and x 
is the output variable. The above formula can be shown as follows for triangular and 








5.3.2.7 Converting crisp failure possibility of BEs into failure probability 
There is inconsistency between failure probabilities of certain hazards and crisp failure 
possibility (CFP) of vague events. This issue can be solved by transforming CFPs of 
vague events into failure probabilities. This transformation can be performed by using 
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for converting CFP to failure probability. This function is derived by establishing some 
properties such as the proportionality of human sensation to the logarithmic value of a 
physical quantity. The probability rate can be obtained from the possibility rate, as 
follows (Onisawa, 1990; Lin & Wang, 1997): 
,               
      
( 5.12) 
5.3.3 Scheming the MCSs and calculation of top event occurrence   
Based on its description, the system is analysed with a top-down approach that starts 
with the dangerous or unacceptable event, called the top-level event, from which a 
graphical logical tree is created that consists of lower-level events (i.e. BEs) combined 
with logical operators such as AND or OR. The analysis is carried out in iterations until 
a desired level of detail is achieved (e.g. single component failure). Causes in this level 
are called BEs; an example of an FT is shown in Figure ‎5.5. If the FT is traversed from 
the top, it can be seen that, in order to trigger the top-level event, either IE-1 or IE-2 
must occur. In order to trigger IE-1, both events BE-1 and BE-2 need to occur, whereas 
either event BE-3 or event BE-4 triggers event IE-2. A set of BEs which together 
activate the top-level event is called a cut set. In Figure ‎5.5 the encircled basic event 
(BE-4) is a cut set. In total there are three minimal cut sets (i.e. BE-1 to BE-4). In the 
right branch of the FT there are two minimal cut sets of size 1, which means that they 
are single points of failure. In the left branch of the FT there is one minimal cut set of 
size 2, which means that one fault is tolerated without compromising the safety 
function. Thus, the minimal cut set sizes have a natural correspondence to the fault 
tolerance of the system. FTA leads to all possible minimum combinations of basic 
human, operation, instrument and equipment failures, called MCSs, which could lead to 
the occurrence of the TE. When FTs have BEs which appear more than once, the 
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Figure  5.5: Minimal cut set 
An MCS is a collection of BEs. If all these events occur, the TE is guaranteed to occur. 
However, if any BE does not occur, the TE will not occur. Therefore, by using Equation 
(‎5.13) if a FT has nc MCSs (MCSi ,i=1,…,nc) then the TE “T” exists if at least one MCS 
exists (Andrews & Moss, 2002). A quantification of the TE occurrence likelihood can 


















































where P(MCSs) is the occurrence probability of MCS  and  is the number of MCSs. 
Any FT will consist of a finite number of MCS that are unique for that TE. Single-
component MCSs, if there are any, represent those single failures that will cause the TE 
to occur. Two-component MCSs represent the double failures that together will cause 
i N
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the TE to occur. TE can be obtained from MCSs by using Equation (‎5.14). The analysis 
gives the system designers or decision-makers a set where the effort in improvement 
can be best focused to reduce the risk taking into consideration the costs and benefits. 
The MCSs can be prioritised according to their importance. 
Prioritisation is the recognition that we cannot solve multiple problems simultaneously 
due to the lack of infinite resources (i.e. operation, equipment, human factor, etc.). 
Therefore, it is necessary to have a foundation in order to evaluate the reliability and 
availability of the system. FTA uses failure rates, mean time between failure (Dhillon, 
1999, Bedford and Cooke, 2001) and minimal cut sets to evaluate the reliability and 
availability of the system in question (Tang & Dugan, 2004). One of the most important 
outputs of an FTA is the set of importance measures that are calculated for the TE. Such 
importance measures establish the significance for all the MCSs in the FT, in terms of 
their contributions to the TE probability. Both events as well as MCSs can be prioritised 
according to their importance. Importance measures can also be calculated that yield the 
sensitivity of the TE probability to an increase or decrease in the probability of any 
event in the FT. Two types of TE importance measure can be calculated for each MCS 
in the FT and are described as follows:  
Risk reduction measures the decrease in the probability of the TE if a given MCS is 
certain not to occur. This importance measure can also be called the top decrease 
sensitivity. Risk reduction measures for a MCS show the decrease in the probability of 
the TE that would be obtained if the MCS did not occur. Therefore, the risk reduction 
measure can be calculated by redoing the FT with the probability of the given MCS set 
to 0. Thus, it measures the maximum reduction in the TE probability. A risk reduction 
measure’s value is determinable for every MCS in the FT.  
The Fussell-Vesely importance measure is the contribution of the MCSs to the TE 
probability and is determinable for every MCS modelled in the FT. This provides a 
numerical significance for all the FT elements and allows them to be prioritised. The 
importance is calculated by summing all the causes (MCSs) of the TE involving the 
particular event. This measure has been applied to MCSs to determine the importance of 
individual MCSs. The importance measure can be quantified as per Equation (‎5.15) 
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(Modarres, 2006), where )(t
i
Q is the contribution of MCSi to failure of the system, and 
also )(t
s
Q  is the occurrence probability of TE due to all MCSs.  
  
( 5.15) 
5.4 Application of proposed Fuzzy FTA methodology in MODUs  
In order to illustrate how the proposed methodology is applied, and also to have a 
manageable risk model, a limited number of generic BEs are defined, covering the 
MODU’s operations risk which may directly cause an event or introduce latent failures 
in a system which may cause an event at a later point in time. In this section the 
application of the Fuzzy FTA is described; in particular, the application of the proposed 
research methodology for risk assessment of the MODU’s operation system is 
presented. In conjunction with PRA, FTA specifically focuses on the causes of failure 
for a system as a series of individual BEs and provides a visual representation of the 
series of events that can lead to failure of that system. Application of the Fuzzy FTA 
method consists of stages such as the following: 
- Hazard identification and elicitation of failure rate data to the events. 
- Establishment of an operational hierarchy system diagram which includes the 
breakdown of a complex decision problem into smaller, manageable elements of 
different hierarchical levels as necessary. 
- Construction of the Fuzzy FTA model in line with the MODU’s operational 
hierarchy 
-  Establishment of calculations and identifying the area for further safety 
improvement. 
In this study, a five-level hierarchy, illustrated in Figure ‎5.3, is developed. The highest 
level of the hierarchy corresponds to the occurrence probability of the TE (i.e. L1D-O1: 
Drilling failure due to drilling system failure) and the last layer corresponds to the 
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According to the requirement of the Norwegian oil and gas regulations (NORSOK D-
010, 2004) pertaining to well integrity during drilling activities, all phases of offshore 
operations must have two separate and independent barriers. An application of the 
proposed approach is demonstrated through a specific system failure. Well drilling 
completion is an appropriate example, in which the mud column is the primary barrier 
and the secondary barrier is the BOP, which protects the well from a disaster as the last 
resort. In overbalanced processes, the mud column is the primary well barrier and 
should function within the drilling margin pressure (i.e. a pressure greater than the hole 
pressure and lower than the fracture gradient). The secondary barrier shall be active on 
the detection of an influx and the well should be closed, and this also prevents further 
unwanted flow in the case of failure of the primary well barrier (PSA, 2008). As an 
instance, the Macondo (BP, 2010) was planned to be abandoned and left underbalanced 
by replacing drilling mud with sea water, and with two cement barriers in place 
(Commission, 2010b). 
Mud and BOP control are the operation functions and loss of control can lead to an 
emergency situation. Well control systems are defined in the NORSOK standard (D-
001, 2004) defined as the mechanical well control and associated equipment and 
system. This includes BOP, choke & kill system, rise, and the control system for the 
BOP. As explained, the mud system and BOP are the key components of the system 
that provide the well integrity. Therefore, the simple process diagram of the mud 
circulation and mixing including BOP system, as illustrated in Figure ‎5.6, is considered 
in levels 4 and 5 of the MODU’s operational hierarchy, as in Figure ‎5.3. 
Drilling mud is the primary requirement to start drilling operations and the mud mixing 
system provides appropriate mud in an adequate combination of dry cement and water. 
The prepared mud, stored in mud pit(s), will be pumped by mud pump(s) through the 
standpipe manifold into the drill string. The mud pump provides adequate pressure to 
overcome the mud column static pressure at the bottom of the drilled hole. Mud returns 
through the annular casing, and then the returned mud is directed to the shell shakers via 
the mud ditch to remove earthen impurities such as sharp rocks. At a later stage, the 
returned mud will pass through Desander, Desilter and Gas Separator in order to 
remove smaller impurities as well as mixed gas trapped in the mud. At the last stage, the 
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treated, returned mud will go back to the mud pits for further circulation. This 
circulation process is repeated throughout the course of drilling. The returned mud 
pressure is continuously measured by BOP sensors and, in case of over-pressure, the 
normal circulation line will be blocked and the high-pressure mud will be led to the 
choke/kill manifold, which is designed for higher pressure, in order to reduce the 
pressure of the pumped mud going to the atmospheric level. In case of kick (high 
pressure in the return line because of entry of water, gas, oil, or other formation fluid 
into the wellbore), the very high-pressure mud will be injected into the well through the 
kill line by an additional pump. The cement pump is also connected to the choke/kill 
manifold. It should be noted that the “kick” pressure is lower than the “choke” pressure. 
As the bit “drills ahead”, a specially formulated drilling fluid or mud is continually 
pumped or circulated from the surface to the bottom of the well, and then back to the 
surface to cool the bit and remove the cuttings, as illustrated in Figure ‎5.6.  
As is shown in Figure ‎5.6, the mud and cementing circulation system is composed of 
the following: bulk and storage system, high-pressure mud pumping system, mud 
treatment system and cementing system. The BOP, which is one of the major pieces of 
equipment for drilling, is comprised of the following: BOP stack failure, control system 
and components. The BOP system stack is made up of a series of pipe rams and annular 
preventers in charge of sealing and shearing the drill pipe. A common subsea stack is 
shown in Figure ‎5.7 and was also the control system of the Macondo Deepwater 
Horizon, as illustrated in Figure ‎5.9. In ultra-deepwater drilling operations, the drilling 
platform is connected to the BOP, installed at the wellhead on the seabed by the drilling 
riser. 
.  
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Figure  5.6: Schematic diagram of mud circulation and mixing system/equipment in levels 4 and 5. 
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The drilling riser is a steel tube containing the drill string which enables the flow of 
drilling fluids. In most drilling systems, the drilling fluid is pumped into the well 
flowing through the drill string and returns to the surface by flowing up through the 
annular space between the drilling riser’s internal wall and the outer circumference of 
the drill string. The BOP could be installed on the platform (surface) for a fixed 
platform or on the seabed (subsea) for a floating platform where the wellhead is 
attached to the seabed (Figure  5.8). 
  
Figure  5.7: BOP control system in the 
Macondo Deepwater Horizon (Gröndahl 
et al., 2010) 
 Figure  5.8: Typical position of subsea 
BOP (Image provided by BP). 
The BOP is a critical part of the safety system of an MODU, as proven in the 2010 
Macondo accident (Deepwater Horizon). Blowout preventers act as a safety barrier in 
emergencies or undesired events by controlling reservoir pressures and fluids in the well 
(Tumer, 2010). A great challenge for the oil and gas industry is to decide what to do 
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Figure  5.9: BOP control system in Macondo Deepwater Horizon (Gröndahl et al., 2010) 
The closing of rams is controlled by the BOP control system, which is driven mainly by 
hydraulic power. An accumulator attached to the subsea control pod operates the 
hydraulic system used to close the rams. It passes through a regulator, SPM (Stand Pipe 
Manifold) valve and a shuttle valve. The closing of the blind shear rams starts when 
hydraulic fluid from the control pod passes through the shuttle valve and pushes both 
pistons inward. The BOP control system is a critical component in a BOP stack because 
this is the heart of a system that drives preventers and rams to close and open with or 
without using primary rig power. After the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, 
investigators focused on the failure of a component on the well’s BOP that was 
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supposed to close-off a well spewing out of control. The device, called a blind shear 
ram, is the only part of the blowout preventer that can completely seal the well. Minutes 
after the explosion, at least one rig worker hit an emergency button, which is supposed 
to trigger the blind shear ram within about 30 seconds and then disconnect the rig from 
the well. However, that night the blind shear ram never fully deployed. A typical blind 
shear ram system is shown in Figure ‎5.10 and also a usual configuration of a subsea 




Figure  5.10: Blind shear rams closing 
(Gröndahl et al., 2010) (Rig Train, 2001) 
Figure  5.11: BOP stack used for 
the FTA (Holand, 1999) 
5.5 Hazard identification and potential hazard sources/sub-sources 
A complete system-level risk assessment is greatly dependent on properly identifying 
the key events of the area of interest. In particular, the identification of potential hazard 
sources within the structure of the problem domain should be considered as a 
fundamental step in operation system risk assessment. The fundamental concept of the 
proposed methodology consists of the translation of a physical system in a structuralised 
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logical diagram, in which certain specific causes lead to a top event of interest. In 
Chapter 4, the contextual information on the MODU HGs and the objectives of the 
application were provided and also a novel methodology was introduced for HGs 
classification with particular emphasis on drilling failure (L1D-O1-01). A model in 
association with the circulation and mixing system is developed in Level 4 with special 
focus on analysis failures of the mud system caused by its HGs. As was shown in 
Figure ‎5.3, there are three HGs of interest, L2D-N1, L2D-O1 and L2D-H1, which 
belong to level 2 of the operational hierarchy. L2D-N1, L2D-O1 and L2D-H1 can be 
inferred directly from the BEs in level 3, which include: L3D-N1-01 to 5, L3D-O1-01 
to 8 and L3D-H1-01 to 3 respectively, while the event L3D-O1-01 was expanded in two 
more levels (levels 4 & 5) and is dependent on the existence of lower-level events. The 
following illustrates four of the intermediate events in Level 4, each of which has its 
own BEs in Level 5,:  
 L4D-O1-01-01: High-Pressure Mud System Failure  
-  L5D-O1-01-1-1: Mud Pump #1 Failure  
-  L5D-O1-01-1-2: Mud Pump #2 Failure 
-  L5D-O1-01-1-3: Bulk Handling System Failure 
-  L5D-O1-01-1-4: High-Pressure Route Failure  
                                (HP hoses, Standpipe Manifold, Choke and Kill Manifold) 
 
 L4D-O1-01-02: Mud Treatment System Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-2-1: Shale Shaker Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-2-2: Desander Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-2-3: Disilter Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-2-4: Degasser Failure   
  
 L4D-O1-01-03: Drilling Equipment Failure  
- L5D-O1-01-3-1: Draw Work Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-3-2: Rotary Table Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-3-3: Top Drive Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-3-4: Pipe Handling System Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-3-5: Drilling Control System Failure 
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 L4D-O1-01-04: Drilling Failure due to Blow out Preventer (BOP) System Failure/ 
Drilling Failure due to Failure of Managed Pressure Drilling Stack 
- L5D-O1-01-4-1: BOP Stack Failure  
- L5D-O1-01-4-2: BOP Control System Failure  
- L5D-O1-01-4-3: Component Failure/Leak  
5.6 Input failure rate and data collection 
The process of full application of a Fuzzy FTA involves a number of stages, which start 
with the definition of a major hazard of the MODU at its system level (i.e. level 1); this 
is followed by development of the sub-system (i.e. intermediated events) at the next 
levels; and then a development of a hierarchy up to the BEs is the subsequent stage of 
this methodology. As stated, the probabilistic FTA is a quantitative analysis method 
used to calculate the probability of the TE from given failure probabilities of the 
system’s BEs. The estimation of probability of failure has an important role in correctly 
prioritising the risks involved and also applying adequate corrective measures. Accurate 
statistical data is vital to most existing techniques but the statistical data of the system 
and equipment are hardly available. With consideration of availability of failure rates 
data, the BEs with known failure rates are separated from those BEs with vague failure 
rates. Therefore, the data collection involves two stages: in the first, the known failure 
rate required to build the model is collected. In the second stage, an expert system is 
developed to estimate the failure rate of MODU operational system events. Therefore, 
to determine the failure rate of an event, utilisation of Fuzzy set theory may be 
necessary. A Mamdani Fuzzy rules system is used to develop the Fuzzy model.  
5.6.1 Scheming of the probabilities of failure of events  
At this stage, the real data collected from the industry will be used to test the 
performance of the proposed model. Limited data such as failure frequency for different 
equipment are available in different sources (i.e. the OREDA handbook, SINTEF report 
etc.); however, more accurate data may be available within different companies but 
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have not been presented to the market. Failure probability analysis determines the 
likelihood of an event occurring. A failure rate should apply to the particular application 
of a component, its operating environment, and its non-operating environment. The 
component failure probability can be obtained from Equation ( 5.3) (Spouge, 2000; 
Rausand, 2004). Calculating the failure probability will require considerable 
engineering judgement. Since the failure probability has a strong influence on the 
prioritisation process, it should either be based on validated data or be assessed 
conservatively.  
 
Figure  5.12: Computing of Bulk handling system probability of failure (OREDA, 2002). 
In some cases, however, either the data were unavailable for a specific event or the data 
could not be broken down to the model level of detail. In these cases, expert judgement 
was used to estimate failure rates for events; however, most of the equipment failure 
rates used in the quantification of the overall failure probability are time-dependent. The 
data include failure frequency information and expert responses to the interviews and 
questionnaires, which together establish the necessary input for gathering information 
required for test-running the model and its preliminary validation studies with regard to 
offshore platform risk assessment.  
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Figure ‎5.13: Calculating probability of failure of BOP (SINTEF report, 1999)  
As illustrated in Figure ‎5.12 to Figure ‎5.14, the failure rates were assigned to each BE 
and its component based on the available detailed data from the OREDA-2002 and 
SINTEF report-1999. With consideration of the logic of P-Tanks failure (i.e. 4 out of 6), 
the bulk handling system’s probability of failure is 4.14E-4 (Figure ‎5.12), the 
probability of failure of the BOP is 3.79E-3 (Figure ‎5.13), and the power generation 
system’s probability of failure with the logic of 4 out of 5 main generators is 3.04E-7 
(Figure ‎5.14).  
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Figure  5.14: Computing of Power generation system’s probability of failure with the logic of 4 out of 5 main generators failing (OREDA, 
2002).
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As mentioned, the FTA is a tool for risk assessment that can combine quantitative 
information of different accuracy and qualitative data. Risk assessment of the MODU 
operational system is mostly held up by the absence of appropriate and reliable data. In 
most circumstances, only descriptive information on the offshore operation system and 
very limited failure data for components becomes available but quantitative data about 
cause-effect relations are still missing. To understand these cause-effect relationships 
expert judgement remains the only available choice. Taking this into account, it is 
necessary to introduce the probability of BEs in their entirety, so a model with this 
purpose has been developed using FL. This theory is employed to incorporate expert 
knowledge, gathered through a questionnaire. Experts usually use the linguistic variable 
to assess the importance of one criterion over another criterion or even to rate the 
alternatives with respect to various criteria. The linguistic terms of Figure ‎5.15 are in 
the form of both triangular and TPFNs. All of the triangular Fuzzy numbers can be 
converted into the corresponding TPFNs for ease of analysis. Table  5.1 presents all the 
Fuzzy numbers of Figure ‎5.15 in the form of TPFNs. 
 
Table  5.1: Logistics variable, ((Chen & 
Hwang (1992)) 
 
Figure  5.15: Fuzzy linguistic conversion 
scale 6 (Chen and Hwang (1992)) 
 
A heterogeneous group of experts is employed to perform the judgement for the vague 
events. The experts’ weights can be obtained by using Table  4.5. 
a b c d
Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2
u(x) 0 1 1 0
Low 0.1 0.2 0.3
u(x) 0 1 0
Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
u(x) 0 1 1 0
Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6
u(x) 0 1 0
Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
u(x) 0 1 1 0
High 0.7 0.8 0.9
u(x) 0 1 0
Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1
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Three experts are employed for performing the judgements. Table ‎5.2 shows the 
experts’ weights.  
Table  5.2: Experts’ weight factor 
 
As illustrated in Table  5.3 and Table  5.4, in the assessment process, verbal statements 
are used to describe the occurrence probabilities of BEs.  
Table  5.3: Occurrence probabilities of BEs (Experts’ knowledge) in level 3 
 
According to these linguistic variables a value on a numerical scale is assigned to each 
BE. The occurrence probability of each of the MODU operation hazards is calculated 
on the basis of occurrence probabilities of the BEs. A common approach to deal with 
















Expert 1 Engineer 3 Ph.D 5  20-30 4 12 0.34
Expert 2 Engineer   3 Master (M.Sc.) 4  > 30 years 5 12 0.34
Expert 3 Senior academic 4.5 Master (M.Sc.) 4  10-19 3 11.5 0.32
Total 35.5 1
L3D-N1-01 Very Low 0.1 0.2 0.34 low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Very Low 0.1 0.2 0.32 0.10
L3D-N1-02 Very Low 0.1 0.2 0.34 low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Very Low 0.1 0.2 0.32 0.03
L3D-N1-03 Very Low 0.1 0.2 0.34 low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Very Low 0.1 0.2 0.32 0.03
L3D-N1-04 Very Low 0.1 0.2 0.34 low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.32 0.04
L3D-N1-05 Very Low 0.1 0.2 0.34 low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Very Low 0.1 0.2 0.32 0.03
L3D-O1-01
L3D-O1-02 low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.32 0.05
L3D-O1-03 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.34 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.32 0.12
L3D-O1-04 very low 0.1 0.2 0.34 low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.32 0.06
L3D-O1-05 very low 0.1 0.2 0.34 very low 0.1 0.2 0.34 very low 0.1 0.2 0.31 0.03
L3D-O1-06 very low 0.1 0.2 0.34 very low 0.1 0.2 0.34 low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.32 0.03
L3D-O1-07 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.34 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.34 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.32 0.12
L3D-O1-08 very low 0.1 0.2 0.34 low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 very low 0.1 0.2 0.32 0.03
L3D-H1-01 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.34 Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.32 0.18
L3D-H1-02 high 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.34 Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.34 high 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.32 0.23
L3D-H1-03 high 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.32 0.14












FactorExpert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3
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judgements of experts. However, these linguistic terms are related to different kinds of 
uncertainties (i.e. stochastic, lexical and, informal uncertainty).  
Table  5.4: Occurrence probabilities of BEs (Experts’ knowledge) in level 5 
 
5.6.2 Aggregation scheming of the BEs and defuzzification process  
In order to obtain more information for making better judgements, the assessments are 
performed by three experts. For group evaluation, it is necessary to aggregate different 
expert opinions into one. The aggregation is a result of the union of two or more 





L5D-O1-01-1-1 low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.34 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.32 0.14
L5D-O1-01-1-2 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.34 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.32 0.13
L5D-O1-01-1-3 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.34 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.32 0.10
L5D-O1-01-1-4 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Very Low 0.1 0.2 0.34 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.32 0.04
L5D-O1-01-2-1 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.32 0.05
L5D-O1-01-2-2 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.34 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.32 0.12
L5D-O1-01-2-3 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.34 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.32 0.10
L5D-O1-01-2-4 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.34 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.32 0.12
L5D-O1-01-3-1 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Very Low 0.1 0.2 0.34 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.31 0.04
L5D-O1-01-3-2 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.32 0.05
L5D-O1-01-3-3 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.34 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.32 0.10
L5D-O1-01-3-4 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.34 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.32 0.14
L5D-O1-01-3-5 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.34 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.32 0.13
L5D-O1-01-4-1 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.34 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.34 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.32 0.15
L5D-O1-01-4-2 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.34 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.34 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.32 0.21












FactorExpert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3
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Table  5.5: Aggregation calculations for the BE of “L5D-O1-01-01-01” 
 
Aggregation is used to merge associated ratings for BEs. As an instance, the 
aggregation calculations for BE of “L5D-O1-01-01-01” are given in Table ‎5.5.  is 
considered as 0.5 in the aggregation scheme. These scheming contain characteristic-
based aggregation calculations such as average degree of agreement (AA) and relative 
degree of agreement (RA) of each expert. Table ‎5.6 presents the results of calculations 
for aggregation for all the BEs. Based on the features of the commonly used 
defuzzification techniques, the centre of area defuzzification method is employed to 










Expert 1 (E1) low 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Expert 2 (E2) High 0 0.7 0.8 0.9
Expert 3 (E3) High 0 0.7 0.8 0.9
S (E1&E2) 0.55 AA (E1) 0.775 RA (E1) 0.333 CC (E1) 0.336
S (E2&E3) 1 AA (E2) 0.775 RA (E2) 0.333 CC (E2) 0.336
S (E1&E3) 0.55 AA (E3) 0.775 RA (E3) 0.333 CC (E3) 0.329
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Table  5.6: Aggregation calculations and defuzzification of the BEs 
 
Basic Events (BEs) Crisp No.
L3D-H1-01  0.056 0.190 0.223 0.256 0.175
L3D-H1-02 0.023 0.045 0.078 0.112 0.065
L3D-H1-03 0.023 0.079 0.112 0.146 0.089
L3D-N1-01 0.090 0.223 0.257 0.279 0.206
L3D-N1-02 0.267 0.300 0.333 0.333 0.307
L3D-N1-03 0.023 0.088 0.122 0.155 0.095
L3D-N1-04 0.000 0.167 0.200 0.234 0.142
L3D-N1-05 0.000 0.200 0.233 0.266 0.164
L3D-O1-02 0.000 0.033 0.067 0.100 0.050
L3D-O1-03 0.056 0.190 0.223 0.256 0.175
L3D-O1-04 0.023 0.045 0.078 0.112 0.065
L3D-O1-05 0.023 0.079 0.112 0.146 0.089
L3D-O1-06 0.054 0.121 0.154 0.188 0.128
L3D-O1-07 0.023 0.188 0.222 0.255 0.164
L3D-O1-08 0.000 0.033 0.067 0.100 0.050
L5D-O1-01-1-1 0.000 0.499 0.599 0.699 0.424
L5D-O1-01-1-2 0.023 0.088 0.122 0.155 0.095
L5D-O1-01-1-3 0.023 0.122 0.155 0.189 0.119
L5D-O1-01-1-4 0.110 0.177 0.211 0.244 0.184
L5D-O1-01-2-1 0.000 0.200 0.233 0.266 0.164
L5D-O1-01-2-2 0.000 0.022 0.055 0.089 0.042
L5D-O1-01-2-3 0.000 0.133 0.167 0.200 0.119
L5D-O1-01-2-4 0.054 0.189 0.222 0.255 0.174
L5D-O1-01-3-1 0.000 0.022 0.055 0.089 0.042
L5D-O1-01-3-2 0.054 0.223 0.256 0.289 0.197
L5D-O1-01-3-3 0.143 0.244 0.277 0.300 0.236
L5D-O1-01-3-4 0.000 0.022 0.055 0.089 0.042
L5D-O1-01-3-5 0.054 0.223 0.256 0.289 0.197
L5D-O1-01-4-1 0.267 0.300 0.333 0.333 0.307
L5D-O1-01-4-2 0.000 0.022 0.055 0.089 0.042
L5D-O1-01-4-3 0.023 0.088 0.122 0.155 0.095
Aggregation calculations for each subjective BE
A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk                                              CHAPTER 5: Fuzzy FTA for 




5.6.3 Converting CFP of BEs into failure probabilities 
By using Equation (‎5.12) the CFP of the BEs can be transferred into failure 
probabilities and the results of all BEs are presented in Table ‎5.7. 
Table ‎5.7: Converting CFP into failure probability  
 
5.6.4 Scheming the MCSs and calculation of TE 
Based on the FT hierarchical model, each BE’s occurrence probability must be provided 
in order to measure the occurrence probability for the TE. The BE probabilities can be 
propagated upward using MCSs. The failure probability of each MCS is presented in 
Table ‎5.8. Furthermore, the occurrence probability of the TE is obtained by using 
Equation (‎5.14). 
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Table  5.8: Failure probability and importance level of each MCS 
 
5.6.5 Prioritising the MCSs according to their importance 
This prioritisation process by definition requires an assessment of each individual 
MCSs. An unsafe condition may be defined with various specific words but, in general, 
it refers to any component failure which has the potential to be the cause of a TE. An 
important objective of many reliability and risk analyses is to identify those components 
or MCSs that are the most important from a reliability or risk viewpoint so that they can 
be given priority with respect to improvements. The ranking of MCSs based on their 








MCS1 4.04E-05 0.0003 14
MCS2 1.61E-02 0.1052 4
MCS3 7.95E-03 0.0520 11
MCS4 1.23E-02 0.0805 10
MCS5 7.44E-03 0.0487 13
MCS6 6.13E-03 0.0401 6
MCS7 1.42E-02 0.0928 9
MCS8 5.85E-03 0.0383 12
MCS9 1.47E-02 0.0854 3
MCS10 1.47E-02 0.0959 2
MCS11 4.21E-03 0.0275 8
MCS12 6.13E-03 0.0401 1
MCS13 5.85E-03 0.0383 5
MCS14 1.87E-02 0.1223 7
MCS15 1.87E-02 0.0040 8
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5.6.6 Risk modelling and analysis of an MODU’s operation system 
Risk modelling and analysis has a fundamental role in the identification of hazard cause 
potentials, the understanding of the fundamental causal events, the likelihood 
assessment of these events, the severity evaluation of the potential consequence of 
catastrophes and the prioritisation of mitigations. The HG hierarchy of the MODU’s 
operation system as illustrated in Figure ‎5.1 is converted into an FT. For instance, 
drilling failure due to Drilling System Failure (L3D-O1-01) is converted to the 
corresponding parent nodes and the consequence of BOP Stack Failure (L5D-O1-01-4-
1) is converted to the corresponding root node. The link between L4D-O1-01-04 and 
L5D-O1-01-04-01 is converted to a corresponding link in the FT. Each category of 
events consists of some different sub-events that affect the performance of the MODU’s 
operations, as presented in Figure ‎5.16. For instance, Drilling control system failure 
(L5D-O1-01-3-5) is the source of failure of L4D-O1-01-3. Likewise, the L5D-O1-01-2-
1 (Shale shaker failure) and L5D-O1-01-2-2 (Desander failure) contribute to L4D-O1-
01-02 (Mud Treatment system failure) to a certain degree. Figure ‎5.17 illustrates the 
results for the FT model of L2D-H1 (Human Error) and Figure ‎5.18 illustrates the 
results for the FT model of L2D-N1 (Natural Hazard).  
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Figure ‎5.16: FT model of the MODU’s drilling system  
Ref. Figure 5.18 Ref. Figure 5.17 
FT of L3D-O1-01  
(Ref. to Appendix 1)  
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Figure  5.17: FT model of L2D-H1 (Human Error)                Figure  5.18: FT model of L2D-N1 (Natural Hazard) 
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5.7 Validation and sensitivity analysis 
Validation is an important aspect of a model for the reason that it affords a sensible 
amount of confidence in the results of the model. It is very useful to be able to compare 
a model against actual data to verify that the model adequately corresponds to reality 
and to assess its usefulness as a predictive tool. In this case, in order to carry out a 
validation of the model, the parameters used need to be closely monitored for a period 
of time. For MODU system operations, it is obviously an impractical exercise due to the 
lack of offshore operations data. For validation of the proposed methodology and 
modelling, three basic principles are considered and should be satisfied. First, a minor 
oscillation in the prior probability of each parent node should certainly be the result of a 
relative fluctuation of the posterior probabilities of child nodes. Second, fluctuation in 
the probability distributions of an individual parent node and its consequent gradation to 
child node values should be kept steady. Lastly, the size of the entire effect of the group 
of probabilities’ variations from the values of attributes should constantly be more than 
that from the set of A-b (b ∈A) features (Cai et al., 2013). Validation is the assignment 
of representations that the model is a realistic demonstration of a real system and is an 
important aspect of a methodology because it provides a reasonable amount of 
confidence in the result of the model. Due to lack of real data, the model should at least 
satisfy the three basic principles as mentioned above. From the above, it can be 
concluded that increasing each influencing node satisfies the three basic principles, 
therefore providing a partial validation of the model. 
Risk reduction measure (RRM) is employed to conduct sensitivity analysis. The RRM 
can be calculated by setting an MCS probability to 0. It is expected that elimination of 
the MCS that has the highest contribution to the occurrence of TE should result in 
reducing the occurrence rate of the TE more than other MCSs. Therefore, ranking of 
RRM values is expected to be the same as the ranking result of MCSs in Table ‎5.8. As 
shown in Table ‎5.9, MCS13 has the highest contribution to the TE occurrence 
probability. Therefore, the RRM value of MCS13 must be the largest. As demonstrated 
in Table  5.9, the RRM value of MCS13 is 0.0248, which is the highest, as expected. 
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Table  5.9 shows the ranking result, which remains the same as the one in Table  5.8. The 
proposed model satisfies the aforementioned expectations. 
Table  5.9: Failure probability and importance level of each MCS 
 
5.8 Results and discussion 
MODU risk assessment and probability of failure has made limited improvement 
compared to analysis methods developed for other offshore structures’ probability 
estimation. Estimation of probability of failure and analysis of the consequences for 
MODU operation systems can be facilitated by FTA, as presented in this chapter, 
allowing modelling with respect to its HG features. This chapter has presented the 
modelling aspects, including hazard identification and its consequences for MODU 
failures and offered a methodology for MODU risk assessment which supports a 









MCS1 0.002 0.066867246 5 0.0519 0.0019 5
MCS2 0.0004 0.013373449 11 0.0534 0.0004 11
MCS3 0.003 0.100300869 4 0.0509 0.0029 4
MCS4 0.0006 0.020060174 9 0.0532 0.0006 9
MCS5 0.00000001 3.34336E-07 15 0.0537 0.00001 15
MCS6 0.00066 0.022066191 7 0.053 0.0008 7
MCS7 0.00035 0.011701768 12 0.0535 0.0003 12
MCS8 0.0002 0.006686725 13 0.0536 0.0002 13
MCS9 0.002 0.066867246 5 0.0519 0.0019 5
MCS10 0.005 0.167168115 3 0.049 0.0048 3
MCS11 0.001 0.033433623 8 0.0531 0.0007 8
MCS12 0.014 0.468070723 2 0.0404 0.0134 2
MCS13 0 0 1 0.029 0.0248 1
MCS14 0.0001 0.003343362 14 0.0537 0.0001 14
MCS15 0.0006 0.020060174 9 0.0532 0.0006 9
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failure. The presented methodology can easily be extended to include other HGs and the 
processes should they be considered simultaneously; also, it is possible to propagate 
uncertainties for different HGs and their BEs through modelling and analysis so that the 
overall system failure can be indicated in a probabilistic approach (i.e. probability 
distribution or higher and lower confidence limits). This will benefit the decision-
maker, who would appreciate the changeability and sensitivity of failure possibility 
estimates, which would not be so understandable if a risk assessment was offered as 
single point estimates only.  
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a methodology for risk analysis and decision support and 
examined the probability of failure of an MODU operation system by using a Fuzzy 
FTA. This methodology is used for risk assessment through a unique application of 
Fuzzy theory, and the proposed methodology can be used as a process for developing a 
set of decisions for understanding and identifying the range of consequences and trade-
offs of actions within an uncertain atmosphere, which allows representation of offshore 
operation systems such as MODUs in different levels of detail. Risk analysis is 
performed by assigning probabilities to a certain event failure or evolution, in which a 
hierarchical breakdown is used to decompose one single component into a more detailed 
representation of the component. It is assumed that an MODU’s system failure is carried 
out by a series of simple occurrences, each affecting a different component. An event 
failure can be seen as a path through the evolutionary graph from a start point to an end 
point. 
Risk assessments are subject to many sources of uncertainty and data limitations that 
hamper the description of model input and the selection of an appropriate model 
structure. Conceptual model uncertainty and lack of system understanding is 
demonstrated to have a great impact on risk assessments. FTAs have the advantage that 
they are based on a logical framework of cause-effect relations. These relations are 
based on existing knowledge or experience. As little knowledge is available about the 
individual relations, many assumptions have to be made. For these assumptions expert 
knowledge is essential. Risk assessment for an offshore operation system with Fuzzy 
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FTA concepts often involves a portion of information in order to achieve a useful BBN 
model, especially in the case of an MODU risk assessment, when a large amount of data 
is vague. Therefore, a combination of various data and information resources is 
essential. This chapter has proposed a new approach for FTA construction by 
employing a Fuzzy theory combining domain knowledge from experts where there are 
limited data. Expert knowledge with Fuzzy set theory was used to estimate the BE 
failure probability table. 
The quantification and assessment of probability of failures allows an engineered design 
of MODUs and adjustment of an offshore operation system so that risk is appropriately 
controlled. The largest concern of operators is the disruption of hydrocarbons of 
delivery to the departure point. An MODU failure has previously caused interruptions in 
drilling; therefore, operators could use the Fuzzy FTA model to quantify loss frequency, 
mitigation measures, and mitigation to control or to avoid a specified risk of HGs. By 
doing so, the expected loss of hydrocarbons and expected costs of construction 
(depending on the acceptable risk level to the operator) can be determined for 
establishing budgets for design, construction and installation, and also for operations 
and maintenance. From this study, it can be concluded that this has the following 
advantages:  
- Assistance in understanding the mitigation process for rare or extreme events, and 
providing an analysis and structure for strategy creation in situations of uncertainty 
and risky events. 
- When insufficient information concerning the occurrence frequencies of hazardous 
events is available, a Fuzzy FT methodology for evaluation seems to be a viable 
alternative solution. 
- It can be useful in the process of MODU risk analysis  
- By using linguistic variables, it is possible to handle the ambiguities involved in the 
expression of the occurrence of a hazard (BE).  
- It helps the decision-maker as a decision support tool and can be used for cause and 
effect analysis by, for example, simulating the consequences of a decision. 
A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk                                              CHAPTER 5: Fuzzy FTA for 




The validation results show that the proposed model calculates the failure probability of 
MODUs. However, in spite of their remarkable power and potential in addressing 
inferential processes, there are some inherent limitations and liabilities in FTA (i.e. the 
BEs are considered as independent in this chapter), so it is required to develop a method 
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6 CHAPTER 6: Risk assessment of MODUs based on BBNs 
Chapter summary 
The main purpose of this chapter is to propose a methodology to improve the current 
procedures used in the risk assessment of MODUs. A new methodology for the 
assessment of the risk level of MODUs is presented. An operational hierarchy of an 
MODU is translated into a BBN using a Fuzzy-AHP to determine the degree of 
influence and importance of factors of each HG in terms of their contributions to the 
system’s failure. The associated values emphasise the chance of occurrence or 
importance, which is based on prior information that is incorporated into the model. The 
methodology is developed using a commercial computer-based modelling system to 
demonstrate how a BBN can facilitate a comprehensive assessment of the risk level of a 
complex MODU system. A generic model is presented that considers the operational 
failure of the drilling systems and the focus has been on mud circulation including the 
BOP system that is implemented to predict the failure of an event during drilling, rather 
than on measures that mitigate the consequences once an event has occurred. In the 
model, failure is influenced by the high-pressure mud system, mud treatment system, 
equipment failure, BOP and the other influences of the BEs shown in level 5 of the 
model which are involved in operation failure. The proposed methodology provides a 
rational and systematic approach for the unit’s risk assessment and comprises a number 
of stages: i) Identification of probable critical events that may lead to the unit’s 
operational failure, ii) Unique applications of a combination of a BBN technique and an 
AHP method are used, iii)Ranking of events using a Fuzzy-AHP to determine the 
degree of influence of each HG and calculation of the conditional probability table 
(CPT), and iv) Construction of hierarchy for the offshore operation system and 
translation into a BBN. The drilling failure of an MODU has been considered, focusing 
on the mud circulation systems including the blow-out preventer. The aim is to prevent 
a critical event occurring during drilling rather than on measures that mitigate the 
consequences once an event has occurred. The study proposes a methodology for 
developing such an assessment. For the purpose of developing a risk analysis and 
decision support model, a relatively realistic and practical approach has been chosen. 
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Ensuring the operational safety of systems used in the offshore industry is often a 
complex problem. An offshore system faces hazards from many different sources which 
dynamically threaten its integrity and operators have to be aware of the current and 
future states of the system in order to make an appropriate decision. QRA techniques 
have been widely applied to offshore operations to reduce the probability of failure. The 
conventional FT is one of several deductive logic techniques which have been used 
extensively for accident investigation, hazard identification and risk analysis of process 
systems (Khan et al., 2002). Standard fault are assumed to be independent although this 
assumption is not always valid in many offshore systems. 
BBNs have emerged as an alternative technique in risk assessment (Bobbio et al., 
2001). Conventional failure assessment techniques such as FTA are often incapable of 
handling changes in uncertainty which are significant in the operation risk assessment 
of offshore systems such as MODUs (Aquaro et al., 2010; Lecklin et al., 2011; Helle et 
al., 2011). A BBN is a graphical technique used to express the causal relationships 
between variables. It can be used to either predict the probabilities of events or to 
update the probabilities of events given the state of other evidence, through the process 
of probability propagation (Mahadevan et al., 2001). The network can perform forward 
or predictive analyses, and backward or diagnostic analyses. New information can 
easily be incorporated as it becomes available, as only the conditional probabilities of 
the affected events require redetermination.  
AHP is a technique often used to model subjective decision-making processes based on 
multiple attributes, and can be applied to both individual and group decisions (Bolloju 
2001). The Fuzzy-AHP method has been applied in order to identify and measure the 
relative importance of the events. It allows input from experts based on previous 
experience to determine the degree of importance and dependency factors of each event 
in the model in terms of their contributions to other failure events. The pairwise 
comparison scheme used in AHP is ideally suited to estimating the relative importance 
of an event for multiple criteria. The occurrence of a hazardous situation may lead to a 
range of consequences. It cannot be assumed that each HG is of equal importance and 
weight in terms of its influence on the failure of the MODU. Therefore, it is necessary 
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to consider the contributory factors of an individual HG to failure. AHP is used to 
define the consequence of a failure and its contribution to and influence on other events. 
In the proposed model, a Fuzzy-AHP is used to determine the relative contribution 
weight factors of events in terms of their effect on system failure. This overcomes the 
shortcomings of conventional methods and effectively produces a final decision. The 
values used throughout the analysis are selected based on their high probability of 
occurring and/or the high importance of potential impact. The proposed methodology 
provides a rational and systematic approach for the risk assessment of offshore units. A 
comprehensive model is proposed which takes into consideration the different 
influences which impact on the operation of the offshore system. The main steps in the 
development of this methodology include:  
- Identifying the probable critical events that may lead to operational failure, ranking 
the events in terms of their influence to other events and relative importance of the 
events with respect to system failure, and calculating the conditional probability table 
of each node. 
- Establishing an operational hierarchy system diagram and breaking down the events 
in detail with respect to the main function.  
- Translating the operational hierarchy to a BBN.  
6.2 The case for decision support systems for offshore systems 
A MODU comprises a large number of complex sub-systems, which makes decision-
making in a time-critical situation extremely difficult. The development of effective 
decision support systems is an important field of investigation (Lu et al., 2008). Most 
disasters in offshore operations are not caused by a single event or failure but by a 
combination of human errors, operational issues and equipment failures. Statistical 
results have indicated that human actions/errors play a significant role in offshore and 
marine operation failures. Studies indicate that human failures are responsible for over 
70% of the causes in marine and offshore accidents and only 30% are attributed to 
technical failures (Trucco et al., 2008). The fundamental human issues that have an 
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impact on offshore operations may be at the organisational and individual level (i.e. 
competence level, stress, and motivation). 
In the last several years, human factors have been widely researched using various QRA 
methods. In the Macondo Well on April 20, 2010, for example, a series of 
organisational and human errors and hydraulic and mechanical failures resulted in a loss 
of well control, which finally led to a blow-out, leading to fatalities, damage and a 
substantial amount of hydrocarbon spill. The fire and explosions that followed the 
blow-out finally caused the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) semi-submersible drilling rig to 
explode and sink in the northern Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, killing 11 crew 
members and initiating the largest marine oil spill in US history (Cleveland et al., 2010, 
Hickman et al., 2012). The results from the investigations showed that the DWH 
accident was a result of failures on different levels of a social and technical system 
involved in the control of safety (i.e. staff; management; company; regulators and 
associations at government level). According to the BP investigation, a chain of events 
was to blame for the loss of well control (e.g. poor cementing caused a kick to occur, 
the failure of the blow-out preventer to close the well, failure to notice the kick 
indications and wellbore pressure (Skogdalen et al., 2011, Cleveland et al., 2010, 
Hickman et al., 2012).  
Risk assessment is a process that comprises several stages, starting with identification 
of the variables (hazards) from vulnerability analysis and expressing relationships as 
conditional probabilities to formulate a risk mitigation measure. Probability theory is 
the technique of choice for dealing with uncertainty in numerous sciences and for a 
complex system (Newman, et al. 2005).  
6.3 Proposed methodology for MODU risk assessment  
BBNs are increasingly used to model complex domains for which knowledge and data 
are uncertain (Henriksen et al., 2007; Cai et al., 2013; Uusitalo, 2007). They have 
proven effective for capturing and integrating quantitative and qualitative information 
from various sources (Smith, et al. 2007). They have the ability to support decisions 
where there is a shortage of empirical data and can be easily updated when new 
evidence becomes available (Henriksen & Barlebo, 2008). 
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The proposed methodology uses the BBN technique to express the causal relationships 
between variables and to combine the evidence from different sources for a QRA of 
offshore systems. The BBN is used to represent the links between unsophisticated 
available information and to foresee the occurrence likelihood of events that may have 
consequences in the operation of the MODU systems. The methodology presented uses 
a hierarchical model to describe dependencies among the systems or components. A 
hierarchical relation exists in the model that is analysed on different levels (e.g. level 2 
and level 3). A BBN model of a system (i.e. MODU) is the compact representation of a 
joint probability distribution of the variables or events comprising the system. An 
MODU’s system operation is represented by a combination of the various sub-systems, 
which comprise both discrete and continuous variables. However, when it comes to 
modelling uncertainty and to performing probabilistic assessment of a unit’s operation 
system, what BBNs have to offer is quite limited. The reasons for choosing BBN 
graphical models are their capability of establishing relationships between hazardous 
events and capacity to show cause and effect relationships of the events by their 
directional capability. Since decision-making in a real MODU operation system is 
extremely complicated, the intention of the proposed methodology is to support 
offshore operators in making rational decisions in uncertain circumstances or hazardous 
situations and to address all HGs and their root cause issues. The proposed new method 
concentrates on the assessment of the failure of offshore operational systems (i.e. 
MODUs) posed through the HGs and root causes (BEs) and presents a novel context to 
implement a methodology that matches probability theory with the AHP technique to 
perform assessment with BBN. As presented in Figure ‎6.1, the proposed methodology 
comprises the following four important tasks: 
 HG identification. 
 Data collection (using input from experts where there is a lack of data). 
 Identifying the relationships between events and establishment of a suitable 
hierarchy.  
 Expression of events’ relationships and influences as conditional probabilities with 
importance factors. 
After hazard identification and construction of an operational hierarchy domain, a 
framework is established which is capable of quantifying the judgements from experts. 
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This is followed by establishment of their membership functions for the linguistic terms 
for the BEs. A conditionally probability table is established using AHP to calculate the 
importance of contributing factors and the weights of the relevant importance of each 
HG in its  risk tree from a viewpoint of their contribution to the failure of the MODU 
and, finally, BBN calculation.  
The risk analysis process includes hazard identification from a vulnerability analysis at 
the start point and is followed by adapting an operational hierarchy of the MODU’s 
system into the BBN. This allows representation of the MODU operation system with 
its HGs at different levels of detail. This aims to detect the failure of equipment or 
systems as well as to support risk mitigation measures (Baiardi et al., 2009). In a real 
system, the amount of analysis required may be enormous because of the number of 
nodes and arcs of the entire system and associated HGs. Because of the complexity of 
integrating the information, and in order to simplify the assessment processes, a 
manageable group of hazards has been considered. Each HG may be broken down into a 
number of simpler system components in different levels, as illustrated in Figure ‎6.2. 
Three HGs (i.e. Natural hazard: L2D-N1, Operational hazard: L2D-O1 and Human 
error L2D-H1) are modelled to the BBN, in which the components and routes describe 
the MODU’s operation system. The failure of each component may influence another 
component or system at the same level or a different level (e.g. ESD System Failure 
(L3D-O1-06) in level 3 has a consequence for Drilling System Failure (L3D-O1-01) at 
the same level, as well as Operational Failure (L2D-O1) at level 2).  
A BBN can be considered as a representation of static cause-effect relations among the 
events. The line between two nodes denotes dependencies or direct contributing 
influences between them. The strength of these dependencies is represented by 
conditional probabilities. The operational hierarchy model is developed based on the 
BBN to model the unsafe conditions of the MODU based on occurrence of BEs. A 
structural hierarchy model with a list of the MODU’s hazardous events employed in this 
model is shown in Figure 6.2. The set of values for each event is also given along with 
the relevant code of reference to be used throughout. This method of assessment can 
help the operator to carry out the MODU risk evolution in a realistic and 
methodological way.  
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L2D-H1:   
Human 
L3D-N1-03:Wellbore influx / Kick                                    WD3N-3 
L3D-N1-04:Punch Through                                                WD3N-
L3D-N1-05:Ground movement                                         WD3N-
L3D-O1-01: Due to Drilling System  Failure              WD3O-1
L3D-O1-02: Due to Power System Failure                     WD3O-2
L3D-O1-03: Due to  Rig Control System Failure            WD3O-3
L3D-O1-05: Due to Water Handling System Failure    WD3O-5
L3D-O1-04: Due to Jacking System Failure                    WD3O-4
L3D-O1-06: Due to  ESD System Failure                         WD3O-6
L3D-H1-02: Management / Supervision / Staff             WD3H-2
L3D-H1-03: Individual- Competence/Motivation WD3H-
L3D-N1-01:Present of high speed wind/wind/Current WD3N-1                                            
L3D-N1-02:Hole instability                                                WD3N-2    
L3D-O1-07: Due to Fuel System Failure                         WD3O-7
L3D-O1-08: Due to  Air/Hydraulic System Failure        WD3O-8
L4D-O1-01-03 : Drilling 
Equipment Failure
WD4O-1-3
L4D-O1-01-04 : Drilling 
failure due to Blow out 
Preventor (BOP) system 
failure  / Drilling failure 
due to failure of managed 
pressure drilling stack            
WD4O-1-4
L4D-O1-01-01 : High 
Pressure Mud System Failure      
WD4O-1-1
L4D-O1-01-02 : Mud 
Treatment System Failure       
WD4O-1-2
L5D-O1-01-1-1:Mud Pump #1 Failure      WD5O-1-1-1
L5D-O1-01-1-2:Mud Pump #2 Failure                      WD5O-1-1-2
L5D-O1-01-1-3:Bulk Handling Suystem Failure       WD5O-1-1-3
L5D-O1-01-1-4::  High Pressure route Failure (HP hoses, 
Standpipe Manifold, Choke and Kill Manifold)       WD5O-1-1-4
L5D-O1-01-2-1:Shale Shaker Failure                          WD5O-1-2-1
L5D-O1-01-2-2:Desander Failure                               WD5O-1-2-2
L5D-O1-01-2-3:Disilter Failure                                   WD5O-1-2-3
L5D-O1-01-2-4:Degasser Failure                                WD5O-1-2-4
L5D-O1-01-3-1:Draw Wrok Failure                           WD5O-1-3-1
L5D-O1-01-3-2:Rotary Table Failure                        WD5O-1-3-2
L5D-O1-01-3-3:Top Drive Failure                                  WD5O-1-3-3
L5D-O1-01-3-4:Pipe Handling System Failure            WD5O-1-3-4
Level  1 Level  2 Level  3 Level 4 Level  5
L5D-O1-01-4-1 : BOP Stack Failure                             WD5O-1-4-1 
L5D-O1-01-4-2: BOP Control System Failure            WD5O-1-4-2 
L5D-O1-01-4-3 : Component Failure/Leak               WD5O-1-4-3  
L3D-H1-01: Organizational , Polices and Procedures   WD3H-1
L5D-O1-01-3-5:Drilling Control System Failure      WD5O-1-3-5
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6.4 The BBN concept and theory 
The BBN methodology was introduced in the 1980s and the theory is based on the 
Bayes rule, proposed by Sir Thomas Bayes (Carlin and Louis, 1997; Cheeseman, 1983; 
Strauss & Sadler, 1989; Dale, 1999). BBNs have a strong similarity to FTA in many 
respects. FTA is an effective method in probabilistic failure assessment but is limited to 
modelling simple static systems. The distinct advantages of BBNs are their capability to 
explicitly represent the dependencies among the events, updating probabilities, flexible 
structure compared to FTA and is appropriated for risk assessment and analysis of 
offshore operation systems (Wang et al., 2011; Ren et al., 2008).  
BBNs are increasingly used to model complex domains for which knowledge and data 
are uncertain (Henriksen et al., 2007). They provide both diagnostic and predictive 
capabilities and allow for updating the probability distributions when new evidence 
becomes available (Henriksen and Barlebo, 2008); (Pearl, 2000). However, the 
calculations involving large numbers of variables are complex and appropriate tools are 
required (Cheng and Druzdzel, 2000). Bayes’ theorem is one that has been proven to be 
an understandable method of mathematically expressing a decrease in uncertainty 
gained by an increase in information (Bayes, 1763). A BBN is a directed graph 
consisting of a set of nodes and links among them. Uncertain variables are associated 
with each node where the probability of the failure expresses the certainty of the various 
events consequences and is conditionally subject to the status of the parent nodes at the 
entering boundaries. BBNs obviously accommodate uncertainty and inconsistency in 
model predictions because of the probabilistic presentation (Uusitalo, 2007), and they 
have proven effective for capturing and integrating quantitative and qualitative 
information from various sources (Smith et al., 2007).  
BBNs are excellent tools for managing and understanding complex processes compared 
to other methods of risk assessment for the reason that they represent the process 
graphically; each node in the network represents either the prior or conditional 
probability of the parameter of interest. As mentioned, BBNs offer several advantages 
over conventional risk assessment techniques (Woodberry et al., 2005):  
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- A process is presented graphically and the intuitive visual presentation showing 
causal relationships can be sensibly understood. 
- BBN models would be a valuable decision support tool. 
- Different sources of information can be employed concurrently in the model.  
- Dependent relationships between the events can be described by directing links. 
- The data can be simply updated with new knowledge. 
6.4.1 BBN theory 
Bayes’ theorem provides a means for creating probability calculations. In order to 
generate probability statements about the model’s parameters, the analysis must start 
with providing an initial or prior probability approximation for specific outcomes or 
events of interest. The objective of this chapter is to apply a probabilistic model for an 
MODU’s risk assessment; this is defined as a translation of information that permits us 
to evaluate every sophisticated decision in line with the following three axioms as 
presented in Equation (‎6.1) (Pearl, 2000):  
Causal BBNs express causal relationships between random variables and involve nodes 
connected by directed edges. Essentially, it is a relation among conditional and marginal 
probabilities. Conditional probabilities are essential to a fundamental rule of probability 
calculus, the product rule. As presented in Equation (‎6.2), the product rule defines the 
probability of a conjunction of events (i.e., for two events, A and B):  
 P(A|B)P(B) = P(A,B) = P(B|A)P(A) ( 6.2) 
In Bayesian probability, the concept of inference plays an important role. The rule of 
updating probabilities is given by Equation (‎6.3), which is the theorem conventionally 
known as Bayes’‎theorem‎(Strauss and Sadler, 1989;, Dale, 1999): 
• 0 ≤ P(A) ≤ 1 
• P(sure proposition) = 1 
• P(A or B) = P(A)+P(B) where A and B are exclusive events              ( 6.1) 
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 P(A|B) =  ( 6.3)  
Term P(A|B) in Equation (‎6.3) is called the posterior probability of A given the 
assumption that B is known. It is posterior in the sense that it is resulting from or 
entailed by the specified value of B, and this is called the conditional probability. When 
P(A|B) = P(A), A and B are said to be independent. In Bayesian probability, conditional 
probability is not defined in terms of joint events; A|B is rather seen as A in the context 
specified by B. The term P(B) is the prior or marginal (total) probability of B but also 
one that provides evidence of interest for the probability update of A. Its inverse is 
usually regarded as a normalising constant. With this terminology, Figure ‎6.3 shows a 
graphical illustration of Bayes’ theorem (Press and Press, 1989). 
 
Figure  6.3: A graphical illustration for terms of Bayes’ theorem 
The term P(A) is named the prior probability of A and is also called the marginal 
probability of A. It is prior in the sense that it precedes any information or knowledge 
about B, what is called data, and this is what grounds all the arguments. In light of this 
new information providing a new data belief, it is desirable to improve the state of 
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probabilities, referred to as the posterior probabilities. The term P(B|A), for a specific 
value of B, is called the likelihood function for B given A, where the vertical bar “|” 
indicates “given that” (Pearl, 2011). 
6.4.2 Definition and properties of BBN 
The BBN is the common technique used to measure posterior probabilities’ distribution 
given the prior probabilities. This type of inference can use simulation techniques and 
subjective opinions to obtain fairly accurate probability values. Likelihood estimation is 
the proportion of occurrence between the various states of the variable. A BBN consists 
of a set of nodes for representing variables and a set of directed edges representing 
causal influences between variables (Cowell, 1998; Smyth, 1997). Each variable has a 
finite set of mutually exclusive states. Figure ‎6.4 shows a typical BBN or directed 
acyclic graph where A is the observed variable, because it is a node with no child node. 
This node A is an uncertain variable; its value is influenced by B, which is the 
parameter of interest in this problem; we observe A (with n specified), and use this 
information to infer possible values for B. The dashed region at the top of the graph, 
labelled Data, clarifies the type of prior distribution used for B that is entered by the 
analyst. 
 
Figure ‎6.4: Typical BBN (Directed acyclic graph) 
As mentioned, a significant benefit of the Bayesian paradigm is that additional 
parameters can easily be added to a model without seriously adding to the complexity of 
the statistical analysis, provided that those parameters fit into a conditional 
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parameters on the existing data and parameters can be made explicit, assessing the new 
parameters is often a simple matter of additional computing time. 
6.4.3 Joint probability distribution (JPD)  
In the general case, a JPD over a set of variables, A = [A1, A2,…,‎An], can be defined 
recursively using the product rule as presented in Equation (‎6.4) (Pearl, 1988): 
 
P(A1, A2,…,‎An) = P(A1|A2,…,‎An)P(A2,…,‎An) 
              = P(A1|A2,…,‎An)P(A2|A3,…,‎An)P(A3,…,‎An) 
 = P(A1|A2,…,‎An)P(A2|A3,…,‎An)…P(An–1|An)P(An)  
( 6.4) 
 
Equation (‎6.5) illustrates an application of BBN for (A1, A2, B, C, D) for the graph 
given in Figure ‎6.5. 
 
 











( 6.5)  
This factorisation property of JPDs is referred to as the chain rule of probabilities and is 
one that allows any ordering of variables in the factorisation. Such a rule is especially 
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conditional probabilities, which is what a BBN stores. For example, the JPD for three 
events, a1, a2, and a3, can be expressed more compactly as: 
 P(a1| a2, a3)P(a2, a3) = P(a1, a2, a3) = P(a2| a1, a3)P(a1, a3) ( 6.6) 
Then, in applying Equation (‎6.7), Bayes’ theorem specifies the probability of an event 
a1, given the condition that an event a2 and an event a3 both occur as: 
 
 )|(










aaaP   ( 6.7) 
Thus, risk assessment of events can be carried out on this basis to enhance reasoning 
that will enable reliable decision-making. Generally, Bayes’ rule can be considered for 
the problem of estimating values of j parameters (causes), A = [a1,…,aj], using i 
observations (effects), B = [b1,…,bi]. In the rule then, given the observations B = 















bbAP   ( 6.8) 
 
 
Figure  6.6: An illustration of probability update via Bayes’ theorem 
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Bayesian inference proceeds by summarising the posterior distribution, P(A|B). As 
depicted in Figure ‎6.6, after observing the data, the wide prior distribution is converted 
into the more narrow posterior distribution using Bayes’ rule. The process of Bayes’ 
theorem is repeated every time when new or additional information becomes available 
(Lindley and Smith, 1972). Bayes’ theorem has been particularly useful in estimating 
knowledge about the frequency of rare events or making reliability predictions where 
there is sparse or no directly applicable data (Hall et al., 2009). 
6.4.4 Marginalisation of probabilities 
The probability distribution P(A) can be calculated from a table P(A, B) of probabilities, 
P(ai, bj). Let ai be a state of A. There are exactly m different events for which A is in 
state ai, namely the mutually exclusive events (ai, b1),…,‎(ai, bm). Therefore: 
 P(ai) =  =  ( 6.9) 
In other words: 
  =  ( 6.10) 
This calculation is called marginalisation (summing out) and expresses the fact that the 
variable B is marginalised out of the JPD, P(A, B) (resulting in P(A)) (Sandholm and 
Suri, 2003; Russell and Norvig, 2003). The notation is: 
 P(A) =  =  ( 6.11) 
In a similar way, if P(B, A) is a CPT over A and B, then a CPT over the state space of 
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 P(b1) =  = P(b1|a1) P(a1) + P(b1|a2) P(a2) ( 6.12) 
Marginalisation is of utmost importance for all inference in Bayesian probability: 
integrating out all superfluous variables derives the information about a subset of the 
system’s variables. Furthermore, the process of marginalisation tackles the problem of 
decision uncertainty explicitly, by preventing overoptimistic predictions (Vellido and 
Lisboa, 2001). 
6.4.5 Conditional probability distribution  
A BBN allows the analytical evaluation of all the probabilities of interest and also 
represents the quantitative relationships between the modelled variables. It provides us 
with probabilities information and makes it possible to recognise system failure or 
weaknesses. The BBN comprises different variables (i.e. independent and dependent), 
the links represent how the variables are related and each node is described by a 
probability distribution. Underlying each dependent variable is a conditional probability 
table that specifies the probability of each state conditional on other variables. A 
conditional probability is a probability of one event given that another event has 
occurred, i.e. the conditional probability of a parameter, a1, given an observed 
parameter, b1, would be written as P(a1| b1).  
There are some differences depending on the level to which the node belongs. As per 
hazard identification and an MODU’s operational hierarchy, shown in Figure ‎6.2, a 
framework was chosen to model the system and each dependent node is described by a 
conditional probability distribution. In level 5, CPT evaluation is reduced to the 
definition of prior probabilities of occurrence of adverse events. This can be done by 
relying on historical data and expert opinion; as an example, the conditional probability 
table associated with the event High-Pressure Mud System Failure (L4D-O1-01-01) 
being directly dependent on the Mud Pump #1 failure (L5D-O1-01-1-1). Another 
important characteristic of conditional probability is the nature of failures that can 
happen within a system and how that may affect other dependent systems or equipment. 
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between services or equipment, i.e. the event of Drilling System Failure (L3D-O1-01) 
in level 3 is conditional on the event of Power System Failure (L3D-O1-02). 
Principally, a typical conditional probability table is a matrix of conditional 
probabilities and knowledge of CPT is an integral and essential part in understanding 
numerical evaluation of probabilities. As illustrated in Table ‎6.1, a CPT in level 4 is 
described for four nodes by its matrix format containing two states of each specified 
event (i.e. Risky & Consistent). Thus, Consistent represents a certain state for each 
event whilst Risky stands for a failure state. The importance factors which are outputs 
of the AHP analysis are shown in the second column of each related node and the 
cumulative states are presented in the last two columns.  
Table  6.1: CPT in level 4 of four nodes containing two states of specified events  
 
An additional class of dependencies that is even harder to identify is associated with the 
operators’ management system and dependencies among the different organisations of 
the MODU’s operation system (i.e. managing different subcontractors for different 
activities). A failure in one organisation (e.g. Cementing subcontractor) can cascade 
through dependencies to other parts of the MODU’s operation system. A dependency 



















Risky 0.220 Risky 0.271 Risky 0.175 Risky 0.335 1.000 0.000
Risky 0.220 Risky 0.271 Risky 0.175 Consistent 0.665 0.335
Risky 0.220 Risky 0.271 Consistent Risky 0.335 0.825 0.175
Risky 0.220 Risky 0.271 Consistent Consistent 0.490 0.510
Risky 0.220 Consistent Risky 0.175 Risky 0.335 0.729 0.271
Risky 0.220 Consistent Risky 0.175 Consistent 0.394 0.606
Risky 0.220 Consistent Consistent Risky 0.335 0.555 0.445
Risky 0.220 Consistent Consistent Consistent 0.220 0.780
Consistent Risky 0.271 Risky 0.175 Risky 0.335 0.780 0.220
Consistent Risky 0.271 Risky 0.175 Consistent 0.445 0.555
Consistent Risky 0.271 Consistent Risky 0.335 0.606 0.394
Consistent Risky 0.271 Consistent Consistent 0.271 0.729
Consistent Consistent Risky 0.175 Risky 0.335 0.510 0.490
Consistent Consistent Risky 0.175 Consistent 0.175 0.825
Consistent Consistent Consistent Risky 0.335 0.335 0.665
Consistent Consistent Consistent Consistent 0.000 1.000
L4D-O1-01-1   L4D-O1-01-2   L4D-O1-01-3 L4D-O1-01-4  CPT  (Symmetric model)
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6.4.6 Conditional independence and dependency 
A BBN also represents the quantitative relationship among the modelled variables and it 
represents the JPD among them. Any probability of interest can be calculated from the 
JPD of the variables. However, a BBN not only outputs the graphical representation of a 
joint probability of the variables, but also captures properties of conditional 
independence (i.e. missing arrows that imply no direct influence) between variables. 
Conditional independence has the advantage of representing joint probabilities more 
compactly and efficiently, before the actual conditional probability distributions are 
numerically specified. Combination of quantitative information with qualitative 
information of numerical parameters makes probability theory easy to express; the 
above mixture leads to reduction in complexity of the probability computation and also 
simplifies probabilistic inference of the network. 
Conditional independence also reduces the size of CPTs. As an example, given two 
events, A and B, A is independent of B if P(A|B) = P(A). Independence is symmetric, 
and therefore it follows that P(B|A) = P(B). The independence of A and B can also be 
expressed as P(A,B) = P(A)P(B). Also, A is conditionally independent of B given 
another event, C, if P(A|B,C) = P(A|C). Conditional independence is symmetric, and 
therefore it follows that P(B|A,C) = P(B|C). Now, when many variables are 
conditionally independent, as in the case of Equation ( 6.6), calculation of joint 
probabilities using the chain rule can be simplified significantly. As a simple example, 
if A is conditionally independent of B given C, then P(A,B,C) = P(A|B,C)P(B|C)P(C) = 
P(A|C)P(B|C)P(C). 
6.5 Applications of research methodology for MODU risk assessment 
In this section, the application of the BBN is emphasised, in particular, the application 
of the proposed research methodology for risk assessment of the MODU’s operation 
system is presented. The BBN technique is used to determine the probability of the 
MODU’s failure in the course of an offshore operation. The proposed methodology 
benefits from the inclusion of different complex variables of a hybrid nature in the 
offshore operation. Application of the BBN method consists of three stages. It starts 
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with hazard identification and construction of the BBN model in line with the MODU’s 
operational hierarchy and is followed by elicitation of probabilities to nodes and, 
finally, the establishment of calculations. The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate 
the modelling aspects of the BBN with regard to its ability to update probabilities as 
well as its various modelling features such as incorporation of variables, dependent 
failures and expert opinion, which are frequently encountered in risk assessment of 
operational systems like MODUs.  
In spite of the BBN’s attraction and widespread attention for modelling complex large-
scale marine and offshore operations (i.e. MODU risk assessment), there are a number 
of concerns in relation to the construction of the hierarchy model and the incorporation 
of data. The person who creates the models needs to be aware of these concerns, such as 
distinguishing the variables appropriate to the MODU’s operation system, recognising 
the relationships between these variables and expressing these relations as a conditional 
probability distribution table. A hierarchy model is regulated by variables and their 
interactions.  
The requirement and guidelines pertaining to well integrity during drilling activities and 
operations are specified in the Norwegian oil and gas regulations (NORSOK D-010, 
2004). According to this standard, all phases of offshore operations must have two 
separate and independent barriers. Well drilling completion is a good example, in which 
the mud column is the primary barrier and the secondary barrier is the blow-out 
preventer BOP, which protects the well from a disaster as the last resort. The primary 
barrier is the first stumbling block against undesirable flow from the source (Hauge et 
al., 2011). In overbalanced processes, the mud column is the primary well barrier and 
should function within the drilling margin pressure (i.e. a pressure greater than the hole 
pressure and lower than the fracture gradient). Mud control is an operation function and 
loss of control can lead to an emergency situation. The mud and cementing circulation 
system is composed of the following: bulk and storage system, high-pressure mud 
pumping system, mud treatment system and cementing system. The secondary barrier 
should be active on the detection of an influx and the well should be closed, and this 
also prevents further unwanted flow in the case of failure of the primary well barrier 
(PSA, 2008). Macondo (BP, 2010) was planned to be abandoned and left 
underbalanced, by replacing drilling mud with sea water, and with two cement barriers 
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in place (Commission, 2010b). Well control systems are defined in the NORSOK 
standard (D-001, 2004) as the mechanical well control and associated equipment and 
system. This includes BOP, choke & kill system, rise, and the control system for the 
BOP. As explained previously, the mud system and BOP are the key components of the 
system to provide the well integrity. Therefore, the simple process diagram of the mud 
circulation and mixing system as illustrated in Figure ‎6.7 is considered in levels 4 and 5 
of the MODU’s operational hierarchy (Figure ‎6.2). Drilling mud is the primary 
requirement to start drilling operations and the mud mixing system provides appropriate 
mud by an adequate combination of dry cement and water (diesel oil or brine may be 
used to provide viscidity). Drilling mud is made and stored in mud pit(s). Mud pumped 
through the standpipe manifold into the drill string will pump the prepared mud stored 
in the mud pit. The standpipe design pressure is in line with the mud pump capacity 
(typically 7,500 psi). The mud pump provides adequate pressure to overcome the mud 
column static pressure at the bottom of the drilled hole.  
Mud returns through the annular casing, and then the returned mud is directed to the 
shell shakers via the mud ditch to remove earthen impurities such as sharp rocks. At a 
later stage, the returned mud will pass through Desander, Desilter and gas separator in 
order to remove smaller impurities as well as mixed gas trapped in the mud. At the last 
stage, the treated, returned mud will go back to the mud pits for further circulation. This 
circulation process is repeated through the course of drilling. The returned mud pressure 
is continuously measured by BOP sensors and, in the case of over-pressure, the normal 
circulation line will be blocked and the high-pressure mud will be led to the choke/kill 
manifold, which is designed for higher pressure (typically 10000 psi), in order to reduce 
the pressure of the pumped mud on the atmospheric level. In the case of kick (high 
pressure in the return line because of entry of water, gas, oil, or other formation fluid 
into the wellbore), the very high-pressure mud (10000 psi) will be injected into the well 
through the kill line by an additional pump (normally cement pump). The cement pump 
is also connected to the choke/kill manifold. It should be noted that the “kick” pressure 
is lower than the “choke” pressure. As the bit “drills ahead”, a specially formulated 
drilling fluid or mud is continually pumped or circulated from the surface to the bottom 
of the well, and then back to the surface to cool the bit and remove the cuttings, as 
illustrated in Figure ‎6.7.(For the system’s components description refer to Appendix 2) 
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Figure  6.7: Schematic diagram of mud circulation and mixing system/equipment in levels 4 and 5 
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6.5.1 Hazard identification and potential hazard sources/sub-sources 
In the previous chapters (Chapters 4 & 5), the contextual information on the MODU’s 
HGs and the objectives of the application were provided and also a novel methodology 
was introduced for HG classification with particular emphasis on Drilling Failure (L1D-
O1-01). In the hazard identification, the MODU’s operational hierarchy is illustrated, 
beginning with the BEs (root causes) in level 5, followed by the intermediate nodes in 
levels 3 and 4, also called hinge nodes, and ending up with the target node in level 1. 
Figure ‎6.7 illustrated the schematic diagram of the mud system. A model in association 
with the circulation and mixing system is developed in level 4 with special focus on 
analysis of failures of the mud system caused by its HGs. 
A comprehensive system-level risk analysis is heavily dependent on appropriately 
identifying the key events of the area of interest. In particular, the identification of 
potential hazard sources within the structure of the problem domain should be 
considered as a fundamental step in operational system risk assessment. Within this 
context, for drilling failure (L1D-O1-01) a HG was developed and, based on its 
classification and analysis, three main category hazard sources were identified and 
labelled as: Human (L2D-H1), Operational (L2D-O1) and Natural (L2D-N1). A 
hierarchy model, represented as a directed graph, as shown in Figure ‎6.2, is used to 
assess the goals of L1D-O1-01 (Drilling failure) due to its associated HGs in different 
levels by disintegration into measurable sub-systems and events. 
The analysis starts by identifying the importance of BEs and parent notes in different 
levels that can influence the goal level (i.e. level 1). In the next step, the exploratory 
approach is adopted in order to explain the importance of events and their consequences 
at different levels through application of the AHP technique based on expert judgement. 
The pairwise comparison scheme in the AHP is an ideal solution to work out the 
relative importance of an event, providing an explanation for multiple criteria in 
evaluating important consequences. By employing the pairwise comparison of the AHP 
technique, the interactive relationships expressed between the risk events through causal 
and logical dependency and a relative contributions weight factor were introduced. A 
Fuzzy-AHP is used to determine the importance factors of each event, which interprets 
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their influence on and contributions to the MODU’s operational system failure. As an 
example, in level 4 of the operational hierarchy importance factors (WD4O-1-1 to 4) are 
considered as the relative weight factors for the nodes L4D-O1-01-01 to 4 respectively. 
These factors then explain the significance of the event in comparison with the others in 
a particular process. The corresponding importance factors as a conditional probability 
are identified and ranked by the Fuzzy-AHP method, as illustrated in Figure ‎6.8. 
The higher levels (i.e. levels 2, 3 and 4) can also affect indirect root causes and 
consequently their associated hinge nodes from other hazard sources. Several events can 
exist in parallel or the existence of one event can comprise the existence of another 
event. As shown in Figure ‎6.8, there are three HGs of interest, L2D-N1, L2D-O1 and 
L2D-H1, which belong to level 2 of the operational hierarchy. L2D-N1, L2D-O1 and 
L2D-H1 can be inferred directly from the BEs in level 3 which include: L3D-N1-01 to 
5, L3D-O1-01 to 8 and L3D-H1-01 to 3 respectively. While the event L3D-O1-01 was 
expanded in two more levels (levels 4 & 5) and is dependent on the existence of lower-
level events (i.e. level 4: L4D-O1-01-1 to 4) and BEs in level 5, as listed below: 
 L4D-O1-01-01: High-Pressure Mud System Failure  
-  L5D-O1-01-1-1: Mud Pump #1 Failure  
-  L5D-O1-01-1-2: Mud Pump #2 Failure 
-  L5D-O1-01-1-3: Bulk Handling System Failure 
-  L5D-O1-01-1-4: High-Pressure Route Failure  
          (HP hoses, Standpipe Manifold, Choke and Kill Manifold) 
 L4D-O1-01-02: Mud Treatment System Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-2-1: Shale Shaker Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-2-2: Desander Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-2-3: Disilter Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-2-4: Degasser Failure   
 L4D-O1-01-03: Drilling Equipment Failure  
- L5D-O1-01-3-1: Draw Work Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-3-2: Rotary Table Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-3-3: Top Drive Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-3-4: Pipe Handling System Failure 
- L5D-O1-01-3-5: Drilling Control System Failure 
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 L4D-O1-01-04: Drilling Failure due to Blow out Preventer (BOP) System Failure/ 
Drilling Failure due to Failure of Managed Pressure Drilling Stack 
- L5D-O1-01-4-1: BOP Stack Failure  
- L5D-O1-01-4-2: BOP Control System Failure  
- L5D-O1-01-4-3: Component Failure/Leak  
As illustrated in Figure ‎6.8, a coding system with event importance factors was 
considered, i.e. in level 3 of the hierarchy model the importance factors WD3N-1 to 
WD3N-5 are designated to Natural Hazard (L2D-N1) BEs and, similar to that, WD3O-1 
to WD3O-8 are designated to the Operational (L2D-O1) BEs. Also the importance 
factors WD3H-1 to WD3H-3 are designated to the Human (L2D-H-1) BEs. In the same 
manner, in levels 4 and 5 the importance factors were calculated and are illustrated in 
Figure ‎6.8.  
6.5.2 Application of AHP for prioritising of risk in the hierarchy 
In the real world, events or combinations of events that lead to MODU operation system 
failure are not well recognised. An integrative model incorporates both failure data and 
the importance factor of each event based on its contribution to the MODU failure, 
which is necessary for analyses. When statistical data or expert judgement is presented 
for prior probabilities, there is a need to identify the consequences and effects of the 
failure of one system or component on another system. This relation is known as the 
conditional dependency. The Fuzzy-AHP technique is employed to deal with the 
importance factor of dependency and ranking of each considered event with its 
contribution to the failure of the target goal. Table ‎6.2 shows the pairwise comparison 
of sub-nodes of L3D-O1-01 and, in a similar way; Table ‎6.3 presents the pairwise 
comparison of sub-nodes of node L2D-O1. 
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Figure  6.8: A hierarchy model of the MODU system’s HG factors
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Table  6.2: AHP pairwise comparison for nodes L4D-O1-01-1 to 4 
 
 
In Figure ‎6.8, three categories of HGs at different levels of hierarchy are defined for 
determination of the relative importance of risk events according to their consequence 
with respect to other events in view of their contribution to the MODU’s failure. 
Interactive relationships were then expressed between risk events through causal 
diagrams. Once the risk quantities are inputted by the user, the challenge then is to 
modify the influence of these inputs towards risk items that need a higher priority as 
determined by the use of the simultaneous engineering design and operation philosophy, 
previous management, organisational experiences, and best practices and standards. 
Table  6.3: AHP pairwise comparison for nodes L3D-O1-01 to 8 
 
 

























L4D-O1-01-1 1.00 1.30 1.25 0.80 WD4O-1-1 0.26
L4D-O1-01-2 0.77 1.00 1.10 0.65 WD4O-1-2 0.21
L4D-O1-01-3 0.80 0.91 1.00 0.55 WD4O-1-3 0.19
L4D-O1-01-4 1.25 1.54 1.82 1.00 WD4O-1-4 0.33
Ranking alternatives for " L3D-O1-01: Drilling System  Failure"             
Importance Factor



























































L3D-O1-01 1.00 1.26 1.37 1.47 1.53 1.58 1.68 1.63 WD3O-1 0.17
L3D-O1-02 0.79 1.00 1.14 1.29 1.36 1.43 1.57 1.50 WD3O-2 0.15
L3D-O1-03 0.73 0.88 1.00 1.17 1.25 1.33 1.50 1.42 WD3O-3 0.14
L3D-O1-04 0.68 0.78 0.86 1.00 1.10 1.20 0.60 0.80 WD3O-4 0.11
L3D-O1-05 0.66 0.737 0.80 0.91 1.00 1.11 1.33 1.22 WD3O-5 0.11
L3D-O1-06: 0.63 0.70 0.75 0.83 0.9 1.00 1.25 1.13 WD3O-6 0.11
L3D-O1-07 0.59 0.64 0.67 1.67 0.75 0.8 1.00 0.83 WD3O-7 0.10
L3D-O1-08 0.61 0.67 0.71 1.25 0.82 0.89 1.20 1.00 WD3O-8 0.11
Ranking alternatives for L2D-O1: Operational 
Importance Factor
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This, in turn, leads to highlighting of the relatively high-risk HG (i.e. Drilling Operation 
failure) and makes up the first pass of risk assessment in a specific phase. The objective 
form of the BBNs is the same as the causal diagram for that HG. 
6.5.3 Node probability data gathering and expert judgement  
In the process of developing the risk analysis methodology, the estimation of 
probability of failure has an important role in correctly prioritising the risks involved 
and also applying adequate corrective measures. Accurate statistical data are vital to 
most existing techniques but the statistical data of the system and equipment are hardly 
available. Therefore, to determine the prior probability of an event, utilisation of Fuzzy 
set theory may be necessary.  
The probability of occurrence of each of the MODU’s operation hazards is calculated 
based on prior probabilities of the BEs and the conditional probabilities of nodes, 
although the prior probabilities and event relationships are not always obvious and 
usually require expert knowledge.  
Table  6.4: Probabilities of occurrence of BEs (Experts’ knowledge) in level 3 
 
L3D-N1-01 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.09
L3D-N1-02 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.303 0.15
L3D-N1-03 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 0.13
L3D-N1-04 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.09
L3D-N1-05 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.09
L3D-O1-01 
L3D-O1-02 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.303 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.25
L3D-O1-03 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.09
L3D-O1-04 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.303 0.15
L3D-O1-05 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 0.13
L3D-O1-06 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.09
L3D-O1-07 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.09
L3D-O1-08 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 0.13
L3D-H1-01 Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.303 0.37
L3D-H1-02 Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.31
L3D-H1-03 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.303 0.25
This event of drilling failure is expanded to its subsystem and events in two lower levels (i.e. Levels 4 and 5)
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3
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As mentioned, the BBN is a tool for risk assessment that can combine quantitative 
information of different accuracy and qualitative data. Risk assessment of the MODU’s 
operational system is mostly held up by the absence of appropriate and reliable data. In 
most circumstances, only descriptive information of the offshore operation system and 
very limited failure data for components become available, but quantitative data about 
cause-effect relations are still missing. For understanding these cause-effect 
relationships, expert judgement remains the only available choice. A manageable 
number of hazards are required in order to have a comprehensive risk assessment for the 
different operational conditions (i.e. Human error, Operational and Natural hazard). 
Taking this into account, it is necessary to introduce the probability of BEs in their 
entirety, so a model with this purpose has been developed using FL. This theory is 
employed to incorporate expert knowledge, gathered through a questionnaire. As 
illustrated in Table ‎6.4 and Table ‎6.5 in the assessment process, verbal statements are 
used to describe the occurrence probabilities of BEs. According to these linguistic 
variables, a value on a numerical scale is assigned to each BE.  
Table  6.5: Occurrence probabilities of BEs (Experts’ knowledge) in level 5 
 
A common approach to deal with these values is the use of semi-quantitative estimation 
methods, which rely on linguistic judgements of experts. However, these linguistic 
terms are related to different kinds of uncertainties (i.e. stochastic, lexical and, informal 
uncertainty). Various approaches have been developed to decrease the uncertainties in 
L5D-O1-01-1-1 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 0.12
L5D-O1-01-1-2 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.303 0.15
L5D-O1-01-1-3 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.09
L5D-O1-01-1-4 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 0.11
L5D-O1-01-2-1 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 0.12
L5D-O1-01-2-2 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 0.13
L5D-O1-01-2-3 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.09
L5D-O1-01-2-4 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.303 0.15
L5D-O1-01-3-1 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Very Low 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 0.11
L5D-O1-01-3-2 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 0.12
L5D-O1-01-3-3 Mol. Low 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.303 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.09
L5D-O1-01-3-4 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.21
L5D-O1-01-3-5 Low 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.303 0.15
L5D-O1-01-4-1 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.303 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.25
L5D-O1-01-4-2 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.303 0.23
L5D-O1-01-4-3 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 0.21
Expert 2 Expert 3
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different fields of risk assessment; one popular solution is the use of FL (Darbra and 
Casal, 2009). If the data for a risk event is sufficient to enable quantitative reasoning, 
then the form of the information such as frequency of occurrence of the BEs can be 
converted into a probability distribution for the assessment.  
6.5.4 Conditional probability table  
A conditional probability table (CPT), which relates states of the parent nodes to those 
of a child node, includes entries for all possible combinations of the child and parent 
node states. In a Bayesian network, the number of probability distributions required to 
aggregate a CPT grows exponentially with the number of parent-nodes associated with 
that table. The input to the methodology consists of a set of weight factors that quantify 
the relative strengths and influences of the parent nodes with consideration of their 
contribution to the MODU’s operation failure by using expert knowledge. A Fuzzy-
AHP is used for calculation of the CPTs for the entire parent nodes to determine the 
degree of influence and importance of factors.  
As shown in Figure ‎6.9, a failure in one system or equipment such as High-Pressure 
Mud System Failure (L4D-O1-01-01) will affect other systems or equipment like Mud 
Treatment System Failure (L4D-O1-01-02). Another important characteristic of 
dependencies is the natures of failure that can occur within a system and how they may 
spread to other dependent component(s). 
The dependencies among an MODU’s components present a major challenge for 
modelling. Dependencies among components can occur in any part or organisational 
level of an MODU’s operation system. The probability of the MODU’s drilling failure 
due to an operational issue is set between 0 and 1 for the Consistent and Risky 
(hazardous) states, and it is presumed that the situation is initially consistent.  
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Figure ‎6.9: Schematic dependency among systems/equipment in level 4 
The probable values of importance factor for the Consistent and Risky states are shown 
in the second column of Table ‎6.1. As is illustrated in Figure 6.10, Drilling System 
Failure (L3DO101) is mainly affected by four categories of events (i.e. L4DO1011 to 
4). An AHP methodology was used to show the relative importance factor (i.e. WD4O-
1-1 to 4) of each parent node for its associated child node. As a result, for each node the 
conditional probability of that node taking a certain value and the cumulative values of 
the entire node is presented in the last two columns of Table ‎6.1. Note that a probability 
is provided for each combination of events (64 in this case). The CPTs for different 
levels are established in a similar way and presented in Appendix 3. 
Direct dependence of each BE node to its associated node is quantified by assigning 
each BE node a CPT by using a symmetric model. In the symmetric model, the experts’ 
opinion is distributed by relative importance of each parent node for its associated BEs. 
The strength of direct dependence of each BE to its associated parents is indicated by 
their normalised weights (Riahi et al., 2014). This CPT is actually the conditional 
probability of each event given the other variables or events. 
.
L4D-O1-01-03 : Drilling 
Equipment Failure
WD4O-1-3
L4D-O1-01-04 : Drilling failure 
due to Blow out Preventor 
(BOP) system failure  / Drilling 
failure due to failure of 
managed pressure drilling stack            
WD4O-1-4
L4D-O1-01-01 : High Pressure 
Mud System Failure          
WD4O-1-1
L4D-O1-01-02 : Mud Treatment 
System Failure                    
WD4O-1-2
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Figure ‎6.10: BBN model for drilling system failure (L3DO101) 
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6.5.5 Risk modelling and analysis of the MODU’s operation system 
Risk modelling and analysis has a fundamental role in the identification of hazard cause 
potentials, the understanding of the fundamental causal events, the likelihood 
assessment of these events, the severity evaluation of the potential consequence of 
catastrophes and the prioritisation of mitigations. The HG hierarchy of the MODU’s 
operation system as illustrated in Figure ‎6.8 is converted into a BBN. For instance, 
drilling failure due to Drilling System Failure (L3D-O1-01) is converted into the 
corresponding parent nodes and the consequence of Mud Pump #1 Failure (L5D-O1-01-
1-1) is converted into the corresponding root node. The arc between L4D-O1-01-01 and 
L5D-O1-01-01-01 is converted into a corresponding link in the BBN. Each category of 
events consists of some different sub-events that affect the performance of the MODU’s 
operations, as presented in Figure ‎6.11. For instance, the Pipe Handling System Failure 
(L5D-O1-01-3-4) is the source of failure of L4D-O1-01-3. Likewise, the L5D-O1-01-4-
1 (BOP Stack Failure) and L5D-O1-01-4-2 (BOP control system failure) contribute to 
L4D-O1-01-04 (Drilling failure due to BOP system failure/drilling failure due to failure 
of managed pressure drilling stack) to a certain degree. 
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Figure ‎6.11: BBN model of the MODU’s drilling system 
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Detailed failure statistics for the various BOP systems are presented in the Sintef report, 
in which the main information source from the study has been the daily drilling reports 
(Holand, 1999). The probability that there will be L4D-O1-01-4 (BOP control 
system/stack/component failure) can be calculated as shown in Figure ‎6.12.  
  
Figure  6.12: BBN model of L4D-O1-01-4 (BOP control system/stack/component 
failure)  
 
Figure ‎6.13 illustrates the results for L5D-O1-01-4-1 (BOP stack failure). As would be 
expected, the probability of drilling failure due to BOP stack failure increases from 
45.8% to 68.3%, when BOP stack failure has been observed. This update is due to 
diagnosis (i.e., bottom-up) inference from the L5D-O1-01-4-1 node to the “evidence” 
node. 
  
Figure  6.13: Propagated results for BOP control system/stack/component failure when 
BOP stack failure has been observed) 
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As illustrated in Figure ‎6.14 the probability of drilling failure due to BOP stack failure 
decreases from 68.3% to 28.3%, when BOP stack is 100% consistent. 
 
Figure ‎6.14: Propagated results for BOP control system/stack/component failure, when 
BOP stack is 100% consistent 
6.6 Validation and sensitivity analysis 
Validation is an important aspect of a model for the reason that it affords a sensible 
amount of confidence in the results of the model. It is very useful to be able to compare 
a model against actual data to verify that the model adequately corresponds to reality 
and to assess its usefulness as a predictive tool. In this case, in order to carry out a 
validation of the model, the parameters used need to be closely monitored for a period 
of time. For MODU system operations, it is obviously an impractical exercise due to the 
lack of offshore operations data. For validation of the proposed methodology and 
modelling, three basic principles are considered and should be satisfied. First, a minor 
oscillation in the prior probability of each parent node should certainly be the result of a 
relative fluctuation of the posterior probabilities of child nodes. Second, if there is any 
fluctuation in the probability distributions of an individual parent node, its consequence 
gradation to child node values should be kept steady. Lastly, the entire effect 
magnitudes of the probabilities variations from an attribute should constantly be more 
than that from the set of A-b (b ∈A) features (Cai et al., 2013). Validation is the 
assignment of representations that the model is a realistic demonstration of a real 
system and is an important aspect of a methodology, because it provides a reasonable 
amount of confidence in the model’s results. Due to lack of real data, the model should 
at least satisfy the three basic principles mentioned above. In order to demonstrate the 















L5DO10143: BOP stack failure
Risky
Consistent 
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satisfaction of the principles, the BBN for drilling system failure node, L3DO101, is 
considered, as illustrated in Figure ‎6.10. 
For instance, in the parent nodes of L3DO101 (Drilling system failure), as illustrated in 
Table ‎6.6 and also as shown in Figure ‎6.15, when the risky probability of L5DO1-01-1-
4 (High Pressure route failure HP hoses, Standpipe Manifold, Choke and Kill Manifold) 
is set to 100%, as would be expected, the probability of consistent operations of node 
L4DO1011 (High-Pressure Mud System Failure) decreases from 87.8% to 70.9%.  
Table  6.6: Probability failure of L5DO10114 (High-pressure route failure - HP hoses, 
                 standpipe manifold, choke and kill manifold) is set to 100% 
 
Accordingly, as presented in Table ‎6.7 and illustrated in Figure ‎6.16, when the risky 
probability of L5DO10135 (Drilling control system failure) is set to 100%, in the parent 
nodes of L3DO101 (Drilling System Failure), the probability of operational consistency 
decreases from 85.1% to 82.7%. Furthermore, in the node of L4DO1013 (Drilling 







Risky Consistent Risky Consistent
11% 89% 100% 0%
L1D: Drilling Failure 29.7 70.3 30.1 69.9
L2DO1: Operational 14.2 85.8 15.3 84.7
L3DO101: Due to Drilling System Failure 14.9 85.1 20.7 79.3
L4DO1011: High Pressure Mud System Failure 12.2 87.8 29.1 70.9
L5DO10114: High Pressure route failure (HP hoses, 
Standpipe Manifold, Choke and Kill Manifold)
Nodes
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Table ‎6.7: Probability failure of L5DO10135 (Drilling control system failure) is set to 
100% 
 
Lastly, in the node of L4DO1014 (Drilling failure due to BOP system failure/Drilling 
failure due to failure of managed pressure drilling stack), when the node of L5DO10121 
(BOP stack failure) is set to 100%, the probability of operational consistency decreases 
from 77.3% to 58.6%, as presented in Table ‎6.8 and also illustrated in Figure ‎6.17. 
Table  6.8: Probability failure of L5DO10141: BOP stack failure is set to 100% 
 
From the above it can be concluded that increasing each influencing node satisfies the 
three basic principles, therefore providing a partial validation of the model. 
 
 
Risky Consistent Risky Consistent
15.0% 85.0% 100.0% 0.0%
L1D: Drilling Failure 29.7 70.3 29.9 70.1
L2DO1: Operational 14.2 85.8 14.6 85.4
L3DO101: Due to Drilling System Failure 14.9 85.1 17.3 82.7
L4DO1013: Drilling Equipments Failure 13.1 86.9 21.7 78.3
Nodes
L5DO10135: Drilling Control System 
Failure
Risky Consistent Risky Consistent
25% 75% 100% 0%
L1D: Drilling Failure 29.7 70.3 30.0 70.0
L2DO1: Operational 14.2 85.8 15.0 85.0
L3DO101: Due to Drilling System Failure 14.9 85.1 19.0 81.0
L4DO1014: Drilling failure due to Blow out Preventor (BOP) system failure/ 
Drilling failure due to failure of managed pressure drilling stack
22.7 77.3 41.4 58.6
Nodes
L5DO10141: BOP stack failure
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Figure ‎6.15: BBN of an MODU drilling system failure when the probability failure of L5DO10114 (High-pressure route 
                  failure - HP hoses, Standpipe Manifold, Choke and Kill Manifold) is set to 100% 
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Figure ‎6.16: BBN of an MODU drilling system failure when the probability failure of L5DO10135 (Drilling control system 
                   failure) is set to 100% 
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Figure ‎6.17: BBN of an MODU drilling system failure when the probability failure of L5DO10141 (BOP Stack failure) is 
                   set to 100% 
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The evaluation of the test case shows how change in one or more specific variables would 
change the belief in the target node L3DO101. This evaluation also revealed the effect of 
conditional dependence between variables. Further, the test case indicated that Netica is a 
suitable tool to be used in the calculations of a real-world scenario.  
6.7 Results and discussion 
MODU risk assessment and probability of failure has made limited improvement compared to 
analysis methods developed for other offshore structures’ probability estimation. Estimation of 
probability of failure and analysis of the consequences for the MODU operation system can be 
facilitated by a BBN, as presented in this chapter, allowing modelling with respect to its HG 
features. This chapter has presented the modelling aspect, including hazard identification and its 
consequences for MODU failures and offered a methodology for MODU risk assessment, which 
supports a structured approach to all tasks, involved in the failure of MODUs due to their HGs 
failure. The Netica Ver (4.16) software is used for propagation of the BBN model and the 
outcome of assessment offers constructive information in preventing an event’s recurrence in the 
future. The BBN format also allows the establishment of a common model for the entire MODU 
system, considering all HGs, but in this chapter only a manageable HG is considered. The 
framework is demonstrated through the assessment of a case study that shows the probability of 
failure of responses in BBN circumstances and the model is shown in Figure 6.12. Furthermore, 
many failure-reducing measures influence the risk from other hazards; therefore, for proper risk 
assessment of an operation system one must consider the risk and associated consequences of 
those risks from all operation processes. 
The presented methodology can easily be extended to include other HGs and the processes 
should be considered simultaneously; also, it is possible to propagate uncertainties for different 
HGs and their BEs through modelling and analysis so that the overall system failure can be 
indicated in a probabilistic approach (i.e. probability distribution or higher and lower confidence 
limits). This will benefit the decision-maker, who would appreciate the changeability and 
sensitivity of failure possibility estimates, which would not be so understandable if a risk 
assessment was offered as single point estimates only. Still, it is then uncertain whether or not 
the acceptable risk level should be compared with the mean, intermediate levels or some higher 
confidence limit of the system. Some decision-makers may wish to work this out by using a 
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higher confidence limit, resulting in the conservative use of risk acceptance criteria. Such an 
approach may not always be usual but it does mean that the decision-maker with consideration 
of the whole aspect (i.e. environmente issues, cost, time and quality) needs to make a sensible 
and proper decision. 
6.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has presented a methodology for risk analysis and decision support and examined 
the probability of failure of an MODU operation system by using a BBN. This methodology is 
used for risk assessment through a unique application of Fuzzy-AHP and BBN techniques to 
assess the consequences of risk events based on prior knowledge and accounting for influences 
on each other to determine the probability of risk events. The proposed methodology can be used 
as a process for developing a set of decisions for understanding and identifying the range of 
consequences and trade-offs of actions within an uncertain atmosphere, which allows 
representation of offshore operation systems such as MODUs in different levels of detail. Risk 
analysis is performed by assigning probabilities to a certain event failure or evolution, in which a 
hierarchical breakdown is used to decompose one single component into a more detailed 
representation of the component. It is assumed that an MODU’s system failure is carried out by a 
series of simple occurrences, each affecting a different component. An event failure can be seen 
as a path through the evolutionary graph from a start point to an end point. 
Risk assessments are subject to many sources of uncertainty and data limitations that hamper the 
description of model input and the selection of an appropriate model structure. Conceptual model 
uncertainty and lack of system understanding is demonstrated to have a great impact on risk 
assessments. Bayesian networks have the advantage that they are based on a logical framework 
of cause-effect relations. These relations are based on existing knowledge or experience. As little 
knowledge is available about the individual relations, many assumptions have to be made. For 
these assumptions expert knowledge is essential. Risk assessment for an offshore operation 
system with Bayesian concepts often involves a portion of information in order to achieve a 
useful BBN model, especially in the case of MODU risk assessment, when a large amount of 
data is vague and, therefore a combination of various data and information resources is essential. 
This chapter has proposed a new approach for BBN construction by employing a Fuzzy-AHP 
and combining domain knowledge from experts where there are limited data. Expert knowledge 
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with Fuzzy set theory was used to estimate the BE failure and conditional probability table. From 
a theoretical point of view, the methodology has constructed a Fuzzy-AHP of Bayesian learning 
and a case study is presented showing the practical application.  
The quantification and assessment of probability of failures allows an engineered design of 
MODUs and adjustment of an offshore operation system so that risk is controlled. The largest 
concern for operators is the disruption of hydrocarbons of delivery to the departure point. 
MODU failure has previously caused interruptions in drilling; therefore, operators could use the 
BBN model to quantify loss frequency, mitigation measures, and mitigation to control or to 
avoid a specified risk of HGs. By doing so, the expected loss of hydrocarbons and expected costs 
of construction (depending on the acceptable risk level to the operator) can be determined for 
establishing budgets for design, construction and installation, and also for operations and 
maintenance. 
From this study, it can be concluded that the model has the following advantages:  
- The proposed model can take into consideration uncertainty and dependency in different HGs. 
-  Modelling and simulation are seen as key elements to better understanding of dependencies.  
- Assistance in understanding the mitigation process for rare or extreme events. 
-  It can be useful in the process of MODU risk analysis (i.e. vulnerability assessment). 
- Helps the decision-maker as a decision support tool and can be used for what-if analysis by, 
for example, simulating the consequences of a decision. 
- Provides an analysis and decision structure for strategy creation in situations of uncertainty 
and risky events. 
 
The validation results show that the proposed model calculates the failure probability of 
MODUs. Furthermore, the BBN model is uniquely capable of directly computing the posterior 
probabilities of variables which are most valuable for the enhanced system risk assessment. 
However, in spite of their remarkable power and potential in addressing inferential processes, 
there are some inherent limitations and liabilities in BBNs such as: 
- The elicitation of CPTs to the nodes and edges can be done as a brainstorming exercise by the 
expert group. In general, this means that, for each node, the expert group has to assess the 
conditions of probability (i.e. failure of events and the effect of the events on others). They 
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cannot easily incorporate unobserved variables, owing to the fact that the size of the internal 
CPT for a child node can very quickly become quite large. 
- There is computational complexity/difficulty (filling in of details of numerical recipe, 
computer time, convergence monitoring), which is exponential with the increase in the 
number of present nodes. 
 
The prior probability is relatively easy to assess. Based on available data or expert judgement, 
and experience in Netica development and evaluation, it can be done by ranking the importance 
of the different events, giving them probabilities from a predefined set. The complexity of 
inference is usually associated with large probabilistic dependencies recorded during inference. 
However, a large model is preferable to a smaller one only if it provides a sufficiently large 
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7 CHAPTER 7: Fuzzy MCDM and Fuzzy TOPSIS for cost-
benefit analysis and decision-making 
Chapter summary 
The main objective of this chapter is to propose a methodology for assessment of the 
relative importance of criteria and the performance ratings of alternatives of an offshore 
operation system with respect to the criteria. The proposed methodology offers a 
quantitative decision model that can help the decision-maker to set priorities, the RCOs, 
and gain the most benefits for controlling the risk of the MODU’s operation system. 
The purpose is to find the most appropriate alternative(s) from a discrete set of feasible 
alternatives with respect to a limited set of criteria. A Fuzzy MCDM model based on 
Fuzzy-AHP and Fuzzy TOPSIS is used for construction of the model and composition 
of weighting scheme and implementation. In real situations, the decision-makers have to 
combat curiously vague and conflicting criteria. This controversy increases empirical 
uncertainties, disputes, and the resulting consequences of these decisions. A Fuzzy 
MCDM method, which is suitable for treating group decision-making problems in a 
Fuzzy environment, is proposed for ranking the RCOs from a cost-benefit point of view 
and to aggregate the conflicting opinions. The proposed methodology with respect to 
cost and benefit has been implemented in an MODU’s operation system intended for 
decreasing/controlling of the operational risk level of the MODU. A generic model is 
presented that considers the operational failure of the drilling systems and the focus is 
on human error and the BOP system that is implemented to propose barriers for 
reducing the MODU’s operational risk. The proposed methodology provides a rational 
and systematic approach and the main steps in the development of this methodology 
include: i) Defining and describing the alternatives, ii) Computing the criteria 
weightings, iii) Evaluating the performing of alternatives against the criteria, iv) 
Converting the criteria performance values to commensurable units and normalised 
values, v)Performing the analysis and applying the selected MCDM technique(s), vi) 
Ranking the RCOs from a cost-benefit point of view, and vii)Evaluating the results and 
making the final decision. 
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The main purposes of this chapter are to develop and implement an integrated Fuzzy 
MCDM model based on Fuzzy-AHP and Fuzzy TOPSIS and construct a composite 
weighting scheme appropriate to enhance the quality of solving MCDM problems.  
The MCDM techniques generally enable a problem to be structured clearly and 
systematically. With this characteristic, decision-makers have the possibility to easily 
examine and scale the problem in accordance with their requirements (Isiklar and 
Buyukozkan, 2006). MADM is a significant part of modern decision-making which can 
offer a quantitative decision model that can support the decision-maker to set priorities 
and achieve the most benefits for reducing and controlling the risk level of the system 
(Shyur and Shih, 2006).  
The aim of the MCDM/MADM is to obtain the optimum alternative that has the highest 
degree of satisfaction for all of the relevant attributes. The decision-maker may express 
or define a ranking for the attributes in terms of importance/weights. The aim is to 
obtain the optimum alternative that has the highest degree of satisfaction for all of the 
relevant attributes (Yang and Huang, 2000). The purpose of this chapter is to suggest 
and implement an integrated Fuzzy MADM model based on Fuzzy-AHP and Fuzzy 
TOPSIS and construct a combined weighting scheme composed of appropriate 
subjective weights, and then present an experimental sample to illustrate the 
applicability of the proposed methodology. This model is used to improve the current 
techniques used in assessment of the relative importance of criteria and is applied for 
the evaluation and ranking of the MODU’s operational barriers. The results gained from 
it show the preference order. MCDM refers to finding the best opinion from all of the 
feasible alternatives in the presence of multiple, usually conflicting, decision criteria 
(Torfi et al., 2009) 
In the traditional formulation of the TOPSIS, personal judgements are represented with 
crisp values. However, in many practical cases the human preference model is uncertain 
and decision-makers might be reluctant or unable to assign crisp values to the 
comparison judgements (Chan & Kumar, 2007). In many real-world situations, crisp 
data are not adequate and sufficient to model some decision-making problems (Chen, 
A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk           CHAPTER 7: Fuzzy MCDM and Fuzzy TOPSIS  




2000; Chen & Lu, 2001; Chen et al., 1992). This is because most of the criteria are 
difﬁcult to measure by crisp values, and so they are frequently neglected during the 
evaluation course. In the real world, crisp data are not adequate and sufficient to model 
the decision-making problems in the decision-analysis process (Chen, 2000; Chen & 
Lu, 2001; Chen et al., 1992). To resolve this problem, Fuzzy set theory has been used 
and is implemented herein. Fuzzy set theory attempts to select, prioritise or rank a ﬁnite 
number of sequences of action by evaluating a group of pre-set criteria. The proposed 
methodology is able to handle both Fuzzy and crisp data; in general, each expert’s 
opinion for a given attribute may be different from those of the others, but the proposed 
model is able to aggregate the conflicting opinions.  
Numerous qualitative and quantitative criteria may have an equal effect when assessing 
alternatives, which may make the selection process difficult and challenging. AHP is a 
technique often used to model subjective decision-making processes based on multiple 
attributes, and can be applied to both individual and group decisions (Bolloju, 2001). 
The Fuzzy-AHP method has been applied in order to identify and measure the relative 
importance of the barriers, in order to prevent a critical event occurring during the 
drilling operation of the MODUs. It allows input from experts based on previous 
experience to determine the degree of importance of each barrier in the model in terms 
of their contributions to control and reduce the MODU’s risk level. The pair-wise 
comparison scheme used in AHP is ideally suited to estimating the relative importance 
of an event for multiple criteria. Weighting the criteria and evaluating the performance 
of alternatives against the criteria are two of the most important and difficult aspects of 
applying the MCDM methodology and are potential sources of considerable uncertainty 
(Larichev & Moshkovich, 1995; Roy and Vincke, 1981).  
In order to prevent the occurrence of a hazardous situation, it may be necessary to put in 
place a range of barriers and it cannot be assumed that each barrier is of equal 
importance and weight in terms of their influence in preventing a hazard. Therefore, it is 
necessary to consider the contributory factors of an individual barrier in preventing a 
failure. AHP is used to define the effect of a barrier and its contribution to and influence 
on other barriers. In the proposed model, a Fuzzy-AHP is used to determine the relative 
contribution of weight factors of barriers, in terms of their effect in preventing system 
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failure. This overcomes the shortcomings of conventional methods and effectively 
produces a final decision. The values used throughout the analysis are selected based on 
their high probability of occurring, and/or the high importance of the potential outcome.  
In this chapter, the barriers preventing drilling failure of an MODU have been 
considered, focusing on the human error and the BOP including the BOP control 
system. The aim is to prevent a critical event occurring during drilling by assignment of 
barriers. The study proposes a methodology for developing such an assessment. The 
decision-maker may express or define a ranking for the attributes in terms of 
importance/weights. The aim of the MADM/MCDM is to obtain the optimum 
alternative that has the highest degree of satisfaction for all of the relevant attributes 
(Yang & Huang, 2000). The purpose is to find the most desirable alternative(s) from a 
discrete set of feasible alternatives with respect to a finite set of attributes.  
Defining the alternatives as well as figuring out the criteria weighting, applying the 
selected MCDM technique(s), ranking, assessing the result and, as an outcome, making 
the final decision are the main steps in the development of this methodology. The 
decision process of selecting an appropriate alternative usually has to take many factors 
into consideration; for instance, organisational needs and goals, risks, benefits, limited 
resources, etc. Because of the vagueness of human thought, the selection is often based 
on inadequate information or personal judgements. Decision-makers may find it 
difficult to identify the best choice due to the lack of systematic methods to deal with 
multi-criteria problems.  
7.2 Literature review 
MCDM refers to the problem of selecting among alternatives associated with multiple 
criteria. The association of weights in multiple criteria problems is a serious step of the 
entire decision-making process. In conventional MCDM, alternative rating and weights 
are measured in crisp numbers. Conventional MCDM methods require the 
determination of alternative ratings and criteria weights are made which are subject to 
decision-makers’ judgements. Crisp values are usually used to represent those ratings 
and weights. However, in practice, alternative ratings and criteria weights cannot be 
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assessed accurately (Yeh & Deng, 1997). It is shown that calculation of the criteria 
weights is serious and it may change the ranking results. In a MCDM problem-solving 
process, weights can practically change the outcome of the whole process. Criteria 
weighting plays an important role in most MCDM approaches because the evaluation 
result is often greatly affected by the criteria weights used in the evaluation process. For 
the reason that the evaluation of criteria entails diverse opinions and meanings, it cannot 
be assumed that each evaluation criterion is of equal importance (Tzeng & Ding, 2003). 
Numerous methods for solving MADM problems require definitions of quantitative 
weights for the attributes (Wang & Chang, 2007; Torfi et al., 2009; Al-Kloub et al., 
1997; Gass, 1986; Goh et al., 1996; Srdjevic et al., 2004; Wang & Lee, 2009; Yeh & 
Deng, 2004; Olson, 2004; Diakoulaki et al., 1995; Deng et al., 2000). Identifying the 
means by which to measure the weights of decision-makers is a motivating research 
topic. Each factor has its own contribution to the evaluation. The weight values of 
evaluation criteria are the most influential coefficients in a system. The higher the 
weight value, the more significant is the criterion. Usually the weight value depends on 
the decision-maker’s subjectivity, which may result in some errors or mistakes.  
Different criteria weight values are used to evaluate a task, which will not lead to the 
same assessment outcomes (Pilavachi et al., 2006; Afgan et al., 2007). Different criteria 
weights have an important role in the decision-making process. The way in which to 
arrange the decision weights should be deliberated in the evaluation process. Many 
methods have been proposed to determine the weights of decision-makers. Chen and 
Fan (2007) proposed a factor score method for obtaining a ranking of the assessment 
levels of experts in group-decision analysis. Ramanathan and Ganesh (1994) proposed a 
simple and intuitively appealing eigenvector-based method to intrinsically determine the 
weights of group members by using their own subjective opinions. Xu (2008) gave a 
direct technique to determine the weights of decision-makers by using the deviation 
measures between additive linguistic preference relations. Yue (2011a) developed a 
method for determining weights of decision-makers with interval numbers. 
In various circumstances where performance rating and weights cannot be given 
accurately, the Fuzzy set theory is introduced to deal with the uncertainty of human 
judgements, and such problems are known as Fuzzy multiple criteria decision-making. 
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The Fuzzy set theory can make available a decision context that incorporates imprecise 
judgements in the decision-making process (Dursun & Karsak, 2010). 
The use of Fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1965) allows the decision-makers to incorporate 
unquantiﬁable information, incomplete information, non-obtainable information and 
partially unknown facts into the decision model (Kahraman, 2005). Bellman and Zadeh 
(1970) first incorporated Fuzzy set theory into MCDM as an approach to effectively 
deal with the inherent inaccuracy, vagueness and ambiguity of the human decision-
making process. Since then, many researchers have been working on the process with 
unreliable data. Chen (2000) extended the TOPSIS of Hwang and Yoon (1981) to a 
Fuzzy environment and developed a technique to calculate the distance between two 
Fuzzy numbers and defined a closeness coefficient to determine the ranking order of all 
alternatives by concurrently calculating the distances to both the Fuzzy positive-ideal 
solution and Fuzzy negative ideal solution. 
TOPSIS and its extensions are developed to solve ranking and justiﬁcation problems. 
Although it is a popular and simple concept, this method is often complained about for 
its lack of ability to appropriately handle the inherent uncertainty and imprecision 
associated with the mapping of the decision-maker’s perception to crisp values (Yong, 
2006; Chen & Tsao, 2008, Kahraman et al., 2007; Wang & Elhag, 2006; Shyur and 
Shih, 2006). Yue (2011b) developed a new approach for determining weights of 
decision-makers in a group decision environment based on an extended TOPSIS by 
proposing the positive ideal solution as the average of the group decision. The negative 
ideal solution includes two parts, left and right negative ideal solutions, which are the 
minimum and maximum matrixes of the group decision, respectively.  
7.3 A proposed integrated Fuzzy MCDM and Fuzzy TOPSIS methodology 
In this chapter, an approach for multi-criteria recommendation is proposed. The 
proposed methodology uses the Fuzzy MCDM and Fuzzy TOPSIS techniques to 
express the causal relationships between a hazard from different sources and its 
proposed barriers in an offshore operation system. An MODU’s operation system is 
represented by a combination of the various sub-systems and the methodology 
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presented uses a hierarchical model to describe reliance among the hazard and its 
suggested barriers.  
The proposed method concentrates on the assessment of the recommended barriers to 
prevent the failure of offshore operation systems (i.e. MODUs) posed through the HGs 
and their root causes (i.e. BEs). The accuracy of assessment in a multi-criteria 
environment can be improved by a combination of the recommended techniques, FL 
and MADM methods. Since decision-making in a real MODU’s operation system is 
extremely complicated, the intention of the proposed methodology is to support offshore 
operators in making sensible decisions through introducing the barriers in order to 
prevent the occurrence of an event and to decrease the MODUs’ risk level. As 
graphically represented and illustrated in Figure ‎7.1, the proposed MCDM methodology 
shows how this method can be applied, and comprises the following stages: 
- Performing the analysis and applying the selected MCDM technique(s)  
- Calculating the weighting of the criteria  
- Defining and describing the alternatives  
- Evaluating the performing of alternatives against the criteria  
- Construction of a decision matrix  
- Establishment of the aggregated weight scheme  
- Obtaining the decision matrix to identify the criteria with respect to alternatives  
- Evaluating the result and making the final decision (by anyone involved in the 
decision analysis process) 
- Normalising the decision matrix in order to make each criterion comparable  
- Calculation of the overall performance evaluation for each alternative  
- Finally, determine the positive ideal solution and the negative ideal solution and 
calculate the closeness coefficient, in order to rank each alternative in descending 
order 
Based on prior discussion on the unavailability of data, FL is used to accumulate the 
data; the experts were asked to evaluate interrelations between given criteria and 
provide multi-criteria ratings for selected alternatives. After defining and describing the 
alternatives and calculation weighting of the criteria, the performance of the alternatives 
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was evaluated against the criteria. Each expert expressed his/her opinion about the 
identified subjective criteria. The expert opinions are in the form of linguistic terms or 
verbal statements and this subjective judgements can be demonstrated by a Fuzzy 
number. The weights of criteria are obtained using Fuzzy-AHP and experts’ weights are 
estimated. Then, a criteria-based aggregation method for grouping experts’ judgements 
is employed. One may conclude that the various experts are not equally important. After 
assigning a weight for each expert, all ratings are aggregated for each subjective 
criterion.  
In the resulting step, all aggregated Fuzzy numbers are converted into numeric ratings 
using the centre of gravity method. The result of the last phase is a decision matrix, 
which contains Fuzzy data. Consequently, the alternatives in hand are ranked by Fuzzy 
TOPSIS by following these steps: 
a) Construct a decision matrix 
b) Calculate aggregate weights for each criterion 
c) Normalise the Fuzzy decision matrix 
d) Calculate overall performance evaluation for each alternative 
e) Determine the positive c deal solutions (PIS) and negative ideal solutions (NIS) 
f) Calculate distance from Fuzzy PIS and Fuzzy NIS 
g) Calculate CC  and determine the best alternative 
The conceptual model of the proposed method is illustrated in Figure ‎7.1. This method 
of assessment can help the operator to carry out the MODU’s risk evaluation and to 
propose the best risk control option in a realistic and methodological way. As 
demonstrated in Figure ‎7.1, the decision process in a MADM method contains four 
main parts, namely: i) alternatives and criteria for evaluating of risk control option, ii) 
calculating the weights for the criteria, iii) performance measures of alternatives with 
respect to the criteria, and vi) ranking and decision-making for selection of the best 
RCOs. The goal of the MCDM is either to design the optimal alternative or to choose 
the best one from the predefined alternatives, and can be classified in two categories: 
i.e. MODM and MADM Figure ‎7.1 describes the features of the two classes. 
A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk           CHAPTER 7: Fuzzy MCDM and Fuzzy TOPSIS  














C1   .   .   .Cj   .   .   .   Cn





C1   .   .   .Cj   .   .   .   Cn
w1   .   .   .wj   .   .   .   wn
A1 Weightings
AHP / Fuzzy AHP
Performance ANP / Fuzzy ANP



































































































A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk           CHAPTER 7: Fuzzy MCDM and Fuzzy TOPSIS  




TOPSIS is a MCDM technique that ranks different alternatives through numerical 
assessments and this chapter proposes an extension of the Fuzzy TOPSIS approach 
which integrates subjective weight. The benefit of the proposed methodology is that it 
not only benefits from decision-makers’ know-how, but also involves the offshore 
operators in the entire decision-making process; moreover, it has the following 
advantages (Chu and Lin, 2002):  
- The method is rational and easy to understand. 
- The calculation involved is simple. 
- It is capable of finding the best alternatives for each evaluation criterion depicted in a 
simple mathematical form.  
- The concept allows both subjective and objective weights to be aggregated in the 
decision-making process and the weights can be specified for each criterion, in order 
to introduce a measure of the relative importance felt by the decision-maker 
(Gamberini et al., 2006). 
7.3.1 Definition and classification of barriers 
Based on experience from a literature survey concerning the understanding of the term 
barrier in various industries, it is clear that different terms with similar meanings  have 
been used to define the word (e.g. protection layer, safety barrier, etc.). A barrier or 
protection layer is implemented to protect people/crew, the environment and assets from 
hazards. In order to properly define the concept of barrier, it is first necessary to define 
the term barrier function, which is what is needed to assure, increase and/or promote 
safety and decrease the risk level (De Dianous & Fiévez, 2006)  
Sklet (2006b) defines safety barrier function as: a barrier function is a function planned 
to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents. “Prevent” means 
reduction of the likelihood of an undesired event, control means limiting the extent 
and/or duration of the event to prevent escalation, and mitigate means reduction of the 
effects of the undesired event. The classification of barriers (i.e. barrier functions and 
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barrier systems) is shown in figure Figure ‎7.2. Xue et al. (2013) divide safety barrier 
functions into proactive and reactive functions depending on whether their service time 
is before or after a particular undesired event. Barriers that are intended to function 
before an undesired event are proactive, while barriers that are intended to function after 
the event are reactive. 
 
Figure ‎7.2: Classification of barriers, barrier functions and barrier systems 
A passive protection layer (i.e. physical, operational and human) is a protection layer 
that does not have to take action to achieve its function in reducing risk. An active 
protection layer is required to move from one state to another in response to a change in 
a measurable process property (e.g. temperature or pressure), or a signal from another 
source (such as a push-button or a switch). A well barrier can be viewed as a protection 
layer whose objective is to prevent flow from the reservoir. A well barrier will, 
however, be a combination of passive and active protection layer basics.  
The requirements and guidelines pertaining to well integrity during drilling activities 
and operations are specified in the Norwegian oil and gas regulations (NORSOK D-010, 
2004). According to this standard, all phases of offshore operations must have two 
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separate and independent barriers. Well-drilling completion is a good example, in which 
the mud column is the primary barrier and the secondary barrier is the BOP, which 
protects the well from a disaster as the last resort. In addition to the two well-barrier 
necessities, it is expected that the primary barrier must continuously be intact. The 
primary barrier must be intact to allow for isolation of the well in the event of an 
external event harmful to the oil and gas platform. 
A failure is dependent on one or several BEs and a system is functioning if and only if 
all of its components are functioning. The MODU’s operation system is functioning if 
there is a connection either through the secondary or the primary well barrier, or both.  
The BOP system for the Deepwater Horizon, Figure ‎7.3 (a), was located on the seabed 
on the wellhead. A riser pipe extended from the top of the system to the drilling rig so 
that drilling mud could circulate between the well and the drilling unit. As illustrated in 
Figure ‎7.3  (b), on top of the five rams of the BOP stack was a blind shear ram. The 
BOP system also had a spare/emergency cut-off system that would facilitate the drilling 
unit to move away from the well once the blind shear ram was activated. As a last 
remedy in a hierarchy of well-control schemes, the two opposing blades of the blind 
shear ram were designed to cut through the drill pipe and seal the well. At the time of 
the Macondo blowout, rig personnel could not recapture control of the well by using the 
BOP because the blind shear ram did not cut the drill pipe and seal the well. In addition, 




The primary barrier is the first stumbling block against undesirable flow from the source 
(Hauge et al., 2011). In overbalanced processes, the mud column is the primary well 
barrier and should function within the drilling margin pressure. If the pressure exerted 
by the drilling mud in the wellbore becomes too great, it can cause a fracture in the 
exposed rock at any point in the wellbore. Drilling mud would then flow from the 
wellbore into the fracture and could no longer exert sufficient pressure to prevent an 
influx of reservoir fluids. Like pore pressure, the pressure at which a fracture occurs 
                                                 
9
 NAE/NRC (National Academy of Engineering/National Research Council). Macondo Well–Deepwater Horizon 
Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. Avail-
able online at http://www.wellintegrity.net/Documents/NAE-NRC%20Report%202011-12-14.pdf. 
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usually increases with drilling depth, although actual pressures can be either higher or 







Figure  7.3 (a): An overview of the drilling 
system for the Deepwater Horizon; BOP was 
located on the seabed on the wellhead (Source: 
CSB-FINAL REPORT-MUX(06-02-2014) 
Figure 7.3 (b): Principle 
indication of BOP stake system 
with four blind rams and one 
shear ram 
As illustrated in Figure ‎7.4, another aspect of the definition is whether such a wide-
ranging definition undermines the concept. It is essential to distinguish among the 
barriers that may prevent or mitigate the event, in which the risk influencing factors 
prompt the barrier performance. In addition, it is vital to specify the barrier function in 
order to clarify at which level different barriers influence the event. A commonly used 
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categorisation is to distinguish between physical and non-physical barriers (Johnson, 
1980; ISO: 17776, 2000; DoE, 1997). As shown in Figure ‎7.4, the barriers may be 
physical or non-physical, or a combination thereof (PSA, 2002). Physical barriers are 
incorporated into the design of a structure or platform, technical barriers are initiated if 
a hazard is understood, while administrative barriers are integrated into administrative 
systems and procedures. Svenson (1991) classified barrier systems as physical, 
technical, or human factors-organisational systems, while Neogy et al. (1996) classified 
barriers as physical, procedural or administrative, or human action.  
 
Figure  7.4: Barrier analyses of a combination of physical, procedural or administrative, 
or human action 
Human/organisational barrier functions can be seen as planned into the process but in 
the end executed by humans with the support of an organised organisation controlling 
the refuelling work process. The DoE (1997) distinguishes between physical and 
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organisation, the activity level, the facility level, and the institutional level. 
Management barriers may be seen as a kind of organisational control.  
The typical circumstances and the examples of possible failures in barrier functions and 
systems are just meant to provide a helpful start for the scenario development. By 
combining the scenarios with different failures and consequences, most operator 
assistances can be verified in all of the typical scenarios. In the case of an MODU’s 
operation system, different failure scenarios can be defined and tested in all of the 
typical situations. 
7.3.2 Main well barriers during drilling operations 
During drilling operations it must be ensured that hydrocarbons do not migrate from the 
reservoir into the well. To maintain well control, barriers to prevent influx are therefore 
implemented. In addition to the static physical components of the well, such as casing 
and cement, two main barriers are implemented during drilling: the drilling mud column 
and the BOP. There are colour coding principles for the different categories of barrier 
failure, and colour designations for the different groups are presented in Table ‎7.1 and 
Table ‎7.2 shows an example of the principles for colour designation and the well barrier 
element (WBE) as well as the well condition (e.g. the principle of the colour red is for 
one barrier failure and the other is degraded/not verified, or a leak to the surface and its 
WBE and condition). 
Table  7.1: The principles and colour designations for the different categories 
Category  Principle 
Red  One barrier failure and the other is degraded/not verified, 
or a leak to the surface  
Orange  One barrier failure and the other is intact, or a single 
failure may lead to a leak to the surface  
Yellow  One barrier degraded, the other is intact  
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Table  7.2: Principles for colour designation and well barrier element (WBE)  
 
 
7.3.3 MODU’s operational hierarchy and proposed barriers  
A four-level operational hierarchy of the MODU is used to identify the root causes of a 
failure. Different methods might be used to identify root causes of operational failure in 
Category An example sketch Principle WBE Condition 
DHSV or deep set plug 
Leak rate within 
acceptance criteria 
Christmas tree ESD valves 
and annulus valves 
Leak rate within 
acceptance criteria 
Tubing hanger and internal 
wellhead seals 
Leak tight 
Completion and casing 
string 
Leak tight 
Production packer Leak tight 
DHSV or deep set plug 
Leak rate within 
acceptance criteria 
Christmas tree ESD valves 
and annulus valves 
Leak rate within 
acceptance criteria 
Tubing hanger and internal 
wellhead seals 
Leak rate within 
acceptance criteria 
Completion and casing 
string 
Leak rate within 
acceptance criteria 
Production packer 
Leak rate within 
acceptance criteria 
DHSV or deep set plug 
Leak rate outside 
acceptance criteria 
Christmas tree ESD valves 
and annulus valves 
Leak rate outside 
acceptance criteria 
Tubing hanger and internal 
wellhead seals 
Leak rate outside 
acceptance criteria 
Completion and casing 
string 
Leak rate outside 
acceptance criteria 
Production packer 
Leak rate outside 
acceptance criteria 
DHSV or deep set plug 
Degraded/not verified, 
or leak to surface 
Christmas tree ESD valves 
and annulus valves 
Degraded/not verified, 
or leak to surface 
Tubing hanger and internal 
wellhead seals 
Degraded/not verified, 
or leak to surface 
Completion and casing 
string 
Degraded/not verified, 
or leak to surface 
Production packer 
Degraded/not verified, 
or leak to surface 
Green 
Healthy well, no 
or minor issue 
Red 
One barrier 
failure and the 
other is 
degraded/not 




failure and the 
other is intact, 
or a single 
failure may 





other is intact 
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a specific offshore operation system like an MODU. Because of the complexity of real 
offshore operations and in order to simplify the assessment processes, a manageable 
group of hazards and their root causes (i.e. BEs) for the MODU’s operation system has 
been considered. The objective is to propose the best RCOs for offshore drilling failure 
due to its HGs. As illustrated in Figure ‎7.5, each HG may be broken down into a 
number of simpler system components in different levels. Operational hazard: L2D-O1 
and Human error: L2D-H1 are the most serious HGs in the offshore operation, in which 
the system/subsystem and routes describe the MODU’s operation system and failure of 
each system/subsystem may influence and have consequences for drilling failure (L1D-
O1-01). Efficient measures to prevent and control the MODUs’ operation system failure 
are important. This section proposes a few new barriers to prevent and control the 
MODUs’ operation failure.  
The Macondo blowout accident in the Gulf of Mexico is used and analysed as a case 
study to show how the proposed methodology can be used to understand the 
development of the events leading to the failure. The methodology can also be used to 
support the decision-maker to prevent future failure or to control the escalation of 
events. With reference to the results of Chapters 5 and 6, literature reviews assessing the 
Macondo blowout accident, and based on expert judgements for the occurrence 
probability of failures of each BE, the following barriers are introduced for the three 
critical BEs, in order to control the MODUs’ operation failure and reduce the risk level. 
i. Introducing a barrier in level 2 of the operational hierarchy, in order to control the 
Management/supervision/staff failure (L3D-H1-02). 
ii. Introducing a barrier in level 5 of the operational hierarchy, in order to control the 
BOP stack failure (L5D-O1-01-4-1)  
iii. Introducing a barrier in level 5 of the operational hierarchy, in order to control the 
BOP control system failure (L5D-O1-01-4-2). 
The occurrence probability of the BE failures can be used as guidance for the MODUs’ 
operators to become conscious of the vulnerabilities of the safety barrier system, and to 
analyse and assess the risk associated with the barriers. As mentioned earlier, the 
barriers can be proposed in different categories such as physical, technical, 
human/organisational, and regulatory. The Fuzzy TOPSIS technique is used to assess  
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Natural Hazard  
L3D-N1-03: Wellbore Influx/Kick                             
L3D-N1-04: Punch Through                                          
L3D-N1-05: Ground Movement                                  
L3D-O1-01:  Due to Drilling System  Failure                    
L3D-O1-20:  Due to Power System Failure
L3D-O1-03:  Due to  Rig Control System 
L3D-O1-05: Due to Water Handling System 
L3D-O1-04:  Due to Jacking System Failure 
L3D-O1-06: Due to  ESD System Failure                     
L3D-H1-02: Managment / 
Supervision / Staff          
L3D-H1-03: Individual -
Competence/Motivation  
L3D-N1-01: High speed Wind/ 
Wave/Current
L3D-N1-02: Hole Instability                                          
L3D-O1-07: Due to Fuel System Failure                             





L4D-O1-01-04 :   
Drill ing Failure due to 
Blow out Preventer 
(BOP) System Failure / 
Dril l ing Failure due to 
Failure of Managed 
Pressure Dril l ing Stack
L5D-O1-01-1-1 : Mud Pump #1 Fa i lure
L5D-O1-01-1-2 : Mud Pump #2 Fa i lure
L5D-O1-01-1-3 : Bulk Handling system Failure 
L5D-O1-01-1-4: High Pressure route Failure 
(HP hoses, Standpipe Manifold, Choke and Kill 
Manifold) 
L5D-O1-01-2-1 : Shale Shaker Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-2 : Desander Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-3 : Dis ilter Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-4 : Degasser Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-1: Draw Work Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-2 : Rotary Table Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-3 : Top Drive Failure
L5D-O1-01-2-4 : Pipe Handling System Failure
Level  1               Level  2                                                            Level  3                          Level 4                                                           Level  5
L5D-O1-01-4-1 : BOP Stack Failure
L5D-O1-01-4-2: BOP control  SystemFailure
L5D-O1-01-4-3 : Component Failure/Leak  
L3D-H1-01: Organizational -
Polices and Procedures   
L5D-O1-01-2-4 : Dri l ling Control System Failure
B-L3D-H1-02
(Barrier for prevention of 






Barriers for prevention 
of basic events 
L4D-O1-01-03 : 







L2D-H1:   
Human Error 
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the possible consequences and effects, and to propose the best risk control option. 
Recommendations for decision-making can be provided based on the level of cost-
effectiveness for each risk control measure that is deemed appropriate and feasible on 
the risk-reduction scale of the ALARP principle framework. 
7.3.4 Fuzzy MCDM basic concept 
Decision-making with more than one criterion to be considered occurs frequently in our 
daily lives. Though these MCDM problems are diverse, they share some mutual 
characteristics (Hwang & Yoon, 1981a). There are two types of weighting approaches: 
objective and subjective methods (Shemshadi et al., 2011; Wang & Lee, 2009). The 
techniques developed take into account both the subjective input from the experts and 
the objective factor resulting from the data that the companies/operators themselves 
collect (Kao & Hung, 2007). The weights of criteria are determined by the subjective 
opinion of the decision-makers as well as by the inherent objective properties of the 
criteria (Zeleny, 1982). The objective weighting approach explains the evaluation in 
data, but occasionally the weight factors of some indexes disagree slightly on actual 
significance of these criteria if there are few criteria or data, and moreover it is more 
difficult to clarify intuitively than the subjective weighting method (Wang et al., 2003). 
As mentioned in a previous section, the subjective weights are determined entirely 
according to the preference or judgements of decision-makers. To determine the overall 
assessment of each decision-maker, a few mathematical techniques can be applied such 
as: the eigenvector method (Saaty, 1977), the weighted least square method (Chu et al., 
1979), and the Delphi method (Hwang & Lin, 1987). Even so, the subjective weighting 
methods cast serious concerns on the reliability of the outcomes (Triantaphyllou & 
Sanchez, 1997). 
7.3.5 Fuzzy TOPSIS techniques for order preference of the alternatives 
Among many well-known MADM methods, TOPSIS is a practical and useful technique 
for ranking and selection of a number of possible alternatives through measuring 
Euclidean distances. It has many advantages such as intuitive analytical principle, 
simple calculation and small sample required and, in practice, TOPSIS has been 
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effectively applied in assessment, selection and evaluation of problems with a limited 
number of alternatives (Yong, 2006; Teodorović, 1985). Hwang & Yoon (1981a) 
developed the TOPSIS method based upon the concept that a chosen alternative should 
have the shortest distance from the PIS (i.e. the solution that maximises the benefit 
criteria and minimises the cost criteria), and the farthest distance from the NIS (i.e. the 
solution that maximises the cost criteria and minimises the benefit criteria). This 
technique ranks alternatives according to their distances from the positive and the 
negative ideal solutions. The positive ideal solution is identified with a hypothetical 
alternative that has the best values for all considered criteria, whereas the negative ideal 
solution is recognised with a hypothetical alternative that has the worst criteria values. 
Moreover, TOPSIS is based on a solid logical basis that reflects the rationale of human 
choice (Sinha and Meller, 2007). A methodology for defining the aggregating function 
based on a Fuzzy set representation of the distance to the PIS and NIS is proposed. The 
methodology proposes the aggregating function to be demonstrated as the membership 
function of the intersection of two Fuzzy sets, the Fuzzy set of the alternative that has 
the shortest distance from the ideal solution and the Fuzzy set of the alternative that has 
the farthest distance from the negative ideal solution. Therefore, it provides the 
mathematical foundation for demonstrating the idea of closeness to the PIS and the NIS 
and allows a proper explanation of the relationship between the closeness of the PIS and 
the NIS. It has been demonstrated to be one of the best approaches in addressing the 
issue of rank problem (Zanakis et al., 1998). However, for the selection of risk control 
option which is often not crisply defined due to absence of data (Zimmermann, 1986), 
many scientists have recommended Fuzzy extensions of the TOPSIS method in order to 
reduce the vagueness that is essential in the corresponding assessment problems (Yong, 
2006, Chen, 2001).  
As illustrated in Figure ‎7.6, usually the MCDM problems are considered by n attribute 
(or criteria); however, here the criteria are reduced from n dimension problems to two 
dimensions in order to comprehend the operation of this method. As illustrated in 
Figure ‎7.6, a two-dimensional criterion  is considered as an example to show the 
evaluation process for an MCDM problem. As shown in Figure ‎7.6, alternative  has 
shorter distances both to the ideal solution  and to the negative ideal solution  than 
the other alternative, . Then it is very difficult to justify the selection of . TOPSIS 
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takes an alternative, called the compromise solution, which has the weighted minimum 
Euclidean distance to the ideal solution in a geometric sense and also has the maximum 
Euclidean distance to the negative ideal solution. Sometimes the chosen alternative, 
which has the weighted minimum Euclidean distance to the ideal solution, has the 
shorter distance to the negative ideal solution than the other alternative(s). Two criteria 
 are considered in order to show the evaluation process of the best performance 
value, in which, the ideal solution is composed of the best performance value on both 
criteria, and the negative ideal solution is composed of the worst performance values on 
both criteria. As illustrated in Figure ‎7.6, alternative  has shorter distances both to the 
ideal solution  and to the negative ideal solution  than the other alternative, . 
Then it is very difficult to justify the selection of .  
 
Figure  7.6: TOPSIS to find the compromise solution for a two-dimensional case 
(Marković, 2010) 
7.3.6 Construction of decision matrix and Fuzzy TOPSIS algorithm 
The decision matrix in a MADM method with the Fuzzy TOPSIS algorithm comprises 
different steps; the following steps can express the basic information involved in a 
MADM model: 
a) Construct a decision matrix 
b) Determination of the weight 
c) Normalisation  
d) Calculation of relative significance rate and data collection 




































S is the set of feasible solution 
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- Estimating weights of experts 
e) Aggregation  
- Calculation of the degree of similarity 
- Calculation of the AA  
- Calculation of the RA degree  
- Estimation of the consensus coefficient degree 
- Result of aggregation of the experts’ judgements 
f) Defuzzifying 
g) Evaluation, Ranking the alternatives and selection 
h) Weights for each normalised criterion 
i) The positive ideal and negative ideal solutions 
j) Calculate the distance from the positive ideal solution and the negative ideal 
solution for each alternative 
k) Calculation of the CC 
7.3.6.1 Construct a decision matrix 
Assume there m alternatives  miAi ,...,2,1  which decision-makers indicate to be 
evaluated against n selection criteria  njC j ,...,2,1 , in which each alternative 
performance is measured. Assume the aggregation rate of alternative  miAi ,...,2,1  for 
criteria  njC j ,...,2,1  is ijy  therefore the matrix can be described by Equation (‎7.1). 
Subjective assessments are to be made by the decision-maker to conclude the following: 
 
i. The weighting vector   
nj wwwwW ,...,...,, 21  
By using the linguistic terms as presented in Table ‎4.3 (Chen and Hwang, 
1992), the weighting vector W  signifies the relative importance of n selection 
criteria  njC j ,...,2,1  for the problem.  
ii. The decision matrix   njmiyY ij ,..,2,1;,...,2,1,   
The matrix represents the utility ratings of alternative iA  with respect to selection 
criteria
jC . Given the weighting vector W  and decision matrix Y , the objective of the 
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problem is to rank all the alternatives by giving each of them an overall value with 







































               nj wwwwW ,...,...,, 21  
( 7.1)  
7.3.6.2 Determination of the weight 
The alternatives in a MADM method are frequently described by qualitative selection 
criteria. When no selection criteria data exist, the preferred approach is to assign 
numerical values to qualitative data scaling (i.e. linguistic terms). The weights of 
various attributes and the ratings of each alternative with respect to each criterion are 
considered as linguistic variables. A Fuzzy set approach is a sustainable method for 
dealing with this problem. An expert’s opinion can be in the form of linguistic terms 
such as low, medium or high. The experts express their estimations for each alternative 
with respect to each criterion. This can be done by asking experts for their opinions for 
each alternative by considering a subjective criterion. These linguistic variables are 
expressed in Table 4.3 (Chen and Hwang, 1992). The concept of linguistic variables is 
very useful in dealing with situations which are too complex or too hard to be defined or 
to be reasonably described by a conventional quantitative expression (Zadeh, 1965).  
7.3.6.3 Normalisation  
It is necessary to normalise the decision matrix in order to make each criterion value 
limited between 0 and 1, so that each criterion is comparable. Criteria ratings are usually 
normalised to eliminate computational problems caused by different measurement units 
in a decision matrix. The normalisation procedure attempts to obtain comparable scales, 
allowing attribute comparisons. The initial data with respect to each criterion will be 
normalised by dividing the sum of criterion values. For Fuzzy data denoted by 
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trapezoidal/triangular Fuzzy number as  ijijijij dcba ,,, , the normalised values for benefit-
related criteria and cost-related criteria are calculated as follows. 
Linear normalisation: this procedure divides the ratings of a certain criterion by its 





































































 max                    Cjifcc ij
i
j 
 min  ( 7.4) 
   rij=Yij / Yij
*




 is the maximum value of Yij and the values of rij vary between 0 and 1. 
. 
Vector normalisation: this method divides the ratings of each attribute by its norm, so 
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7.3.6.4 Calculation of relative significance rate and data collection 
Consider   experts in a decision-making process. Each element in a Fuzzy pair-wise 






















a   ( 7.9) 
Where     is the relative importance by comparing attribute  with attribute  by               
experts, and      is the   th expert’s judgements on the comparison of attribute  with 
attribute  in a Fuzzy number format. The typical trapezoidal Fuzzy number 
 denotes the lower bound     , median      and upper bound      values of 
 Equation ( 7.10) presents a  Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix where  can 




    
Weight factors can be estimated by using the geometric mean technique (Saaty, 1990; 
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In Equation ( 7.12), 
~
iw is the Fuzzy weight factor of the th criteria and
~
if is the 
geometric mean of the th row in the Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix and. As the 
outputs of the geometric mean method are triangular Fuzzy weight factors, 
defuzzification is applied in order to convert triangular Fuzzy weight factors into the 
corresponding crisp weight factors. A defuzzification approach used in Fuzzy-AHP is 
expressed by Equation ( 7.13) (Mikhailov, 2004):   
 
             ( 7.13) 
where   is the defuzzified mean value of a Fuzzy weight factor. The normalised 
weight of attribute i ( iw ) can then be calculated by using Equation ( 7.14). 
 
             ( 7.14) 
 Estimating weights of experts 
The weighting of experts is determined according to Table ‎4.5. Experts’ weights are 
obtained by estimating weight scores and weight factors of experts. Weight scores and 
weight factors of experts can be obtained by using Equation (‎4.29) and Equation (‎4.30) 
respectively and weight of each expert is presented in Table ‎4.6. 
7.3.6.5 Algorithm for aggregation 
Based on the experts’ experience and expertise in the relevant field, each expert may 
have a different opinion. It is necessary to aggregate the experts’ opinions to reach a 
consensus. Presume the experts  express their opinions on a specific 
criterion against a particular situation by a predefined set of linguistic variables. The 
linguistic terms can be converted into corresponding Fuzzy numbers. Hsu and Chen 




















kE  Mk ,,2,1 
iwDF
~
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homogeneous/heterogeneous group of experts and the detailed algorithm is explained in 
the following steps: 
 Calculation of the degree of similarity 
Where for the calculation of degree of similarity  of the opinions 
of a pair of experts, and , and . According to this method, 
 and  are two standard TPFNs. Then the degree of 
similarity between these two Fuzzy numbers, i.e. and 
, can be obtained by the similarity function of , which is defined as:  
              ( 7.15) 
where . The larger the value of , the greater the similarity between 
two Fuzzy numbers of and  
• Calculation of the AA  
Calculate the AA degree  of the experts. 
 
             ( 7.16) 
 Calculation of the Relative Agreement (RA) degree  
Calculate the RA degree,  of the experts. 
      as         
             ( 7.17) 
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Estimate the CC degree, , of expert :  
                 ( 7.18) 
where   is a relaxation factor of the proposed method. It shows the 
importance over . When , no importance has been given to the 
weight of an expert and hence a homogeneous group of experts is used. When , the 
consensus degree of an expert is the same as its importance weight. The consensus 
degree coefficient of each expert is a good measure for evaluating the relative 
worthiness of each expert's opinion. It is the responsibility of the decision-maker to 
assign an appropriate value to  
 Result of aggregation of the experts’ judgements 
Lastly, the aggregated result of the experts’ judgements, , can be obtained as 
follows:  
                 ( 7.19) 
7.3.6.6 Defuzzifying 
After carrying out the aggregation of different experts’ opinions of each alternative 
under each subjective criteria, these opinions have been aggregated for each alternative 
under each subjective criterion up to this stage. Therefore, all the aggregated Fuzzy 
numbers must be defuzzified in order to rank the alternatives of the problem. As a 
result, all the components of the decision matrix are crisp numbers and any classical 
method can be used at the selection stage. Each subjective element of matrix 
 can be converted to its corresponding crisp value by using Equation 
(‎5.10) and (‎5.11). 
 uECC  MuEu ,,2,1 
       uuu ERAEwECC   1
  10  
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7.3.6.7 Evaluation, ranking and selection of the alternatives  
 Weights for each normalised criterion 
Calculate the overall performance evaluation for each alternative and construct weighted 
normalised by multiplying the aggregate weights for each normalised criterion, which 













, mi ,,2,1     nj ,,2,1        ( 7.20) 
 
~~~
ijijij wrv     ( 7.21) 
 The positive ideal and negative ideal solutions 
Define the positive ideal and negative ideal solutions, which can be determined 
in terms of the weighted normalised values by Equations ( 7.22) and ( 7.23), where  











1 ,,, kvvvA 












1 ,,, kvvvA 
,                
( 7.23) 
 Calculate the distance from the positive ideal solution and the negative ideal solution 
for each alternative 
 
The distance between two Fuzzy numbers  11111 ,,, dcbaA   and  22222 ,,, dcbaA  , and also 
the distance of each alternative from positive ideal solution 
id and negative ideal 
solution 
id , can be calculated by Equations (‎7.24) and (‎7.26) respectively (Bojadziev 
& Bojadziev, 1995). 
       22122122122121 )(
3
1




},,min;,{max 21 JivJivv jijii 

},,max;,{min 21 JivJivv jijii 

A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk           CHAPTER 7: Fuzzy MCDM and Fuzzy TOPSIS  



















































































 Relative closeness coefficient (RCC) 
Calculate the RCC to the ideal solution and rank each RCC of each alternative in 
descending order. This allows the decision-makers to choose the most rational 
alternative. The alternative with the highest RCC value will be the best choice and RCC 











RCC ,  mi ,,2,1    ( 7.27) 
Since 0id and 0

id , then  1,0iRCC , and if the alternative reaches A
+
, then 
0id  and RCCi = 1 and if the alternative reaches A
-
, then 0id and RCCi = 0. It 
means when the alternative goes towards A
+
 or farther from A
-
, then RCCi goes towards 
“1”. In addition, if the alternative goes towards A- or farther from A+, then RCCi goes 
towards “0”. However, it should be noted that the notion of RCC may lead to 
inconsistency (Li, 2007). Given two alternatives, i and k, then alternative i is better than 
 if:  













d  ( 7.28) 
 Equation (‎7.28) holds if one of the following three conditions (i.e. a, b and c) is 
satisfied: 
 
  ki dd    and   
  ki dd  ( 7.29) 
k
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a) This condition relates to the basic principle of the TOPSIS method that the chosen 
alternative (i.e. alternative i) is better than alternative k as it should have the shortest 
distance from the positive ideal solution and the farthest distance from the negative 
ideal solution. 
 
  ki dd    and   









d  ( 7.30) 
b) Allows alternative i to be better than alternative k even though alternative i is farther 
from the positive ideal solution than alternative k.  
   ki dd    and   








d  ( 7.31) 
c) Allows alternative i to be superior to alternative k even though alternative i is closer 
to the negative ideal solution than alternative k. 
The normalisation procedure attempts to obtain comparable scales, allowing attribute 
comparisons. The initial data with respect to each criterion will be normalised by 
dividing the sum of criterion values. For Fuzzy data denoted by trapezoidal/triangular 
Fuzzy number as  ijijijij dcba ,,, , the normalised values for benefit-related criteria and 
cost-related criteria are calculated as follows. 
As stated, TOPSIS ranks the alternatives according to their distances from ideal and 
negative ideal solutions; in the earlier section, it is presented that this statement is vague 
in the sense that it does not provide an accurate definition of the relative closeness to the 
negative and ideal solutions.  
In order to overcome this difficulty, a model is proposed to solve the issue. In this 
circumstance, the model suggested by Zimmermann and Zysno (1985) is used to 
determine the membership of the alternative that has the shortest distance from the ideal 
solution and that of the alternative that has the farthest distance from the negative ideal 
solution. With reference to this model, the membership of the previous set is defined as 
a function of the distance 
id between a given alternative i and the ideal solution, and it 
is represented by Equation (‎7.32) and 
id is measured by the Euclidean distance. 
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     ( 7.32) 
The membership of the alternative from the negative ideal solution can also be defined 
as a simple extension of the Zimmermann and Zysno (1985) model. Distance 

id



















Yager (1980) proposed a class of intersection connectives as follows. Assume that A 
and B are subsets of Y with membership values of and  respectively. A general 
class of intersections is defined as follows: 
 where  ,  
( 7.34) 
The following properties can be concluded from this definition: 
i. In Zadeh connective, if , then  
ii. In Lukasiewicz connective, if , then  
The parameter is inversely related to the strength of the “and” operation.  is an 
inverse measure of how strong the operation is meant. It must be noted that  is 
a monotonically decreasing function of . Thus, as  decreases, the strength of the 
“and” operation increases (Yager, 1980). According to the intersection connectives 
suggested by Yager (1980), RCC can be achieved by Equation (‎7.35). 
  1,])1()1(,1min[1
/1   PRCC PPP   (‎7.35) 
where and  are defined by Equations (‎7.32) and (‎7.33) respectively. Different 
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uncertainty. In particular, higher values of  correspond to circumstances where 
decision-makers increasingly take into account the worst characterisation of an 
alternative, whereas lower values of  correspond to situations where decision-makers 
consider closeness to the best characterisation of an alternative with increasing strength. 
As an example, assume the case of two alternatives, i and j, with membership of 
and  respectively. Then the ratings that would be produced 
for different values of parameter P, as presented in Table ‎7.3. 
As illustrated in Table ‎7.3, if  a decision-maker would rank alternative Ci higher 
whereas if  a decision-maker would rank alternative Cj higher. Consequently, the 
proposed class of methods includes an extreme occurrence corresponding to 
circumstances where decision-makers take into account only the worst characterisation 
of an alternative; that means decision-makers have preference alternatives that create as 
much profit as credible. 
Table  7.3: Different values of P for illustration of ranking of two alternatives  
P Ci = (0.3, 0.6) Cj= (0.2, 0.9) 
1 0.000 (2) 0.100 (1) 
2 0.194 (1) 0.194 (1) 
∞ 0.300 (1) 0.200 (2) 
7.4 Case study and implementation of the proposed methodology  
In this section, a case study is provided to demonstrate how the proposed methodology 
can be applied to select the best risk control option for an MODU’s operation system. 
As understood, the BOP, which is installed at the seafloor and connected to the marine 
riser, is the last line of protection against a blowout. The BOP is essentially a system of 
valves designed to be closed in the event of anomalous wellbore pressure (such pressure 
is sometimes referred to as a kick). At the depth and pressures encountered by the 
Deepwater Horizon well, regulations require at least four such valves, or rams, which 
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During the Deepwater Horizon blowout, all of the rams on the BOP failed to close 
properly. In this circumstance, a report was prepared in response to a demand from the 
Secretary of the Interior by the National Academy of Engineering (NAE) and National 
Research Council (NRC) and was released in December 2011with the title of: Macondo 
Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout, Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. On 
the basis of this investigation, the working group/committee perceived that a number of 
imperfect decisions had led to the blowout and explosions, indicating a lack of effective 
safety management among the companies involved in the tragedy. Some of the main 
technical causes of the Deepwater Horizon accident are as follows:  
• Well integrity was not established or failed 
- Annulus cement barrier did not isolate hydrocarbons 
- Shoe track barriers did not isolate hydrocarbons 
• Hydrocarbons entered the well undetected and well control was lost 
- Negative pressure test was accepted although well integrity had not been 
established 
- Influx was not recognised until hydrocarbons were in riser 
- Well control response actions failed to regain control of well 
• Hydrocarbons ignited on the Deepwater Horizon 
- Diversion to mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto rig 
- Fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition 
• Blowout preventer did not seal the well 
- Blowout preventer emergency mode did not seal well 
It is evaluated that approximately five million barrels of hydrocarbons were released 
into the sea due to the well blowout and consequent explosions and fire on the 
Deepwater Horizon drilling rig on April 20, 2010, which led to the deaths of 11 workers 
and 16 serious injuries (Liu et al., 2011). It was felt that a concerted effort by all 
participants would be necessary to overcome the reputational damage caused by this 
event. All members in the industry and regulatory communities have an obligation: i) to 
ensure that such considerations reflect a factual assessment of the risks, and ii) to do all 
that they can to minimise those risks through technology development, personnel 
training, and management systems. Neither objective is likely to be achieved if the risks 
and the responsibility for addressing them are not recognised and accepted. Envisioning 
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failure is key to the safe development and operation of systems, particularly systems 
that incorporate the complexity of deep water well. Risks must be recognised, 
quantified, and mitigated. Designers, developers, operators, and regulators must know 
and understand that the risks are real and conduct themselves accordingly (NAE/NRC, 
2011). 
Neither industry nor US regulators appear to have foreseen the risks of a Macondo-scale 
event. The lack of adequate, previously planned capping and containment techniques 
evidences a failure to foresee an incident of the type or magnitude experienced at 
Macondo. Nowadays, industry and regulators are both stating their good intentions. 
Industry is investing significant resources in capping and containment systems, and 
regulators are making significant organisational and process changes. The question 
remains as to whether these efforts are a start towards recognition, acceptance, and 
active management of the risks inherent in offshore operation industry development or 
whether they represent a transitory response.  
7.4.1 Recommendations for controlling and decreasing the risk level of the MODU  
The committee developed recommendations for industry and regulators, identifying 
measures that would decrease the likelihood and mitigate the effects of future blowouts. 




- Because operating companies are the only ones that can oversee all aspects of well 
integrity, they should have ultimate responsibility and accountability for well design 
and well construction, as well as for assessing the suitability of the drilling rig and 
safety equipment.  
- The companies that share an offshore drilling lease should ensure that the operating 
company conducts activities in a way that keeps risk as low as is reasonably 
practicable.  
                                                 
10
 Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout, Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety. National 
  Academy of Engineering (NAE) and National Research Council (NRC) December 2011. 
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- As drilling operations are carried out and wells are made ready for temporary 
abandonment, there are safety-critical points (e.g. determining the integrity of 
cemented barriers placed in the well) at which poor decisions are likely to increase 
hazards.  
- Guidelines should be established for incorporating adequate margins of safety into 
the operating company’s approach to well design.  
- To improve regulatory effectiveness, the regulatory programme should be expanded 
to a goal-oriented risk management system that incorporates explicit regulatory 
review and approval of the safety-critical points in the drilling operation. As offshore 
drilling operations proceed into deeper waters, the Bureau of safety and 
environmental enforcement (BSEE) and other regulators should identify the safety-
critical points that warrant explicit regulatory review and approval before operations 
can proceed.  
- BOP systems should be redesigned, rigorously tested, and maintained to operate 
reliably under all foreseeable conditions in which they may be deployed. 
- Proper training in the use of these systems in the event of an emergency is also 
essential.  
- Instrumentation and expert system-decision aids should be integrated into the 
offshore drilling unit to provide personnel with timely warnings of a loss of well 
control.  
- Industry and regulators should significantly increase the formal education and 
training in implementing safety systems provided to offshore drilling personnel. 
- Industry should also increase its research and development on improving the safety 
of offshore drilling (well design, equipment, human operational failures, and 
management approaches). 
7.4.2 Implementation of recommendations and evaluation for the best RCOs 
A well barrier can be viewed as a protection layer whose objective is to prevent flow 
from the reservoir. A well barrier will, however, be a combination of passive and active 
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protection layers. As mentioned earlier, three barriers are introduced in different levels 
for the three critical BEs (i.e. L3D-H1-02, L5D-O1-01-4-1 and L5D-O1-01-4-2), as 
shown in Figure ‎7.5. Different RCOs and barriers with different purposes could be 
recommended to improve the safety level of the MODU in the drilling and operational 
phase. With reference to the committee findings, which are presented in the second 
column of Table ‎7.4, three different barriers in the course of the assessment phase are 
considered in order to prevent the MODU operation drilling failure. The barrier must be 
intact to prevent the occurrence of an event. With consideration of NAE/NRC’s (2011) 
findings and recommendations, as illustrated in Table ‎7.4, three different RCOs (i.e. 
Engineering, Equipment redesign/replace and Regulatory/Human error) for the MODU 
system are considered. They are named Eng-RCO, Equip-RCO and Regul-RCO, and are 
presented in the last three columns of Table ‎7.4. Their purpose is to prevent well 
leakage and blowout during the operational phase. The objective is to select the best risk 
control option with respect to cost and benefit.  
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Regulatory                                             
(Regul-RCO)
Recommendation / Risk Control Option (RCO) (Ref. NAE/NRC, 2011)Basic Event 











Engineering                                                            
(Eng-RCO)
Equipment redesign/Test                                                  
(Equip-RCO)
BOP systems should be redesigned 
to provide robust and reliable 
cutting, sealing, and separation 
capabilities for the drilling 
environment to which they are being 
applied and under all foreseeable 
operating conditions.
A BOP system with a critical 
component that is not operating 
properly, or which loses redundancy 
in a critical component, should cause 
drilling operations to cease. Drilling 
should not resume until the BOP’s 
emergency operation capability is 
fully cured.
Test and maintenance procedures 
should be established to ensure 
operability and reliability appropriate 
to their environment of application.
BOP systems should be redesigned 
to provide robust and reliable 
cutting, sealing, and separation 
capabilities for the drilling 
environment to which they are being 
applied and under all foreseeable 
operating conditions of the rig on 
which they are installed.
The regulators should identify 
and enforce safety-critical 
points during well construction 
and abandonment that 
warrant explicit regulatory 
review and approval before 
operations can proceed.
The regulators should 
undertake efforts to expand 
significantly the formal 
education and training of 
regulatory personnel engaged 
in offshore drilling roles to 
support proper 
implementation of system 
safety.
The regulators should foster an 
effective safety culture through 
consistent training, adherence 
to principles of human factors, 
system safety, and continued 
measurement through leading 
indicators.
A single government agency 
should be designated with 
responsibility for ensuring an 
integrated approach for 
system safety for all offshore 
drilling activities. 
Although data were being transmitted to 
shore, it appears that no one in authority 
was required to examine test results and 
other critical data and render an opinion 
to the personnel on the rig before 
operations could continue.
The decision to proceed to displacement 
of the drilling mud by seawater was made 
despite a failure to demonstrate the 
integrity of the cement job even after 
.multiple negative pressure tests. This 
was but one of a series of questionable 
decisions in the days preceding the 
blowout that had the effect of reducing 
the margins of safety, and that evidenced 
a lack of safety-driven decision making.
The BOP system was neither designed nor 
tested for the dynamic conditions that 
most likely existed at the time that 
attempts were made to recapture well 
control. Furthermore, the design, test, 
operation, and maintenance of the BOP 
system were not consistent with a high-
reliability, fail-safe device.
At the time of the Macondo blowout, rig 
personnel could not regain control of the 
well by using the BOP because the blind 
shear ram did not cut the drill pipe and 
seal the well. In addition, the emergency-
disconnect system failed to separate the 
Deepwater Horizon from the well.
Industry should undertake efforts to expand 
significantly the formal education and 
training of industry personnel engaged in 
offshore drilling to support proper 
implementation of system safety.
Existing codes and standards should review 
to determine which should be improved 
regarding requirements for: (a) use of state-
of-the art technologies, especially in areas 
related to well construction, cementing, 
BOP functionality,  and alarm and 
evacuation systems, among others, and (b) 
approval and certification incumbent to 
management of changes in original plans for 
well construction.
Operator training for emergency BOP 
operation should be improved to the point 
that the full capabilities of a more reliable 
BOP can be competently and correctly 
employed when needed in the future.
Industry should greatly expand R&D efforts 
focused on improving the overall safety of 
offshore drilling in the areas of design, 
testing, modeling, risk assessment, safety 
culture, and systems integration. Such 
efforts should encompass well design, 
drilling and marine equipment, human 
factors, and management systems.
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7.4.3 Establishment of decision hierarchy for selection of the best RCOs  
Selection of the best RCO is made on the basis of four subjective criteria; three different 
RCOs (i.e. Engineering (Eng-RCO), Equipment redesign/replace (Equip-RCO) and 
Regulatory/Human error (Regul-RCO)) are selected, because they are regarded as the 
most significant attributes associated with the MODU operational barriers based on 
NAE/NRC’s (2011) findings and recommendations. Since it is useful to develop a 
hierarchical structure showing the overall objective, the criteria and alternatives in such 
a hierarchy for selection of the best RCO are shown in Figure ‎7.7. Three alternatives as 
presented in Figure ‎7.7 (i.e. Eng-RCO, Equip-RCO and Regul-RCO) are considered and 
evaluated against four selection criteria (i.e. Crew safety/People, Asset/Resources, 
Environment and Reputation) with which each alternative performance is measured. 
Decision hierarchy for selection of the best RCO associated with the MODU operational 
barriers based on NAE/NRC’s (2011) findings and recommendations is illustrated in 
Figure ‎7.7.  
 
Figure  7.7: Decision hierarchy for selection of the best RCOs associated with the 
MODU operational barriers based on NAE/NRC’s (2011) findings and 
recommendations. 
In an MCDM problem, the attributes can be divided into two categories. The first is cost 
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In Table ‎7.5, the criteria properties such as the class of criteria and type of assessment 
are summarised and illustrated. 
Table ‎7.5: Criteria properties and type of assessment of the case study 
 
As shown in Table ‎7.5 for the criteria CS, EN and RE, the higher more preferable, for 
the criteria AS, the lower, the better.  
7.4.4 Calculation of relative rate and data collection 
With consideration of the unavailability of field data and with respect to the subjective 
criteria, the alternatives in the case study are evaluated by a group of three experts and 
the experts’ linguistic judgements are transformed into their corresponding Fuzzy 
numbers by using Table 4.3. It should be noted that the AS must be considered to be the 
same as the cost of replacing them. For CS, EN and RE, the experts express their 
opinions with respect to each barrier and they should be considered as benefits; the three 
experts’ judgements are presented for different alternatives (i.e. Eng-RCO, Equip-RCO 
and Regul-RCO) in Table ‎7.6 to  
Table ‎7.8 respectively. As presented in Table ‎7.6, for the basic event of L3D-H1-02, the 
opinion of Expert 1 for the Eng-RCO risk control option with respect to the CS criterion 
is “Very High” and is presented in the second column. Likewise, the opinions of 
Experts 2 and 3 for the same risk control option are “Mol. High” and “High” 
respectively. In the last column, the three experts’ opinions are aggregated and 
converted to the Crip No. (i.e. 0.235). 
No.Description 
(Criteria)
Class of Criteria Nature of criteria Assessment data
1 CS Safety (Benefit) Safe (the higher more preferable) Subjective (Expert Judgment)
2 AS Costs Cost (the lower, the better) Subjective (Expert Judgment)
3 EN Safety (Benefit) Safe (the higher more preferable) Subjective (Expert Judgment)
4 RE Benefit The higher more preferable Subjective (Expert Judgment)
A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk                                                                                                             CHAPTER 7: Fuzzy MCDM and Fuzzy TOPSIS  








Table  7.7: Experts’ opinions for Equip-RCO risk control option with respect to CS criteria 
  
 
Table  7.8: Experts’ opinions for Regul-RCO risk control option with respect to CS criteria 
 
B-L3D-H1-02 Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.303 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.364 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.333 0.235
B-L5D-O1-01-4-1 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.333 0.203









Experts Judgment for Engineering risk control option (Eng-RCO)with respect to (CS)
Expert 2
Basic Event 
(Level 3 & 5) Expert 
Factor




B-L3D-H1-02 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.333 0.177
B-L5D-O1-01-4-1 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.364 Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.333 0.182





Expert 3 Expert 
Factor






(Level 3 & 5)




B-L3D-H1-02 Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.333 0.234
B-L5D-O1-01-4-1 Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.303 High 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.364 Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.333 0.177





Expert 3 Expert 
Factor






(Level 3 & 5)
Experts Judgment for Regulatory risk control option (Regul-RCO) with respect to (CS)
Crisp No.Linguistic 
terms 
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7.4.5 Fuzzy-AHP  estimation process and determination of the weight factors  
Fuzzy-AHP determines weighting factors by conducting pair-wise comparison. Fuzzy 
set theory and AHP have been used to estimate the weights of all the criteria by 
conducting pair-wise comparison. The comparison is based on an estimation scheme, 
which lists the strength of importance using qualitative descriptors. Table ‎7.9 has been 
used to create a pair-wise comparison; five linguistic terms are used fluctuating from 
equal importance to absolute importance. Each qualitative descriptor has a 
corresponding Fuzzy number that is employed to transfer experts’ judgements into a 
comparisons matrix, and corresponds to the lower and upper values of a range to 
describe qualitative. A      pair-wise comparison matrix is developed to obtain the 
weights of all the criteria.  is the pair-wise comparison matrix expressing the 
quantified judgements with regard to the relative importance of the criteria. 
Table  7.9: Qualitative descriptions and their corresponding Fuzzy numbers  
 
As an example, two experts estimated that the criterion of CS compared to the criterion 
of AS is of “Strong Importance” and their judgements are then translated to a Fuzzy 
number of (4,5,6). One expert considered that CS is of “Very Strong Importance” in 
comparison with event AS, which corresponds to Fuzzy number (6,7,8). Using Equation 




(Strength of importance) 
Fuzzy numbers  
(Triangular) 
Descriptions 
Equal Importance (EI) (1,1,2) Two attributes or experts 
contribute equally to the event. 
Weak Importance (WI) (2,3,4) Judgment and experience to 
some extent favour an attribute 
or expert over another. 
Strong Importance (SI) (4,5,6) Judgment and experience 
strongly favour an attribute or 
expert over another.
Very Strong Importance (VSI) (6,7,8) An attribute or expert is 
favoured strongly over another. 
Absolute Importance (AI) (8,9,9) The evidence favouring an 
attribute or expert over another 
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21  rr  
A  Fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix  can be constructed as follows: 
 
 ( 7.36) 
Using the geometric mean technique, each criterion’s weight can be calculated by using 


































( 1.00 1.00 1.00 ) ( 4.67 5.67 6.67 ) ( 2.00 2.33 3.33 ) ( 4.67 5.67 6.67 )
( 0.15 0.18 0.21 ) ( 1.00 1.00 1.00 ) ( 0.17 0.20 0.25 ) ( 1.00 1.00 2.00 )
A=
( 0.30 0.43 0.50 ) ( 0.30 0.43 0.50 ) ( 1.00 1.00 1.00 ) ( 4.00 5.00 6.00 )





                       CS AS EN RE
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Table ‎7.10: Fuzzy weight of attributes/criteria  
 
 
Table ‎7.11: Defuzzified and normalised weight of criteria 
 
7.4.6 Estimating weights of experts 
Three experts are selected to make judgements with respect to the subjective attributes. 
The experts’ weights can be obtained by using Table  4.5.and. Table  4.6. 
7.4.7 Normalising of data and aggregation 
In this step, all the ratings are aggregated for each criterion. As mentioned earlier, the 
subjective criteria are CS, AS, EN and RE. The aggregation calculations for CS, AS, 
EN and RE are given in Table ‎7.12 to Table ‎7.16 respectively. Aggregation of each risk 
control option with respect to CS is performed in two stages. The first stage is to obtain 
rating of judgements of each expert for each RCO, and in the second stage, the 
aggregation of the three experts’ judgements for RCO 1 with respect to criteria needs to 
be obtained. As an example, in Table ‎7.12, the judgements of Expert 1 for Eng-RCO for 
different barriers is given with respect to CS and also the aggregation calculations 
including degree of similarity, average agreement, relative agreement and closeness 
coefficient are presented. 
= (2.57, 2.94, 3.49) = (0.45, 0.61, 0.86)
= (0.40, 0.43, 0.57) = (0.07, 0.09, 0.14)
= (0.77, 0.98, 1.11) = (0.14, 0.20, 0.27)
= (0.33, 0.43, 0.48) = (0.06, 0.09, 0.12)

















= 0.642 =  0.620
= 0.100 =   0.097
= 0.204 = 0.197
= 0.089 = 0.086
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Table ‎7.12: Aggregation of judgements of Expert 1 for Eng-RCO with respect to CS 
 
 
Table  7.13: Aggregation of judgements of Expert 2 for Eng-RCO with respect to CS 
 
 
Table ‎7.14: Aggregation of judgements of Expert 3 for Eng-RCO with respect to CS 
 
B-L3D-H1-02 (B1) Very High 0.8 0.9 1 1
B-L5D-O1-01-4-1 (B2) High 0.7 0.8 0.9
B-L5D-O1-01-4-2 (B3) Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6
S (B1  &  B2) 0.675 AA (B1) 0.725 RA (B1) 0.382 CC (B1) 0.342
S (B2  &  B3) 0.775 AA (B2) 0.613 RA (B2) 0.322 CC (B2) 0.313
S (B1  &  B3) 0.45 AA ( B3) 0.563 RA ( B3) 0.296 CC (B3) 0.300
Total 1.900 1.000 0.955
0.274 0.647 0.742 0.803
Aggregation calculations 
















Judgment of Expert 1 for Eng-RCO with respect to  (CS)





B-L3D-H1-02 (B1) Mol. High 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
B-L5D-O1-01-4-1 (B2) Medium 0.4 0.5 0.6
B-L5D-O1-01-4-2 (B3) High 0.7 0.8 0.9
S (B1  &  B2) 0.725 AA (B1) 0.750 RA (B1) 0.326 CC (B1) 0.345
S (B2  &  B3) 0.775 AA (B2) 0.788 RA (B2) 0.342 CC (B2) 0.353
S (B1  &  B3) 0.8 AA ( B3) 0.763 RA ( B3) 0.332 CC (B3) 0.348
Total 2.300 1.000 1.045






















Degree of similarity Average agreement Relative agreement Consensus coefficient 
B-L3D-H1-02 (B1) High 0.7 0.8 0.9
B-L5D-O1-01-4-1 (B2) Very High 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0
B-L5D-O1-01-4-2 (B3) Very High 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0
S (B1  &  B2) 0.675 AA (B1) 0.838 RA (B1) 0.356 CC (B1) 0.345
S (B2  &  B3) 1 AA (B2) 0.838 RA (B2) 0.356 CC (B2) 0.345
S (B1  &  B3) 0.675 AA ( B3) 0.675 RA ( B3) 0.287 CC (B3) 0.310
Total 2.350 1.000 1.000
0.524 0.831 0.931 0.966Result of aggregation
0.333
Aggregation calculations 
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The aggregation of the three experts’ judgements for Eng-RCO with respect to CS is 
presented in Table ‎7.15. 
Table ‎7.15: Aggregation of three experts’ ratings for Eng-RCO with respect to CS 
 
The aggregation of the three experts’ judgements for Equip-RCO with respect to CS is 
presented in Table ‎7.16. 
Table ‎7.16: Aggregation of three experts’ ratings for Equip-RCO with respect to CS 
 










Expert 1 (E1) 0.274 0.647 0.742 0.803
Expert 2 (E2) 0.172 0.591 0.696 0.801
Expert 3 (E3) 0.524 0.831 0.931 0.966
S (E1 & E2) 0.949 AA (E1) 0.850 RA (E1) 0.340 CC (E1) 0.321
S (E2 & E3) 0.752 AA (E2) 0.778 RA (E2) 0.311 CC (E2) 0.337
S (E1 & E3) 0.804 AA (E3) 0.876 RA (E3) 0.350 CC (E3) 0.342
Total 2.504 1.000 1.000
0.325 0.691 0.791 0.858
Consensus coefficient 




































Average agreement Relative agreement 
Expert 1 (E1) 0.164 0.447 0.543 0.638
Expert 2 (E2) 0.625 0.730 0.834
Expert 3 (E3) 0.418 0.625 0.725 0.793
S (E1 & E2) 0.819 AA (E1) 0.851 RA (E1) 0.339 CC (E1) 0.321
S (E2 & E3) 0.884 AA (E2) 0.846 RA (E2) 0.337 CC (E2) 0.350
S (E1 & E3) 0.808 AA (E3) 0.813 RA (E3) 0.324 CC (E3) 0.329
Total 2.511 1.000 1.000
0.190 0.568 0.668 0.758
Average agreement Relative agreement Consensus coefficient 
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Table ‎7.17: Aggregation of the three experts’ judgements for Regul-RCO with respect 
to CS 
 
The decision matrix, aggregation of subjective ratings for each RCO with respect to 
different criteria, is shown in Table ‎7.18. 
Table ‎7.18: Decision matrix of subjective ratings 
 
All the subjective data are converted into crisp values for each RCO, as presented in 
Table ‎7.19. 
Table ‎7.19: Crisp value of decision matrix 
 
Expert 1 (E1) 0.398 0.596 0.692 0.756
Expert 2 (E2) 0.177 0.696 0.801 0.905
Expert 3 (E3) 0.329 0.531 0.631 0.731
S (E1 & E2) 0.855 AA (E1) 0.845 RA (E1) 0.321 CC (E1) 0.312
S (E2 & E3) 0.835 AA (E2) 0.890 RA (E2) 0.338 CC (E2) 0.351
S (E1 & E3) 0.945 AA (E3) 0.900 RA (E3) 0.342 CC (E3) 0.337
Total 2.636 1.000 1.000
0.297 0.609 0.710 0.800
Average agreement Relative agreement Consensus coefficient 










































Eng-RCO ( 0.325 , 0.691 , 0.791 , 0.858 ) ( 0.133 , 0.400 , 0.500 , 0.600 ) ( 0.202 , 0.634 , 0.734 , 0.823 ) ( 0.062 , 0.456 , 0.556 , 0.657 )
Equip-RCO ( 0.190 , 0.568 , 0.668 , 0.758 ) ( 0.110 , 0.449 , 0.549 , 0.649 ) ( 0.190 , 0.568 , 0.668 , 0.758 ) ( 0.059 , 0.423 , 0.524 , 0.624 )
Regul-RCO) ( 0.297 , 0.609 , 0.710 , 0.800 ) ( 0.110 , 0.441 , 0.542 , 0.642 ) ( 0.118 , 0.646 , 0.746 , 0.846 ) ( 0.052 , 0.424 , 0.524 , 0.625 )
CS                                      
Safety (Benefit)
AS                                             
Costs  
EN                                                        
Safety (Benefit)





Regul-RCO) 0.592 0.421 0.562 0.391
0.649 0.399 0.578 0.415
0.529 0.425 0.529 0.392
CS                                      
Safety (Benefit)
AS                                             
Costs  
EN                                                        
Safety (Benefit)
RE                                              
Benefit
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7.4.8 Normalisation of the decision matrix 
The TOPSIS procedure is applied to the four criteria to obtain the best RCO and ranking 
orders. In this step, the normalisation is carried out for the decision matrix shown in 
Table ‎7.19. The normalised attributes can be obtained using Equation (‎7.6). The 
normalised decision matrix is shown in Table ‎7.20. 
Table ‎7.20: Fuzzy normalised decision matrix 
 
The weighted normalised Fuzzy decision matrix can be obtained by employing 
Equation  (‎7.21). For example, the weighted normalised CS of Eng-RCO is obtained as 
follows: 
392.0620.0633.0 ijv  
The weighted normalised Fuzzy decision matrix is shown in Table ‎7.21. 
Table  7.21: Weighted normalised decision matrix 
 
 
Obtaining the distances of an alternative from ideal and negative ideal solutions 
Determination of the positive ideal solution can be easily made by taking the largest 




Regul-RCO) 0.577 0.585 0.583 0.564
0.633 0.555 0.599 0.600
0.516 0.591 0.549 0.567
CS                                      
Safety (Benefit)
AS                                             
Costs  
EN                                                        
Safety (Benefit)





Regul-RCO) 0.358 0.057 0.115 0.049
0.392 0.054 0.118 0.052
0.320 0.057 0.108 0.049
CS                                      
Safety (Benefit)
AS                                             
Costs  
EN                                                        
Safety (Benefit)
RE                                              
Benefit
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negative ideal solution is simply the opposite formation of the positive ideal solution. 
The positive and negative ideal solutions are given in Table ‎7.22. 
Table ‎7.22: PIS and NIS 
 
The distances and closeness membership functions from each RCO to PIS and NIS are 
calculated for all the alternatives by employing Equations (‎7.25), (‎7.26), (‎7.32) and 
(‎7.33). An example highlighting the calculation process for Eng-RCO is given below 





















CS                                          
Safety (Benefit)
0.392 0.320
AS                                               
Costs  
0.054 0.057
EN                                                
Safety (Benefit)
0.118 0.108




Eng-RCO 0.000 0.073 1.000 0.068
Equip-RCO 0.003 0.000 0.997 0.000
Regul-RCO 0.892 0.039 0.529 0.037
dd

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Table  7.24: Distance and closeness values of each alternative from PIS and NIS 
 
7.4.9 Computing the RCC of each alternative from the ideal solution  
The risk control values of the four RCOs at P =1,2,3,… can be obtained by using 
Equation ( 7.34) and the result is shown in Table ‎7.25.  
Table  7.25: RCC values of the RCOs 
 
It can be seen from Table ‎7.25 that each instance of the proposed method yields 
different values for RCOs corresponding to different behavioural patterns of decision-
makers. Indeed, when P (e.g. P=1000), Eng-RCO is ranked as the best alternative 
followed by Regul-RCO and Equip-RCO respectively. Eng-RCO is characterised by the 
maximum negative membership value of 0.0684, corresponding to decision-makers who 
prefer alternatives that make not only as much profit as to the extent of practically 
possible but also as much as risk reduction possible.  
7.5 Validation  
In the first condition, sensitivity analysis is performed by investigating the values and 















P Eng-RCO Equip-RCO Regul-RCO
1 0.06842 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.06842 0.00018 0.0000
3 0.06842 0.00019 0.00083
4 0.06842 0.00019 0.02356
5 0.06842 0.00019 0.03174
… … … …
1000 0.0684 0.0002 0.0371
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are considered to be of equal importance (i.e. 250.0 REENASCS wwww ). 
Table ‎7.26 shows that the values of the RCOs are changed due to the weight changes.  
Table ‎7.26: Rating of RCOs by considering equal weights for attributes 
 
In the second condition, the weights of 1 and 0 are considered for positive attribute (CS, 
EN and RE) and negative attribute (AS) respectively. The alternatives (RCOs) with 
higher Eng-RCO values should have better ranking results. Therefore, the ranking result 
must be that Eng-RCO is ranked as the best alternative followed by Regul-RCO and 
Equip-RCO. The results in Table ‎7.27 confirm the aforementioned expectation.  
Table ‎7.27: Ranking results considering a weight of one for REL and zero for negative 
attribute 
 
In the third condition, model validation is investigated by considering six instances for 
(1, 1.5, 2.5, 4.5, 7 and 50).Table ‎7.28 demonstrates that each instance results in different 






P Eng-RCO Equip-RCO Regul-RCO
1 0.07844 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.07844 0.00135 0.0000
3 0.07844 0.00135 0.03268
4 0.07844 0.00135 0.03973
5 0.07844 0.00135 0.04134
… … … …
1000 0.0784 0.0014 0.0419
P Eng-RCO Equip-RCO Regul-RCO
1 0.11704 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.11704 0.00215 0.0000
3 0.11704 0.00218 0.04657
4 0.11704 0.00218 0.05989
5 0.11704 0.00218 0.06379
… … … …
1000 0.1170 0.0022 0.0656
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Table ‎7.28: Rating value considering different  instances 
 
RCOs’ ranking in Table ‎7.28can satisfy the expectation. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The offshore industry should greatly expand research and development efforts focused 
on improving the overall safety of offshore operation systems in the areas of design, 
testing, modelling, risk assessment, safety culture, systems integration and regulation. 
The basic principle of the TOPSIS method is that the chosen alternative should ideally 
have the farthest distance from the NIS and shortest distance from the PIS. However, 
such chosen alternative is not always closest to the ideal solution and it may not be the 
farthest from the NIS either. This chapter presents an effective Fuzzy MCDM method, 
which is suitable for solving multiple attribute group decision-making problems under a 
Fuzzy environment where the information available is subjective and imprecise. The 
proposed method enables a group of decision-makers to incorporate and aggregate 
subjective opinions. This chapter has identified a set of suggestions for how barriers can 
be modelled in risk assessment. By using the model developed and presented here, 
offshore operators can choose the best RCO based on the requirements of multiple 
criteria. Such a Fuzzy MCDM can be employed as an alternative tool for use in 







P Eng-RCO Equip-RCO Regul-RCO
1 0.06842 0.0000 0.0000
1.5 0.06842 0.00010 0.0000
2.5 0.06842 0.00019 0.00000
4.5 0.06842 0.00019 0.02863
7 0.06842 0.00019 0.03617
… … … …
50 0.0684 0.0002 0.0371
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8 CHAPTER 8: Conclusion 
Chapter summary 
This chapter briefly outlines that the risk assessment and decision-making 
methodologies and techniques offered in this research would be of support in safe 
MODU operation and management. Several powerful and efficient tools and 
techniques were employed in the development of integrative risk assessment 
analytical models for the offshore operation system application. It is concluded that 
the developed methodology can be integrated to formulate a platform to facilitate 
risk assessment of the MODU operations without jeopardising the efficiency and 
performance of system operations. The development phases for the models that had 
to be provided with data and uncertainties were handled through inference processes 
that are based on sound theorems or logic. The proposed methodologies were also 
enabled via case studies in order to demonstrate their practicality. The areas which 
require more effort to be paid in order to improve the developed approaches for 
further work are outlined; also, this chapter reviews the goals achieved in this 
research. 
8.1 Introduction 
On the basis of the reviewed different analytical concepts, a proposed framework for 
the risk-based assessment settings of this research has been developed in a generic 
sense to be effectively applicable to all offshore operation systems and their 
components/subsystems. The framework incorporates risk analysis for which data 
were obtained from industrial databases and/or by expert judgements. Where it is 
difficult to describe the basic failure events of a system using probabilistic risk 
analysis methods, subjective reasoning analysis has been deemed more appropriate to 
assess the safety of the system. FL was utilised as the modelling tool that dealt with 
the vague/subjective uncertainties in offshore operation systems. In addition, the 
information from one implemented technique, such as a risk contribution hierarchy, 
can be used to process the information produced using another technique, such as a 
FTA. Therefore, the use of well-established risk assessment analytical techniques 
(e.g., FT and BBN) and the developed risk-based analytical tools (e.g., FL) in an 
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integrated manner may make risk assessment comparatively more efficient and 
convenient, since the advantages of each method may be more efficiently explored. 
In this review of the research conducted within this thesis, it can be confirmed that 
not only has the work followed a logical sequence, but that, most importantly, the 
aims and objectives of this thesis have been successfully achieved.  
8.2 Aims and objectives of this research 
The stated aims of this research was to develop a novel QRA methodology for an 
effective and efficient risk assessment of an offshore operation system. The research 
has followed and accomplished and the set of following objectives has been 
achieved: 
 Through a review of the literature, the case for the application of the offshore 
operation system risk assessment principles is examined. This has been 
achieved by carrying out a review of the available literature as pertaining to 
cases for the application of risk assessment on the MODU’s operation system. 
 A novel engineering framework for risk assessment of the MODU is 
developed, which is also applicable to other offshore operation systems at a 
similar stage of risk assessment implementation. The framework development 
was undertaken by representing the MODU’s specific operational 
requirements and the particular stage of risk assessment within the case study 
was applied to a framework incorporating the wider stages.  
 The concept of MCDM as a decision support tools in an MCDM environment 
is examined, through a review of the literature, the most appropriate 
techniques is being used for developing the required decision support models. 
Because of the multitude of factors involved in carrying out of an offshore 
operation system risk assessment, prioritisation of which barrier schemes to 
implement is therefore the key instrument for the optimisation of the 
available resources. MCDA, as the process of analysing, choosing, ranking 
and sorting appropriate actions, is used effectively in resolving decision 
problems in an offshore operation system. In this process, it should be 
A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk                                             CHAPTER 8: Conclusion  




recognised that the decision-making involving prioritisation and optimisation 
of the available resources is based on balancing conflicting criteria using the 
practice of trading-off between them to arrive at a decision that is considered 
most advantageous or optimum. 
8.3 Research limitations 
The developed risk assessment analytical models provide useful integrative tools for 
a proactive offshore operation system world but have limitations owing to the 
complex nature of offshore installations. As with all research, there are limitations 
within issues affecting the research methodology, the analytical techniques and 
processes adopted, and the interpretation of the results, particularly when attempting 
to make generalisations based on the empirical or analytical research. The most 
significant limitations considered to affect this research are discussed here based on 
their relevance to each of the research components. 
 Eliciting conditional probabilities is more difficult, especially if the probability 
is conditioned on several states. Besides, many of the probabilities required to 
quantify a BBN cannot be derived from databases and scientific literature, 
therfore they may need to be elicited from domain experts, based on their 
knowledge and experience. 
 Lack of industrial failure data. 
 Sensitivity analysis is generally deterministic and limited to one- and two-way 
analyses. Thus, only a partial sensitivity analysis could be conducted for the 
MODU. 
  Although FL is widely used today to solve very complex problems in risk 
assessment applications in different fields including science, engineering and 
management, a major limitation of FL is that, for many applications, the 
information that describes desired system behaviour is held in data sets, and the 
designer may have to develop the rules (e.g. "IF THEN") from the data sets 
manually. This is a major task for large data sets. 
 Some limitations introduced into the research scope are generally associated 
with case studies, as discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Such limitations are 
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related to the complexity of the MODU system, and also that a single case 
provides little basis for systematic generalisation. 
These limitations did not mitigate the efficacy of the conclusions and generalisations 
of the conducted research. Nonetheless, tackling these limitations should enable the 
advancement of the integrative risk assessment modelling.  
8.4 Conclusion 
The thesis has been successful in meeting its aim of developing a novel QRA 
methodology for an effective and efficient risk assessment and management of an 
offshore operation system. It is also believed that these methods can be tailored to 
practical applications of dealing with risk assessment in other industries, especially 
in situations where a high level of uncertainty exists. The implementation of the 
defined methodologies could have highly beneficial effects in real life. 
The practicality of the developed methodology can be justified for the risk 
assessment of real-life offshore applications. Envisioning failure is key to the safe 
development and operation of systems, particularly systems that incorporate the 
complexity of an MODU. Risks must be recognised, quantified, and mitigated. 
Designers, developers, operators, and regulators must know and understand that the 
risks are real and conduct themselves accordingly. Offshore operation safety has 
evolved in a reactive manner towards a risk-based goal-setting approach recently due 
to public concern following several catastrophic disasters. Traditional risk 
assessment techniques are capable of handling risks with confidence on the principle 
that historical data are obtainable. On the other hand, such techniques may not 
genuinely reflect risk results in situations where a lack of data exists or the 
information available consists of a high level of uncertainty. Therefore, it is essential 
for a study of safe operation in an offshore operation system such as an MODU, to 
enable the addressing of higher-risk areas where data are scarce. In risk assessment, 
the issue of uncertainty management is a most important concern. However, the 
causes of uncertainty are diverse. Thus, regardless of what methodology is to be 
applied, it is always dependent upon expert judgements to manage such adverse 
effects. In other words, the deficiencies of risk modelling resulting from the lack of 
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information or a high level of uncertainty must be made up by means of the general 
evaluation capacity of experts who are able to understand the essence of the system, 
even if it is vague and unclear. For that reason, the knowledge of experts consulted is 
very important, since the basis of such uncertainty treatment is the professional 
judgements of such personnel. 
The risk assessment frameworks proposed based on Fuzzy set theory in this study are 
capable of handling imprecise, ambiguous and qualitative information from experts 
in a consistent manner. These can be observed as reliable reasoning processes 
capable of quantifying the judgements from experts who express their opinions 
qualitatively. In addition, the linguistic terms employed in assessments are developed 
by consensus. Such harmonious assessments with regard to linguistic terms provide 
compatibility throughout the risk assessment process. 
Following the identification of the research needs, this PhD study has developed 
analytical models capable of performing risk assessment with confidence under the 
said circumstances. Such frameworks have been demonstrated by three 
corresponding test cases with regard to the safe operation of an MODU. The 
frameworks have been developed in a generic sense to be applicable to deal with 
both technical and managerial problems. They provide the basis for the generation of 
the various risk analysis methods and decision-making processes. These methods and 
techniques can be summarised as follows: 
 Using an object-oriented approach to deal with the complexity of MODUs and to 
provide a hierarchical structure of risk assessment, and using a framework of 
aggregative risk assessment to represent the relationships of components, 
subsystems and the overall MODU. 
 Applying Fuzzy-AHP to evaluate and rank the risks of the HGs and their 
subsystems with regard to their capacity to the failure of the MODU. 
 Employing Fuzzy FTA to identify critical components in an MODU. 
 Employing a BBN to represent the links between unsophisticated available 
information and to foresee the occurrence likelihood of events that may have 
consequences in the operation of the MODU systems.  
 Using Fuzzy TOPSIS to select the best RCO for an MODU operation system. 
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Different mathematical theories are combined for assessing the risk frameworks in 
Chapter 4. Fuzzy set theory is used to represent the characteristics of a hazard such 
as likelihood of occurrence, consequence severity and vulnerability. AHP is used to 
rank the risks together with the hierarchical structure to obtain the weight factor to 
estimate the risk associated with each equipment/component, subsystem and the 
overall MODU. Risk analysts can use this information to compare risk levels of 
components and subsystems that contribute to the final aggregated risk. By 
considering the risk value and weight of each component/equipment and subsystem, 
the most critical subsystem can be identified. Offshore drilling failure is selected as 
the most critical HG for further investigation. The next step is to apply Fuzzy FTA to 
identify the most important MCSs of the most critical subsystem of the Drilling 
system. 
In the absence of precise data, it is necessary to work with subjective probabilities. 
Under these conditions, it is inappropriate to use conventional FTA. Therefore, 
Fuzzy FTA is proposed to capture the subjectivity. The results of Fuzzy FTA are the 
likelihood of occurrence of specific hazards and importance measures of potential 
contributing factors. Application of Fuzzy FTA in Chapter 5 shows that it is useful to 
identify critical MCSs for a specific risk ranking. 
BBNs are increasingly used to model complex domains for which knowledge and 
data are uncertain. The proposed methodology uses the BBN technique to express the 
causal relationships between variables and to combine the evidence from different 
sources for a QRA of offshore systems. The BBN is used to represent the links 
between unsophisticated available information and to foresee the occurrence 
likelihood of events that may have consequences in the operation of the MODU 
systems. The methodology presented uses a hierarchical model to describe 
dependencies among the systems or components. The reasons for choosing graphical 
BBN models are their capability of establishing relationships between hazardous 
events and capacity to show cause and effect relationships of the events by their 
directional capability. BBNs have a strong similarity to FTA in many respects. FTA 
is an effective method in probabilistic failure assessment but is limited to modelling 
simple static systems. The distinct advantages of BBNs are their capability to 
explicitly represent the dependencies among the events, their updating probabilities, 
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their flexible structure compared to FTA, and that they are suitable for a 
comprehensive range of risk assessment and analysis as well as offshore operation 
systems. Such a technique is also capable of dealing with conditional probability 
problems. 
The results of Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 can help the analyst to select 
RCOs for mitigating risk of the most critical subsystem and the overall MODU. 
However, it is not financially possible to select all the proposed RCOs. Therefore, 
MADM by using Fuzzy TOPSIS is tailored to select the best RCO from a finite 
number of RCOs. When dealing with RCO ranking/selecting, decision data available 
for MADM are usually Fuzzy, crisp, or a combination of the two. Fuzzy TOPSIS is 
proposed to handle both Fuzzy and crisp data. When evaluating RCOs (i.e. Eng-
RCO, Equip-RCO and Regul-RCO) for enhancing the safe performance of an 
MODU, there are many parameters that need to be considered. On the basis of the 
test case in Chapter 7 involving the elements of CS, AS, EN and RE, it is reasonable 
to judge that the decision-making model developed is capable of handling such 
MADM problems. The proposed method is particularly useful in circumstances 
where multiple experts are involved in a decision-making process. 
Since the case study in this study provides reasonable results, it is felt that the 
analytical models developed have the potential to improve the safe performance of 
the MODUs. Such models can be applied individually by the offshore industry, 
particularly in circumstances where a lack of data exists or the data for use are 
associated with a high level of uncertainty. More importantly, these frameworks can 
be integrated to formulate a platform to facilitate risk assessment of MODU 
operations without jeopardising the efficiency of operations in a variety of situations 
where traditional techniques may not be applied with confidence. 
8.5 Recommendations for further research 
While they go a long way to proactively ensuring offshore operation safety and 
environmental protection at the highest level, it may be beneficial if the novel 
techniques developed in this research could be further applied to facilitate risk 
assessment modelling and decision-making. Since the methodologies proposed in 
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this research are generic in nature, such frameworks can be further verified for risk 
assessment outside the offshore industry. This will provide an added value to the 
promotion of their use in different industries. Any such practical application can thus 
be examined through the exploration of a specific case study of relevance to the 
safety-critical system or component and via the use of the most reliable real-life data 
and competent expert judgements. 
When assessing risks under situations of lack of data, possibly due to the high level 
of costs associated with conducting a full-scale carrying-out of tests, the use of 
computer simulation may be hypothetically useful. It is meaningful to note that some 
computer software enables the data compilation process. 
This PhD research formulates a platform for offshore operation systems such as 
MODUs to improve the risk assessment and risk management of their processes. The 
principal implication of this is that the offshore operation system will have to collect 
data for each component with regard to safe operation based on daily operations with 
the objective of continuous improvement of safe performance and efficiency. 
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Figure A1: FT model for L3D-O1-01   
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Description of drilling equipment and systems: 
 Mechanical system - driven by electric motors  
 hoisting system - used for lifting heavy loads; consists of a mechanical winch 
(drawworks) with a large steel cable spool, a block-and-tackle pulley and a 
receiving storage reel for the cable  
 turntable - part of the drilling apparatus  
  Rotating equipment - used for rotary drilling  
 swivel - large handle that holds the weight of the drill string; allows the string 
to rotate and makes a pressure-tight seal on the hole  
 kelly - four- or six-sided pipe that transfers rotary motion to the turntable and 
drill string  
 turntable or rotary table - drives the rotating motion using power from electric 
motors  
 drill string - consists of drill pipe (connected sections of about 30 ft / 10 m) 
and drill collars (larger diameter, heavier pipe that fits around the drill pipe 
and places weight on the drill bit)  
 drill bit(s) - end of the drill that actually cuts up the rock; comes in many 
shapes and materials (tungsten carbide steel, diamond) that are specialized for 
various drilling tasks and rock formations  
 turntable - The principal component of a rotary, or rotary machine, used to 
turn the drill stem and support the drilling assembly.  
 Top Drive - A mechanical device on a drilling rig that provides rotary torque 
to the drill string to facilitate the process of drilling a borehole. 
 Circulation system - pumps drilling mud (mixture of water, clay, weighting material 
and chemicals, used to lift rock cuttings from the drill bit to the surface) under 
pressure through the kelly, rotary table, drill pipes and drill collars  
 pump - sucks mud from the mud pits and pumps it to the drilling apparatus  
 pipes and hoses - connects pump to drilling apparatus  
 mud-return line - returns mud from hole  
 shale shaker - shaker/sieve that separates rock cuttings from the mud  
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 shale slide - conveys cuttings to the reserve pit  
 reserve pit - collects rock cuttings separated from the mud  
 mud pits - where drilling mud is mixed and recycled  
 mud-mixing hopper - where new mud is mixed and then sent to the mud pits   
 Derrick - support structure that holds the drilling apparatus; tall enough to allow new 
sections of drill pipe to be added to the drilling apparatus as drilling progresses   
 Blowout preventer - high-pressure valves (located under the land rig or on the sea 
floor) that seal the high-pressure drill lines and relieve pressure when necessary to 
prevent a blowout (uncontrolled gush of gas or oil to the surface, often associated 














A Novel Engineering Framework for Risk                                                                                     Appendices  





CPT of nodes containing two states of specified events for different nodes in different levels. 
Table  A3-1: CPT in level 1 of four nodes  L1D containing two states of specified events  
 
Table  A3-2: CPT in level 4 of four nodes L4DO1011 containing two states events  
 
 
Risky 0.200 Risky 0.350 Risky 0.450 1.000 0.000
Risky 0.200 Risky 0.350 Consistant 0.550 0.450
Risky 0.200 Consistant Risky 0.450 0.650 0.350
Risky 0.200 Consistant Consistant 0.200 0.800
Consistant Risky 0.350 Risky 0.450 0.800 0.200
Consistant Risky 0.350 Consistant 0.350 0.650
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.450 0.450 0.550
Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.000 1.000
L2D-N1 L2D-O1 L2D-H1 CPT
Risky 0.249 Risky 0.168 Risky 0.325 Risky 0.259 1.000 0.000
Risky 0.249 Risky 0.168 Risky 0.325 Consistant 0.741 0.259
Risky 0.249 Risky 0.168 Consistant Risky 0.259 0.675 0.325
Risky 0.249 Risky 0.168 Consistant Consistant 0.417 0.583
Risky 0.249 Consistant Risky 0.325 Risky 0.259 0.832 0.168
Risky 0.249 Consistant Risky 0.325 Consistant 0.573 0.427
Risky 0.249 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.259 0.508 0.492
Risky 0.249 Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.249 0.751
Consistant Risky 0.168 Risky 0.325 Risky 0.259 0.751 0.249
Consistant Risky 0.168 Risky 0.325 Consistant 0.492 0.508
Consistant Risky 0.168 Consistant Risky 0.259 0.427 0.573
Consistant Risky 0.168 Consistant Consistant 0.168 0.832
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.325 Risky 0.259 0.583 0.417
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.325 Consistant 0.325 0.675
Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.259 0.259 0.741
Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.000 1.000
L5D-O1-01-1-4                                                        L5D-O1-01-1-3                                    L5D-O1-01-1-2                                                        L5D-O1-01-1-1                                       CPT
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Risky 0.190 Risky 0.170 Risky 0.230 Risky 0.200 Risky 0.210 1.000 0.000
Risky 0.190 Risky 0.170 Risky 0.230 Risky 0.200 Consistant 0.790 0.210
Risky 0.190 Risky 0.170 Risky 0.230 Consistant Risky 0.210 0.800 0.200
Risky 0.190 Risky 0.170 Risky 0.230 Consistant Consistant 0.590 0.410
Risky 0.190 Risky 0.170 Consistant Risky 0.200 Risky 0.210 0.770 0.230
Risky 0.190 Risky 0.170 Consistant Risky 0.200 Consistant 0.560 0.440
Risky 0.190 Risky 0.170 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.210 0.570 0.430
Risky 0.190 Risky 0.170 Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.360 0.640
Risky 0.190 Consistant Risky 0.230 Risky 0.200 Risky 0.210 0.830 0.170
Risky 0.190 Consistant Risky 0.230 Risky 0.200 Consistant 0.620 0.380
Risky 0.190 Consistant Risky 0.230 Consistant Risky 0.210 0.630 0.370
Risky 0.190 Consistant Risky 0.230 Consistant Consistant 0.420 0.580
Risky 0.190 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.200 Risky 0.210 0.600 0.400
Risky 0.190 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.200 Consistant 0.390 0.610
Risky 0.190 Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.210 0.400 0.600
Risky 0.190 Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.190 0.810
Consistant Risky 0.170 Risky 0.230 Risky 0.200 Risky 0.210 0.810 0.190
Consistant Risky 0.170 Risky 0.230 Risky 0.200 Consistant 0.600 0.400
Consistant Risky 0.170 Risky 0.230 Consistant Risky 0.210 0.610 0.390
Consistant Risky 0.170 Risky 0.230 Consistant Consistant 0.400 0.600
Consistant Risky 0.170 Consistant Risky 0.200 Risky 0.210 0.580 0.420
Consistant Risky 0.170 Consistant Risky 0.200 Consistant 0.370 0.630
Consistant Risky 0.170 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.210 0.380 0.620
Consistant Risky 0.170 Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.170 0.830
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.230 Risky 0.200 Risky 0.210 0.640 0.360
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.230 Risky 0.200 Consistant 0.430 0.570
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.230 Consistant Risky 0.210 0.440 0.560
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.230 Consistant Consistant 0.230 0.770
Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.200 Risky 0.210 0.410 0.590
Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.200 Consistant 0.200 0.800
Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.210 0.210 0.790
Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.000 1.000
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Risky 0.430 Risky 0.150 Risky 0.230 Risky 0.190 1.000 0.000
Risky 0.430 Risky 0.150 Risky 0.230 Consistant 0.810 0.190
Risky 0.430 Risky 0.150 Consistant Risky 0.190 0.770 0.230
Risky 0.430 Risky 0.150 Consistant Consistant 0.580 0.420
Risky 0.430 Consistant Risky 0.230 Risky 0.190 0.850 0.150
Risky 0.430 Consistant Risky 0.230 Consistant 0.660 0.340
Risky 0.430 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.190 0.620 0.380
Risky 0.430 Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.430 0.570
Consistant Risky 0.150 Risky 0.230 Risky 0.190 0.570 0.430
Consistant Risky 0.150 Risky 0.230 Consistant 0.380 0.620
Consistant Risky 0.150 Consistant Risky 0.190 0.340 0.660
Consistant Risky 0.150 Consistant Consistant 0.150 0.850
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.230 Risky 0.190 0.420 0.580
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.230 Consistant 0.230 0.770
Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.190 0.190 0.810
Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.000 1.000
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Table  A3-5: CPT in level 4 of four nodes L4DO1013 containing two states events  
 
Risky 0.102 Risky 0.183 Risky 0.250 Risky 0.330 Risky 0.136 1.000 0.000
Risky 0.102 Risky 0.183 Risky 0.250 Risky 0.330 Consistant 0.864 0.136
Risky 0.102 Risky 0.183 Risky 0.250 Consistant Risky 0.136 0.670 0.330
Risky 0.102 Risky 0.183 Risky 0.250 Consistant Consistant 0.535 0.465
Risky 0.102 Risky 0.183 Consistant Risky 0.330 Risky 0.136 0.750 0.250
Risky 0.102 Risky 0.183 Consistant Risky 0.330 Consistant 0.614 0.386
Risky 0.102 Risky 0.183 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.136 0.420 0.580
Risky 0.102 Risky 0.183 Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.285 0.715
Risky 0.102 Consistant Risky 0.250 Risky 0.330 Risky 0.136 0.817 0.183
Risky 0.102 Consistant Risky 0.250 Risky 0.330 Consistant 0.681 0.319
Risky 0.102 Consistant Risky 0.250 Consistant Risky 0.136 0.488 0.512
Risky 0.102 Consistant Risky 0.250 Consistant Consistant 0.352 0.648
Risky 0.102 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.330 Risky 0.136 0.567 0.433
Risky 0.102 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.330 Consistant 0.431 0.569
Risky 0.102 Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.136 0.237 0.763
Risky 0.102 Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.102 0.898
Consistant Risky 0.183 Risky 0.250 Risky 0.330 Risky 0.136 0.898 0.102
Consistant Risky 0.183 Risky 0.250 Risky 0.330 Consistant 0.763 0.237
Consistant Risky 0.183 Risky 0.250 Consistant Risky 0.136 0.569 0.431
Consistant Risky 0.183 Risky 0.250 Consistant Consistant 0.433 0.567
Consistant Risky 0.183 Consistant Risky 0.330 Risky 0.136 0.648 0.352
Consistant Risky 0.183 Consistant Risky 0.330 Consistant 0.512 0.488
Consistant Risky 0.183 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.136 0.319 0.681
Consistant Risky 0.183 Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.183 0.817
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.250 Risky 0.330 Risky 0.136 0.715 0.285
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.250 Risky 0.330 Consistant 0.580 0.420
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.250 Consistant Risky 0.136 0.386 0.614
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.250 Consistant Consistant 0.250 0.750
Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.330 Risky 0.136 0.465 0.535
Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.330 Consistant 0.330 0.670
Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.136 0.136 0.864
Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.000 1.000
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Table  A3-6: CPT in level 4 of four nodes L4DO1014 containing two states events  
 
Table  A3-7: CPT in level 3 of four nodes L4DO101 containing two states events  
 
Risky 0.400 Risky 0.350 Risky 0.250 1.000 0.000
Risky 0.400 Risky 0.350 Consistant 0.000 0.750 0.250
Risky 0.400 Consistant 0.000 Risky 0.250 0.650 0.350
Risky 0.400 Consistant 0.000 Consistant 0.000 0.400 0.600
Consistant 0.000 Risky 0.350 Risky 0.250 0.600 0.400
Consistant 0.000 Risky 0.350 Consistant 0.000 0.350 0.650
Consistant 0.000 Consistant 0.000 Risky 0.250 0.250 0.750
Consistant 0.000 Consistant 0.000 Consistant 0.000 0.000 1.000
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Risky 0.220 Risky 0.271 Risky 0.170 Risky 0.340 1.000 0.000
Risky 0.220 Risky 0.271 Risky 0.170 Consistant 0.660 0.340
Risky 0.220 Risky 0.271 Consistant Risky 0.340 0.830 0.170
Risky 0.220 Risky 0.271 Consistant Consistant 0.490 0.510
Risky 0.220 Consistant Risky 0.170 Risky 0.340 0.730 0.270
Risky 0.220 Consistant Risky 0.170 Consistant 0.390 0.610
Risky 0.220 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.340 0.560 0.440
Risky 0.220 Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.220 0.780
Consistant Risky 0.271 Risky 0.170 Risky 0.340 0.781 0.219
Consistant Risky 0.271 Risky 0.170 Consistant 0.441 0.559
Consistant Risky 0.271 Consistant Risky 0.340 0.611 0.389
Consistant Risky 0.271 Consistant Consistant 0.271 0.729
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.170 Risky 0.340 0.510 0.490
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.170 Consistant 0.170 0.830
Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.340 0.340 0.660
Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.000 1.000
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Risky 0.082 Risky 0.368 Risky 0.260 Risky 0.091 Risky 0.199 1.000 0.000
Risky 0.082 Risky 0.368 Risky 0.260 Risky 0.091 Consistant 0.801 0.199
Risky 0.082 Risky 0.368 Risky 0.260 Consistant Risky 0.199 0.909 0.091
Risky 0.082 Risky 0.368 Risky 0.260 Consistant Consistant 0.710 0.290
Risky 0.082 Risky 0.368 Consistant Risky 0.091 Risky 0.199 0.740 0.260
Risky 0.082 Risky 0.368 Consistant Risky 0.091 Consistant 0.541 0.459
Risky 0.082 Risky 0.368 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.199 0.649 0.351
Risky 0.082 Risky 0.368 Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.450 0.550
Risky 0.082 Consistant Risky 0.260 Risky 0.091 Risky 0.199 0.632 0.368
Risky 0.082 Consistant Risky 0.260 Risky 0.091 Consistant 0.433 0.567
Risky 0.082 Consistant Risky 0.260 Consistant Risky 0.199 0.541 0.459
Risky 0.082 Consistant Risky 0.260 Consistant Consistant 0.342 0.658
Risky 0.082 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.091 Risky 0.199 0.372 0.628
Risky 0.082 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.091 Consistant 0.173 0.827
Risky 0.082 Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.199 0.281 0.719
Risky 0.082 Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.082 0.918
Consistant Risky 0.368 Risky 0.260 Risky 0.091 Risky 0.199 0.918 0.082
Consistant Risky 0.368 Risky 0.260 Risky 0.091 Consistant 0.719 0.281
Consistant Risky 0.368 Risky 0.260 Consistant Risky 0.199 0.827 0.173
Consistant Risky 0.368 Risky 0.260 Consistant Consistant 0.628 0.372
Consistant Risky 0.368 Consistant Risky 0.091 Risky 0.199 0.658 0.342
Consistant Risky 0.368 Consistant Risky 0.091 Consistant 0.459 0.541
Consistant Risky 0.368 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.199 0.567 0.433
Consistant Risky 0.368 Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.368 0.632
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.260 Risky 0.091 Risky 0.199 0.550 0.450
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.260 Risky 0.091 Consistant 0.351 0.649
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.260 Consistant Risky 0.199 0.459 0.541
Consistant Consistant Risky 0.260 Consistant Consistant 0.260 0.740
Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.091 Risky 0.199 0.290 0.710
Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.091 Consistant 0.091 0.909
Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.199 0.199 0.801
Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.000 1.000
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Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Risky 0.150 Risky 0.132 Risky 0.140 Risky 0.080 1.000 0.000
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Risky 0.150 Risky 0.132 Risky 0.140 Consistant 0.920 0.080
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Risky 0.150 Risky 0.132 Consistant Risky 0.080 0.860 0.140
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Risky 0.150 Risky 0.132 Consistant Consistant 0.780 0.220
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Risky 0.150 Consistant Risky 0.140 Risky 0.080 0.868 0.132
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Risky 0.150 Consistant Risky 0.140 Consistant 0.788 0.212
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Risky 0.150 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.080 0.728 0.272
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Risky 0.150 Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.648 0.352
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Consistant Risky 0.132 Risky 0.140 Risky 0.080 0.850 0.150
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Consistant Risky 0.132 Risky 0.140 Consistant 0.770 0.230
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Consistant Risky 0.132 Consistant Risky 0.080 0.710 0.290
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Consistant Risky 0.132 Consistant Consistant 0.630 0.370
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.140 Risky 0.080 0.718 0.282
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.140 Consistant 0.638 0.362
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.080 0.578 0.422
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Risky 0.180 Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.498 0.502
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Risky 0.150 Risky 0.132 Risky 0.140 Risky 0.080 0.820 0.180
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Risky 0.150 Risky 0.132 Risky 0.140 Consistant 0.740 0.260
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Risky 0.150 Risky 0.132 Consistant Risky 0.080 0.680 0.320
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Risky 0.150 Risky 0.132 Consistant Consistant 0.600 0.400
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Risky 0.150 Consistant Risky 0.140 Risky 0.080 0.688 0.312
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Risky 0.150 Consistant Risky 0.140 Consistant 0.608 0.392
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Risky 0.150 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.080 0.548 0.452
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Risky 0.150 Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.468 0.532
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.132 Risky 0.140 Risky 0.080 0.670 0.330
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.132 Risky 0.140 Consistant 0.590 0.410
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.132 Consistant Risky 0.080 0.530 0.470
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Consistant Risky 0.132 Consistant Consistant 0.450 0.550
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.140 Risky 0.080 0.538 0.462
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.140 Consistant 0.458 0.542
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant Risky 0.080 0.398 0.602
Risky 0.119 Risky 0.089 Risky 0.110 Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant Consistant 0.318 0.682
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